(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | V A S P S 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | | (5)

LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 (7) | 0 4 2 7 8 3 (8) | 0 5 1 9 8 3 (9)

DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With Unit 1 at CSD, the performance of PT-18.5 and PT-18.6 revealed that the

0 3 degraded voltage time delay for H & J emergency buses was greater than specified

0 4 in T.S. This is contrary to T.S. table 3.7-4 and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2).

0 5 The degraded voltage protection circuit would have function in the time frame

0 6 specified in the safety analysis. Therefore, the health and safety of the public

0 7 were not affected.

0 8

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
E E (11)	B (12)	A (13)	R E L A Y X (14)	H (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 3	—	0 2 1	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	A 1 0 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause was a combination of expected component drift and not considering other

1 1 delays in the circuit to arrive at the T.S. setting. The time delays were reset.

1 2 An evaluation will be performed to determine the appropriate setpoint.

1 3

1 4

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5 G (28)	0 0 0 (29)	N/A	B (31)	Periodic Testing

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6 Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7 0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8 0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9 Z (42)	N/A

8306070220 830519
PDR ADOCK 05000280
S PDR

PUBLICITY

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0 N (44)	N/A	

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE: (804) 357-3184

IE22 1/1

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 83-021/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 04-27-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: EMERGENCY BUS SEPARATION and DIESEL START TIME DELAY SETPOINT TOLERANCE EXCEEDED

1. Description of the Event

With the Unit at Cold Shutdown, performance of Periodic Test 18.15 and 18.16, degraded Protection Function "H" Train and Degraded Protection Function "J" Train, respectively, revealed that the time delay for the emergency bus separation and diesel start for a degraded voltage condition during CLS or SI condition exceeded that specified in Technical Specification Table 3.7-4. This is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The time delay specified for the emergency bus separation and diesel start is 7 $\pm$ .35 seconds. P.T. 18.15 and 18.16 indicated time delays of 7.366 and 7.505 seconds respectively. Since the bus separation and diesel start would have occurred an insignificant amount of time later than specified, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. Cause

The tolerance stated in the T.S. was based on the time delay relays' repeatability accuracy of $\pm$ 5%. Therefore, the time delay specification is given as 7 $\pm$ .35 seconds. During the installation of the circuitry, the time delay relays were set to 7 seconds and consideration was not given to the time required for the other components in the logic circuit to actuate. Thus with the addition of the tolerance of the time delay relay and the addition of the time required for actuation of the remaining logic circuit, the total time for the function exceeded that specified.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The time delay relays were reset to achieve the time delay specified for the function.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

None.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

There is indication that the time specified in the T.S., i.e. 7 $\pm$ .35 seconds, should be for the relay only and does not include actuation time for the other contacts in the logic circuit. An investigation will continue to determine what the correct time should be and if a Tech. Spec. change will be required.

7. Generic Implications

This could have implications for unit 2.

Vepco

MAY 19 1983

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

Serial No: 83-038

Docket No: 50-280

License No: DPR-32

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

Report Number	Applicable Technical Specification
83-021/03L-0	T. S. 6.6.2.b(2)

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

J. L. Wilson
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk, USNRC
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Washington, D. C. 20555