



# LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD • WADING RIVER, N.Y. 11792

Direct Dial Number

June 8, 1983

SNRC-901

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Engineered Safety Feature System-Reset Control  
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-322

Dear Mr. Denton:

In reviewing LILCO's compliance with I&E Bulletin No. 80-06, "Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls", NRC Region I identified, in Inspection Report 83-08, certain additional equipment which changed position to normal upon reset of the initiation signal. LILCO responded to this inspection report via letter SNRC-890, (response to Appendix B) dated 5/17/83. Letter SNRC-890 and its associated "Response to Appendix B" is included as Attachment A to this letter.

It should be noted that, as stated in SNRC-890, Bulletin 80-06 requires that LILCO "review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode".

In the development of the original response to this issue (NRC Question 223.88), the term "ESF actuation signal" was utilized in a narrow context by LILCO. This context was subsequently maintained in LILCO's original responses to follow-up NRC questions 223.99 and 223.100. Follow-on discussions with the NRC Resident Inspector revealed that this complex issue needed to be further reviewed by LILCO.

In an effort to completely resolve the confusion associated with this complex issue, LILCO has conducted an additional engineering review which included the following:

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- a) ESF systems actuated by ESF actuation signals and affected by reset of these signals,
- b) ESF systems actuated by non-ESF actuation signals and affected by subsequent reset of these signals, and
- c) NON-ESF systems affected by resets of ESF actuation signals

This review identified four systems or system modes which contain equipment that would change position if the actuation signals were reset. These systems are as follows:

- 1) Steam Condensing Mode of RHR
- 2) Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) System
- 3) Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System
- 4) Automatic Depressurization System Safety/Relief Valves


A description of the equipment and the circumstances under which they change position as well as a justification for the existing system design is included in the revised responses to NRC requests 223.88, 223.99 and 223.100, the text of which is attached. Revisions are identified by a bar in the right hand margin. These revised responses (including applicable figures) will be incorporated into the next amendment to Shoreham's FSAR.

As stated in the revised response to question 223.88, a design change is currently being pursued for the Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) system which will preclude reinsertion of the TIP probes upon reset of the ESF actuation signal. Discussions with General Electric Company indicate that the generic design and engineering work and documentation needed to initiate LILCO implementation requires a 20-30 week lead time. In order not to impact other post fuel load modifications which are presently scheduled as described in letter SNRC-863, 4/14/83, this field modification has been scheduled to be completed by the last quarter of 1984.

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The information submitted herewith should be sufficient to allow the staff to complete its review and consider this issue resolved. Should you have any question, please contact this office.

Very truly yours,



J. L. Smith  
Manager, Special Projects  
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station

RWG:bc

Attachment

cc: J. Higgins  
All Parties Listed in Attachment 1

ATTACHMENT 1

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