83-888-000 RECENT

1352 NOV 15 PH 12 1.9

FEGION VINC

Burns and Roe, Inc.

601 Williams Blvd. Richland, Washington 99352 Tel (509) 943-8200

Subject:

Work Order 3900-4000 Washington Public Power Supply System WNP-2 10CFR21 Reportable Condition #82-10 Main Steam Isolation Valve-Leakage Control System Responds to: NA

> November 9, 1982 BRGO-RO-82-012 Response Required: NA

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94956

Attention: Mr. R.H. Engelken

Gentlemen:

Sin

This letter is to inform you of a condition we have deemed to be reportable under the guidelines set forth in lOCFR21.

WNP-2 design incorporates a Leakage Control System (LCS) past the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). The purpose of the system is to direct fission products, which may leak past the MSIV's, to the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). It has been discovered that a path of in-leakage may exist post-LOCA which could negate the ability of the MSIV-LCS to perform its safety function. This path exists because a valve required to isolate post-LOCA is not powered from a crital bus. This could result in off-site doses which are a substantial fraction of 10CFR100 values. Complete details are contained in the attached evaluation.

If you have any additional questions, please contact A.T. Luksic at (509) 943-8243.

Very truly yours,

WGC:ATL:lvs

Attachment

Me & Com

W.G. Conn Senior Group Supervisor

IE.

cc: B.A. Holmberg, SS w/a
J.C. Tellefson, SS w/a
R.T. Johnson, SS w/a
L.C. Floyd, SS w/a
R.M. Nelson, SS w/a
E. LeBlanc, BPC w/a



Main Steam Isolation Valve - Leakage Control System (MSIV-LCS)

(82-10)

Description of Deficiency

WNP-2 design incorporates a leakage control system past the MSIV's in order to minimize the release of fission products if the MSIV's were to seat poorly. Suction would normally be taken off the piping downstream of the outboard MSIV, and discharged into the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). It has been discovered that a valve, MS-V-146, on one of the branch pipes is not powered from a critical bus. Post-LOCA, one could not assume it would close, nor could one assume the piping past the valve, ANSI B.31.1, would remain intact.

The fans associated with each MSLC system are designed for 50 cfm flow at 20" of water. Of this flowrate, about 10% is leakage from the main steam lines, the balance is diluent air. This amount of steam does not affect the Standby Gas Treatment System Operation. However, this flowrate is too small to create a face velocity of sufficient magnitude to assure in-leakage of Turbine Building atmosphere into a 24" pipe. Thus, the fan of the outboard MSLC will not create sufficient suction pressure and line velocities to assure that backflow of fission products past this open valve to the atmosphere and hence to the site boundary does not occur.

Date and Method of Discovery

The deficiency was discovered during a Human Factors Engineering Review and documented on September 10, 1982.

Analysis of Safety Implication

As stated above, the function of the MSLC system is to prevent potential leakage of containment atmosphere through closed main steam isolation valves from reaching the site boundary without filtration after a LOCA. It is postulated that after a DBE, the non-seismic Class I steam piping will no longer be intact. An open path to the Turbine Building atmosphere will be created.

This leakage is postulated to occur at a rate of 11.5 ft³/hr per steam line due to poor seating of the MSIV's. The fission products in this leakage stream, were they to reach the site boundary withou filtration, could result in off-site doses which are a substatial fraction of 10CFR100 valves.

Corrective Action

Valve MS-V-146 will be powered from a critical bus to assure that the MSIV-LCS can perform it's intended function when required.

Applicability to Other Nuclear Projects

None. This situation is unique to WNP-2.

Ower-Please see entered ie Dat this entered ie P.7' System PART 21 REPORT LOG SHEET Lug Sheet No. 27 Main Steamfersterlege Citud Syster 1. Subject of Date Verbal Notification Received - 11/5/8 2 Received By - NT Dodds 2. 3. Date Information Placed in Daily Report - 11/8/82 Name and Address of Person Providing Verbal Notification 4. a) Name - Andrew Luprer b) Company and Address - Burro and Roe Richard, WA c) Telephone No. - 509-943-8243 Description of Problem - Andre in the required to porent excession fisimproduct release in the main ation line leakage control appen is provered to a from a monders IE tax. 5. 6. Nuclear Facilities Affected - UNPZ Only Date 5-day Written Report Due - 11/10/82 Date Received -7. Mail Written Report to HQ's and Other Affected Regions 8. a) Date Mailed to HQ's (Bill Mills) -Date Mailed to Other Regions b) Regions Mailed To -Give Written Report to Each Region V Affected Principal Inspector 9. a) Date Given to Principal Inspector(s) - b) Name(s) of Inspectors Given To -Additional Comments -10.

BURNS AND ROE, INC. WPPSS - Nuclear Project No. 2 RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

.

	Time		To be co	onfirmed	()YES
	FROM		TO		(**)NO
Name	A. I. LUKSIC	Nam	BOB DODDS	1	
Company	or Dept. BURNS \$	ROE Comp	any or Dept. NRC R	EGIONV	
SUBJECT	TISI DISCUSSED REA	PORTING OF PART	- 21 / MAIN !	STEAM	
ISOL	ATION VALVE - 1	EAKAGE CONTROL	SYSTEM	SICAL	
REMARK	s + spoke u	with Bob Dod	de and in t	2. 1	1.
that	t we have a	condition we	have desman	rmed	talle
und	ler IOCFR21	+ gave him	some brief	letaile	LOURE_
of	the problem	and advised	I him that	+ was	11
6E	sending out	ta full-repor	t by 11-10-5	12.	all
		/	Ppi	1.	
			AT hut	Ste-	
				10.20	1.00
			the second second		
				92.	
				R.	
				0101	2
				*	P
				No.	
	•				-
		No			
stribution	ERVI				
stribution: 2:File	E.R. Kummerle J.J. Var Julia	W.G. Conn G.W A.T. Lacorno D	Brastad B.A.Hod	(mborg)	E. Li Blane
stribution: 2:File	E.R. Kummerle J.J. Verderber A.N. KUGLER	W.G. Conn G.W A.J. Lagoresse B.J A.J. Lagoresse A.J	Brastad B.A.Hou I.Von Sim J.G. Tel I. L.: R.T. Tak	Imberg)	E. La Blance Site Files PACTEC