

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/5/0/2/8/3/ (8) /0/5/2/5/8/3/ (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On May 2, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 6, the Containment Particulate (RM-259) and /
/0/3/ / Gaseous (RM-260) Activity Monitors were found isolated with the Containment Purge/
/0/4/ / and Exhaust System in operation. This rendered partially inoperable the automa- /
/0/5/ / tic isolation of the Purge and Exhaust System on a Hi-Hi Radiation Alarm contrary/
/0/6/ / to the LCO's of T.S. 3.3.3.1 and 3.9.9 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b./
/0/7/ / Since the Manipulator Crane Area Monitor was available to provide isolation of /
/0/8/ / the Purge Exhaust System, the health and safety of the public were not affected. /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /B/B/ (11) /A/ (12) /B/ (13) /I/N/S/T/R/U/ (14) /X/ (15) /Z/ (16)
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
REPORT NO. TYPE NO.

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/X/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /N/ (25) /W/1/2/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The manual isolation valve on the sample line inlet to the affected Activity /
/1/1/ / Monitors was inadvertently left closed following Type C testing of the sample /
/1/2/ / line Containment Isolation Trip Valves which was performed May 1, 1983. The /
/1/3/ / manual valve was opened and the Activity Monitors were returned to service. /
/1/4/ / /

FACILITY METHOD OF
STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

/1/5/ /H/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / /A/ (31) / OPERATOR OBSERVATION /
ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /
PERSONNEL INJURIES
NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION

/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /
PUBLICITY
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /
NAME OF PREPARER E. Wayne Harrell PHONE (703) 894-5151
8306070276 830525
PDR ADDCK 05000339
S PDR
IE22 1/1

### Description of Event

On May 2, 1983, with Unit 2 in Mode 6, the Containment Particulate Activity Detector (RM-259) and the Containment Gaseous Activity Detector (RM-260) were found isolated with the Containment Purge and Exhaust System in operation. This rendered the automatic isolation feature of the Purge and Exhaust Isolation System on a Hi-Hi Radiation Alarm on either RM-259 or RM-260 inoperable. This is contrary to the LCO's of T.S. 3.3.3.1 and 3.9.9 and is reportable pursuant T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

### Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The operability of the Radiation Monitoring Channels ensure that the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded. The operability of the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels in the containment. With both RM-259 and RM-260 inoperable, Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation would still have occurred on a Hi-Hi alarm on the Manipulator Crane Area Monitor (RM-262). In addition, the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Vent Particulate and Gaseous Activity Detectors, (RM-VG-112 and 113 respectively), were continuously monitoring Containment Purge and Exhaust air as a portion of the total release through the Auxiliary Building Vent Stack B. A review of recorded data from RM-262, RM-VG-112 and 113, as well as from a grab sample taken at 2132 on May 1, indicated no significant increases in activity levels while RM-259 and 260 were isolated. Consequently, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

### Cause of Event

RM-259 and 260 were isolated via manual isolation valves on May 1, in order to perform Type C testing on the sample line containment isolation trip valves. While attempting to place the detectors back in service following Type C testing, the Low Flow alarm for RM-259 would not clear. A subsequent investigation revealed that the manual isolation valve on the sample line inlet to the detectors was closed.

### Immediate Corrective Action

The valve was immediately opened and RM-259 and 260 were returned to service.

### Scheduled Corrective Action

No further action is required.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

Appropriate administrative action was taken.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.

# Vepco

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION  
P. O. BOX 402  
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117

83 MAY 31 AM 11:20  
USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

May 25, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. N-83-064  
NO/JRR: nih  
Docket No. 50-339  
License No. NPF-7


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following License Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit No. 2.

Report No.	Applicable Technical Specifications
LER 83-037/03L-0	T.S. 6.9.1.9.b

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,

  
E. Wayne Harrell  
for Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Document Control Desk (1 copy)  
016 Phillips Bldg.  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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