



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

August 1, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Docket No. 50-328
Tennessee Valley Authority)

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 -
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-08

The enclosed special report provides details concerning several fire barrier penetrations and fire barrier doors that have been intentionally removed from service to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage activities. The fire protection components will be inoperable for periods greater than the TS allowable timeframes. The enclosure contains details of the conditions for each component.

This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

R. H. Shell
Manager
SQN Site Licensing

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 94-08

A. SHIELD BUILDING AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

1. MARK 72 (Elevation 717) Shield Building
2. MARK 100 (Elevation 700) Shield Building
3. MARK 101 (Elevation 698.5) Shield Building
4. MARK 1850 (Elevation 710.0) Additional Equipment Building
5. MARK 1851 (Elevation 710.0) Additional Equipment Building
6. MARK A15-706-5012 (Elevation 710.0) Additional Equipment Building
7. MARK 108 (Elevation 688) Shield Building

Description of Condition

With Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 refueling outage (RFO), the shield building and additional equipment building penetrations noted above were breached to support the Unit 2 Cycle 6 (U2C6) RFO activities. These penetrations will be breached in excess of the technical specification (TS) allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The penetrations were breached to support the steam generator (S/G) maintenance activities. The S/G maintenance activities include sludge lancing, inspection of internals, eddy current testing, tube plugging, and other S/G related work.

The penetrations will remain breached for the duration of the U2C6 RFO.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetrations were verified operable; the roving fire watch will be maintained until the breaches are removed and the fire barriers are reestablished at the end of the U2C6 RFO.

B. SECONDARY ALARM STATION PENETRATION MARK CB6990003C9000

Description of Condition

With Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 RFO, the secondary alarm system (SAS) penetration was breached in association with the security upgrade project that is being worked during the U2C6 RFO. The penetration in the control building wall going into the secondary alarm station will be breached to support the security upgrade activities. The penetration will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The cables going into the SAS will be removed and replaced. The cables for the security door alarms must be removed and replaced with the appropriate new cables in support of the security upgrade project.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable; the roving fire watch will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished.

C. REACTOR BUILDING PENETRATION MK. 109

Description of Condition

With Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 RFO, the penetration noted above was breached to support the U2C6 RFO activities. The penetration will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The penetration was breached in order to route temporary hoses from an auxiliary chiller to the lower compartment coolers. The coils in the four lower compartment coolers are being replaced during this outage.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the penetration were verified operable; the roving fire watch will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished.

D. UNIT 2 UPPER (ELEVATION 734) AND LOWER (ELEVATION 690) CONTAINMENT AIRLOCKS

Description of Condition

On July 7, 1994, the upper containment airlock (2-Door-088-X-2B) on Elevation 734.0 and the lower containment airlock (2-Door-088-X-2A) on Elevation 690.0 were breached open in support of the U2C6 RFO. The airlocks will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period of seven days. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The upper and lower airlocks were breached to facilitate the movement of equipment, material, and personnel traffic into Unit 2 containment. The airlocks will remain breached for the duration of the U2C6 RFO except during the core alteration sequence (fuel movement) when the airlocks will be temporarily closed.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of each of the airlocks were verified operable; the roving fire watch will be maintained until the breach is removed and the air locks are reestablished before entering Mode 4.

E. FIRE BARRIER DOOR A-75

Description of Condition

On July 6, 1994, with Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 RFO, the fire barrier door noted above was breached to support the U2C6 RFO activities. The fire barrier will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The fire barrier door is in the auxiliary building on Elevation 690.0, serving entrance to the Unit 2 pipe chase. The fire door was breached open to facilitate the movement of equipment and personnel in support of the U2C6 RFO activities.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of the fire barrier were verified operable; the roving fire watch will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire barrier is reestablished.

F. FIRE BARRIER DOORS A-44 AND A-46

Description of Condition

On July 6, 1994, with Unit 2 shut down for the Cycle 6 RFO, the fire barrier doors noted above were breached to support the U2C6 RFO activities. Fire Barrier Doors A-44 and A-46 are in the auxiliary building on Elevation 669.0, serving entrance to the Unit 2 penetration room and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) room, respectively. The fire barriers will be breached in excess of the TS allowable time period. This condition is being reported in accordance with TS Action Statement 3.7.12(a).

Cause of Condition

The fire doors were breached open to route temporary hoses into the rooms to perform the Section XI tests required for the suction and discharge piping on the TDAFWP. The duration of the tests exceeds the TS allowable time period.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), a roving fire watch was established after the fire detectors on one side of each of the fire barriers were verified operable; the roving fire watch will be maintained until the breaches are removed and the fire barriers are reestablished.