

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E +

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JAMES D. SHIFFER
MANAGER

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

May 13, 1983

Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 83-003/03L-0
Inoperable Radwaste Monitor

Dear Mr. Martin:

Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.13.b of the Technical Specifications, Appendix A to the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Operating License, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted concerning an Inoperable Liquid Radwaste Discharge Line Radiation Monitor (RE-18).

This event has in no way affected public health and safety.

Sincerely,



JDS:vk

Enclosure

cc w/enc: Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Service List

IE-22
83-107

ATTACHMENT to LER 83-003/03L-0
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Docket No. 50-275

Details of Cause, Corrective Actions,
and Actions to Prevent Recurrence

Circumstances and Investigation:

On April 15, 1983, an Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Technician was sent to investigate the inoperable monitor (RE-18) problem. Upon arrival at the detector, he noted that the source check mechanism was installed and appeared to be intact. When he removed the solenoid operating mechanism, he discovered that the source had apparently been removed. The I&C Technician notified his foreman who in turn notified the Chemistry and Radiation Protection (C&RP) Foreman of the missing source.

The C&RP Foreman initiated the following investigation.

- 1) The source inventory log was checked and the source was logged as installed.
- 2) The detector was surveyed to see if the source had fallen off inside the shield. The detector was also visually inspected with negative results.
- 3) The area around the detector was surveyed to determine if the source had fallen to the floor, with negative results.
- 4) A survey was performed in the General Construction I&C work areas and in the Division I&C work areas. The source was not found.
- 5) The liquid radioactive waste discharge permits were reviewed and it was noted that the last source check on channel 1-RE-18 was at 14:55 on April 8, 1983. A review of Clearance Requests and Special Work Permits (SWP) was performed to determine if any work had been performed on 1-RE-18 since the time of the last source check. None was found.

Description of Source Material:

Nuclide : Cs-137, check source serial No. 66
Form : Solid, encapsulated in a 0.25-inch button
Quantity: Approximately 7.5 microcuries (9 microcuries as determined on June 9, 1975; Note: Exempt quantity, per 10CFR30.18(a).

Disposition of Material:

The source is presumed stolen for unknown reasons or purposes. It is also presumed that this source is no longer within the restricted area.

Radiation Exposures to Individuals, Circumstances, and Extent of Possible Hazard to Persons in Unrestricted Areas:

There are no known exposures to individuals. It does not appear that this source represents a substantial hazard to persons in unrestricted areas. Dose rates for this source strength indicated the following (survey No. 82-206, performed on November 10, 1982):

Gamma - 1.0 mR/hr at approximately one-inch from source

Beta - 2.3 mRads/hr at approximately one-inch from source

Actions Taken to Recover:

- 1) Inspection of 1-RE-18 to verify source did not fall off inside detector.
- 2) Radiation survey of areas around 1-RE-18 to verify source did not fall on ground beside the detector.
- 3) Radiation surveys of work areas in Division and General Construction I&C departments.
- 4) A radioactive source inventory was performed to verify that no other sources were missing and to check all normal source storage locations for possible misplacement of 1-RE-18 source.
- 5) A review of clearance requests and SWPs to determine if the radiation monitor had been worked on since April 8, 1983.

Procedures or Measures to Prevent Recurrence:

Increased surveillance by performing more frequent channel source checks will be instituted during periods of high construction activity, when substantial numbers of workers are present.