

MEMORANDUM FOR: Case File 182-60

THRU: R. M. Gallo, Chief, RPS 1A, DPRP

RWG 7/16/82

FROM: A. C. Cerne, SRI, Seabrook

SUBJECT: QC INSPECTOR CONCERNS

Previous memos to Case File 182-60 discuss a Pullman-Higgins (P-H) QC inspector's concerns regarding perceived harassment of QC within the P-H organization. On June 15, 1982, the SRI agreed to generally discuss the allegations with licensee personnel at a meeting specifically called by the licensee for that purpose. At the conclusion of the SRI's comments, the SRI exited the meeting while it was still in progress. The YAEC Corporate QA Manager serving as spokesman for the licensee indicated that all claims would be fully investigated. Attached as enclosure 1 is the results of the licensee's investigation.

Enclosures 2 & 3 document recent changes in the P-H organization. Prior to this, the P-H Resident Construction Manager (Mr. F. Calder) was relieved on June 16, 1982 and replaced with Mr. J. Corcoran.

The SRI specifically asked if any of these organizational changes were directly related to the allegations and was informed by senior licensee personnel that they were not. It should be noted that one of the persons relieved and no longer at Seabrook was Mr. L. Puzo (former construction superintendent) who was mentioned in the June 17 memo to Case File 182-60 under the spelling - "Piozo".

Robert M. Gallo
Antone C. Cerne
Senior Resident Inspector
Seabrook

Enclosures: As stated

July 1, 1982

To: _____
 From: Investigation Team _____
 Subject: INVESTIGATION OF PULLMAN-HIGGINS TO ADDRESS NRC AREAS OF CONCERN

On June 15, 1982, a meeting was held at Seabrook Station at the request of G.F. McDonald to address concerns discussed during an NRC Exit with the Seabrook Site Resident NRC Inspector, Mr. A. Cerne.

The general concern addressed by Mr. Cerne centered around allegations that pressures of construction were subjugating quality assurance activities within the Piping Contractor Organization (Pullman-Higgins) at Seabrook Station. Some specific examples given by Mr. Cerne as contributing factors resulting in the overall concern were:

1. Relocation of QC Inspection personnel due to construction pressures.
2. Bypassing of hold points on process sheets by construction personnel.
3. Unauthorized weld repairs being made.

In addition to Mr. Cerne of the NRC, the following personnel were present representing YAEC, UE&C, P-H QA & Construction, and PSNH Construction:

YAEC

G.F. McDonald, Manager Construction Quality Assurance
 J.W. Singleton, Manager Construction Field Quality Assurance Group
 P.A. Oikle, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer
 J.F. Nay Jr., Field Quality Assurance Engineer
 T.M. Sherry, Director Construction Seabrook Project
 R.P. Pizzuti, Manager Construction Seabrook Station

UE&C

R.A. Rebel, Resident Construction Manager
 D.C. Lambert, Field Quality Assurance Supervisor
 R.C. Lesnefsky, Supervisor QAE Seabrook Project

PSNH

J.H. Herrin, Site Construction Manager

P-H

A.A. Eck, Director of Quality Assurance
 D.R. Geske, Training Engineer
 R.G. Davis, Site Quality Assurance Manager
 F.M.C. Calder, Resident Construction Manager
 J.J. Corcoran, Assistant Resident Construction Manager

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... Mr. McDonald committed to performing an investigation into the validity of the allegations and also assigned Pullman-Higgins with the responsibility to concurrently perform their own independent investigation into the matter.

The investigation team assigned by Mr. McDonald was comprised of the following individuals:

- P.A. Oikle, YAEC, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer (Team Leader)
- R.R. Cliche, PSNH, Staff Engineer
- D.C. Lambert, UE&C, Field Quality Assurance Supervisor
- R.C. Lesniewsky, UE&C Philadelphia, Supervisor Quality Assurance Engineer
- T. Frolo, UE&C, Welding Engineer

A. Summary

The investigation in which the team expended 175 manhours resulted in 17 Pullman-Higgins Construction and Quality Assurance personnel and one Authorized Nuclear Inspector being interviewed. A list of core questions was developed with which to conduct the investigation. The questioning however, was not limited to this core list.

The investigation resulted in the following consensus being reached by the team:

1. The overall concern that construction pressures were subjugating quality assurance activities of the piping contractor (Pullman-Higgins) was without foundation.
2. With respect to the more specific concerns the investigation also found them to be without substance.
 - a. It was determined that some QC personnel's perception of what constituted normal construction pressures to meet an established schedule versus construction pressure that might influence the performance of their Q.C. Inspection activities or their ability to exercise their judgement could have been a contributing factor in the concern. This perception appeared to be more prevalent with individuals whose previous experience was associated with other than commercial nuclear construction sites. In no instance did any of the QA/QC or Construction personnel interviewed indicate that they had requested or had been requested that discussions compromising or influencing quality were made.
 - b. Regarding the concern of relocation of QC Inspection personnel due to construction influence, the team determined that Pullman-Higgins management was solely expressing its prerogative to reassign personnel as deemed necessary. In a recent incident involving reassignment of a P-H QC Inspector from the Containment to an equally schedule critical area (Main Steam & Feedwater),

... at was performed by both QA and Construction personnel. It was noted that the main concern was that the personnel involved had developed relationships with Construction personnel. After assessing the situation Pullman-Higgins management personnel felt that in the interest of resolving the conflict, it would be more appropriate to reassign the QC individual.

- c. In investigating into the concern that process sheet hold points were intentionally being bypassed by Construction personnel the team found no evidence to back up this concern. A review of the NCR's written against the bypassed hold points and interviews held with several Construction and QA/QC personnel revealed that if a common denominator existed at all it was on specialty welds where the process sheets were often more complex than the standard production versions, thus the craft may not have been totally familiar with established hold points. As a reflection of Pullman-Higgins policy toward missed hold points, it was conveyed to the Team by P-H Construction management that it was their policy to issue warning slips to craft personnel for missing hold points on process sheets. Better indoctrination and training of personnel involved with such specialty welds and the use of process sheets would reduce the occurrence of this problem.
 - d. The concern expressed relative to unauthorized weld repairs being performed on piping welds could not be substantiated. It was conveyed to the team however, that in one instance an apparent base metal repair (grinding gouge) on a support was being performed which resulted in an NCR being generated. From the information available it was an isolated incident and is not condoned practice on this project.
3. As stated above, expressed concerns of the NRC were not substantiated. During the course of the investigation however, the possible reason for certain personnel perceiving that pressures of construction might be influencing quality assurance became evident. Instances were conveyed to the team where on occasion various levels of construction supervision ranging from foreman to construction management would communicate directly with QC Inspection personnel generally in the presence of QA/QC Supervision expressing displeasure in the individuals timeliness of performing assigned inspections and sometimes their performance in areas subject to interpretation. This problem appeared most prevalent in the Containment and Main Steam and Feedwater areas which are critical path zones and which often had a back-log of inspections to be performed by the QC Inspectors. It was the general consensus of the QC personnel interviewed that it would be beneficial to have "area supervisors" covering areas of schedule

original activity to assist in answering questions or following-up on problems that might arise. Although the inspectors do be more productive. Although it was ascertained the QC personnel were interfaced with directly by construction supervision to perhaps work faster, at no time was there any evidence that these interfaces compromised the quality of their work or their ability to exercise judgement in discharging their responsibilities.


B. Recommendations:


Based on the results of the investigations, it is the recommendation of the Team that Pullman-Higgins conduct an indoctrination and training program for all Management and Supervisory personnel in which the duties and functional responsibilities of all managerial and supervisory positions in the Construction, Engineering and Quality Assurance Departments are clearly delineated.


Communication directly with QC personnel by Construction should continue. In the interest of preventing further misperceptions, proper channels of communication must be followed when Construction Supervision wishes to voice concerns relative to QC activities. Strong consideration should be given to the establishment "area supervisors that would provide guidance to QC inspections when questions or problems arise and fill in performing inspections during peak periods.


Pullman-Higgins has been requested to commit to a date by when the recommended indoctrination and training sessions will be completed.

Submitted Respectfully,


Philip A. Cikle, YAEC, (Team Leader)
Senior Quality Assurance Engineer


R.R. Cliche, PSNH, Staff Engineer


R.C. Lesnifsky, UE&C Supervising
Quality Assurance Engineer


D.C. Lambert, UE&C Field Quality
Assurance Supervisor


T. Frolo, UE&C Welding Engineer

DATE July 2, 1982

TO All P-H Department Heads


FROM J. J. Corcoran

SUBJECT

Effective Tuesday, July 6, 1982, the following organizational changes will become effective:

James Butler - Construction Superintendent
Daniel Evans - Unit #1 Superintendent
James Chesnut - WPB Craft Supervisor
Robert Bent - Unit #2 Craft Supervisor
Michael Kuntz - Unit #1 Containment Engineer
Craig Fuller - Assistant Field Engineer (to be assigned)
Dave Coberth - From P&S to Purchasing
Lois DeYoung - Field Engineer III in charge of all
field drawings
Robert Sturtevant - Assistant Engineer

Your cooperation and assistance during the transition period will be appreciated. We extend our best wishes to all the above personnel.



J. J. Corcoran
Resident Construction Manager

JJC:jmp

cc: R. Rebel
J. Mayne
A. Marrs
Field Superintendents
Field Engineers

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DATE July 2, 1982
TO All Department Heads
FROM J. J. Corcoran
SUBJECT

Effective Tuesday, July 6, 1982, the following personnel changes will become effective:

Chris Scannell - Assistant Resident Manager
Al Nance - Chief Field Engineer
Dan Witt - Mechanical Superintendent

Your continued support and cooperation will be appreciated. We wish these gentlemen continued success in their new positions.


J. J. Corcoran
Resident Construction Manager

JJC:jmp
cc: R. Rebel
J. Mayne
A. Marris
C. Scannell
A. Nance
D. Witt

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