NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	V A S P S 1 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)		
	LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	CAT		
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 (7)	0 1 2 2 8 2 (8)	0 2 1 9 8 2 (9)		
		DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE		

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the unit operating at 100% power, a loss of boric acid flow to the blender
0 3 was observed while trying to blend to the VCT. This event occurred twice on
0 4 January 22nd, 1982, and again on January 25th, 1982. This is contrary to T.S.3.2.C.4
0 5 and is reportable as per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). Since during accident conditions, the
0 6 BAST is isolated with boric acid being supplied by the RWST, the health and safety of
0 7 the public were not affected.
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S H (11)	X (12)	Z (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 2	—	0 0 3	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation has determined this event to have been caused by inadequate insulation
1 1 on FT-1113 and the adjacent piping. The blockages were removed or freed and
1 2 additional insulation has been added to prevent recurrence. Appropriate personnel
1 3 will be informed of the need for insulation and the care of insulation on boric
1 4 acid piping systems.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	N/A	A (31)	Operational Event.

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	N/A

8203080464 820219
PDR ADOCK 05000280
S PDR

PUBLICITY: N/A

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 82-003/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 01-22-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: FLOW TRANSMITTER 1113 PLUGGED

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With Unit 1 operating at 100% power, a loss of boric acid flow to the blender was observed while trying to blend to the VCT. This event occurred twice on January 22nd, 1982, and again on January 25th, 1982. This loss of a flow path from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST) to the charging pumps is contrary to T.S.3.2.C.4 and is reportable as per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

Rapid response to the flow blockage limited the loss of flow to a period of 3 hours and 12 minutes, 30 minutes, and 3 minutes respectively. Since during accident conditions, the BAST is isolated with Boric Acid being supplied from the RWST, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

This event has been determined to have been caused by the lack of adequate insulation on FT-1113 and the adjacent piping. This inadequeate insulation nullified the effect of heat tracing in the area by allowing the rapid dissipation of heat. This loss of heat allowed the growth of boric acid crystals producing a slush which served to block flow at the inlet of FT-1113.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediate corrective action consisted of freeing or removing the boric acid plug and verifying boric acid flow to the blender.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Additional insulation has been added to reduce heat losses to ambient.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The need for insulation and the care of insulation will be emphasized to personnel that work on or around boric acid systems.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

A sufficient amount of insulation and heat tracing are essential on boric acid lines that are allowed to become stagnant event for a short period of time.