

DUKE POWER COMPANY

P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

October 1, 1982


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Catawba Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached Significant Deficiency Report
SD 413-414/82-18.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

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Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. P. K. Van Doorn
NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Attorney-at-Law
314 Pall Mall
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Palmetto Alliance
2135½ Devine Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29205

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION
SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY

REPORT NUMBER: SD 413-414/82-18

REPORT DATE: October 1, 1982

FACILITY: Catawba Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2

IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCY:

Radiographic examinations not performed on flux core welding filler material ordered to SFA 5.20.

INITIAL REPORT:

On September 3, 1982, Mr. W. O. Henry and Mr. L. M. Coggins notified Mr. A. J. Ignatonis, USNRC Region II, of the subject deficiency.

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY:

Welding filler material manufactured by Teledyne McKay, York, Pennsylvania, was not radiographed as required by ASME Section II, Part C, SFA 5.20. The material is E70T-1 flux core wire with heat numbers 299T3959 and 299T4019. The total amount received was 20,023 pounds. The material was used in welding the containment dome plates, and additionally, was used on the lower pressurizer supports and two pipe welds.

The root cause of this deficiency is a misinterpretation of the material specification by the manufacturer which was not detected during the records review. Specifically, the manufacturer read paragraph 4.1 of SFA 5.20 to mean that tests required by the material specification were not required unless the purchaser specifically requested the tests on the purchase order. Discussions with other manufacturers led to the conclusion that required tests were always required. Teledyne McKay indicated that their interpretation was applied to all orders handled by them. This concern may have industry wide implications for material supplied by Teledyne McKay.

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS:

A review of field radiographs showed that the filler material in question had successfully passed radiographic examinations in the field as part of the code required examinations. Therefore, the filler material has been demonstrated to produce radiographic quality welds sufficient to meet the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NE. We conclude that no safety hazard exists.

A review of records at McGuire Nuclear Station and Oconee Nuclear Station revealed that one additional heat of flux core welding material had been received at McGuire. This material had received the required radiographic

examination.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Corrective action taken to date is to receive verbal committment from Teledyne McKay that all Duke Power purchase orders for this material will receive radiography.

Corrective action to be taken will be as follows:

- a) Receive written confirmation of the verbal committment to radiograph this type material.
- b) Require all Duke Power purchase orders for filler material include the following statement:

"All tests required by the material specification and ASME Section III shall be performed and the results submitted to Duke Power Company."

This corrective action will be complete by March 1, 1983.