Unit 2.

EIGENSEE EVENT REPORT
CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] [] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 T N S N P 2 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 57 CAT 50
CON'T  O 1 SOURCE L 6 0 5 10 10 10 3 2 8 7 0 4 1 9 8 3 8 0 5 1 8 8 3 9
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  [0   2   With unit 2 in mode 1 (98% Rx power) at 1030 CST on 04/19/83, one automatic control.
valve (2-LCV-3-156) in the auxiliary feedwater system was declared inoperable due to
[0]4   failing to open on demand. The unit complied with action statement (a) of LCO
3.7.1.2. There was no effect upon public health and safety. Previous occurrences -
o 6 Chree (SQRO-50-327/82036, SQRO-50-328/82038, 83042).
07
O B L
SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBC
17 REPORT   8   3   10   11   12   13   18   19   20   20   18   19   20   20   20   20   20   20   20   2
ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS (22) ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURES (23) 37 40 41 (23) [N 24] [L 25] [M 1 1 2 0] (COMPONENT MANUFACTURES (27)
Investigation revealed that the metering orifice in the pneumatic relay was the
incorrect size as supplied by the manufacturer. After consulting with the
manufacturer, the correct parts were obtained and installed. Procedures are being
revised to ensure that a check is made of the metering orifice size prior to
114   installation.
STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  NA B (31) Surveillance test
ACTIVITY CONTENT  RELEASED OF RELEASE  AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)  NA  LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  NA
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 30 NA
PERSONNEL INJURIES  NUMBER DESCRIPTION (1)  NA  NA
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)  TYPE DESCRIPTION  PDR ADOCK 05000328  S PDR
PUBLICITY SSUED DESCRIPTION 45  NAC USE ONLY  NAC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10
Name of Preparer: H. R. Rogers /M. R. Harding Phone: (615) 870-6422

#### LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-328/83060

Technical Specification Involved: 3.7.1.2

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.13.b

Date of Occurrence: 04/19/83 Time of Occurrence: 1030 CDT

### Identification and Description of Occurrence:

During the performance of SI-276 at 1030 CDT on 04/19/83, auxiliary feedwater automatic valve 2-LCV-3-156 failed to fully open on demand from the control board. The valve was declared inoperable and the unit complied with action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.1.2.

### Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 2 in mode 1 at 98% Rx power.

### Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The failure of the valve to fully open was caused by an incorrectly sized metering orifice in the pneumatic relay for the valve positioner.

### Analysis of Occurrence:

Upon investigation, it was found that the pneumatic relay assembly on the valve positioner was leaking air through the relay to the valve actuator, preventing the valve from fully opening. The supply air pressure was set at 60 psig. A new pneumatic relay was installed, but the supply air pressure had to be reduced to 56 psig to make the valve operate properly. The manufacturer stated that a minimum of 48 psig was required to adequately operate the valve at system flow and pressures.

After further discussions with the manufacturer, it was discovered that the wrong metering orifice subassemblies were installed in the relays. Both the old and new relays were rated at 35 psig supply instead of 60 psig. This allowed the higher pressure to leak through the relay.

A safety evaluation was performed by EN DESusing input from the valve manufacturer. It was concluded that the valves were operable even though the incorrectly sized metering orifice was installed since the valve stroked properly at a slightly reduced supply pressure (4 psig).

An inspection was made on both units of auxiliary feedwater valves and found one other valve with an incorrectly sized metering orifice. Operation of this valve, 1-LCV-3-164, on unit 1 was verified.

#### Corrective Action:

At 0815 CDT on 04/20/83, valve 2-LCV-3-156 was returned to service using a new relay with a 35 psig rated metering orifice and a slightly reduced supply pressure of 56 psig. On 04/22/83, after receiving new correctly sized metering orifices, valves 2-LCV-3-156 and 1-LCV-3-164 were repaired. Pneumatic relays rated at

60 psig were installed and the supply pressure returned to its normal 60 psig setting.

To prevent further recurrence, a tag will be placed on the positioner to indicate that a 60 psig metering orifice should be used if replacement is necessary. Also, a statement will be incorporated in the surveillance instruction to verify the proper metering orifice on replacement parts.

## Failure Data:

None.

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 18, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT SQR0-50-328/83060

The enclosed report provides details concerning the inoperability of an auxiliary feedwater automatic control valve. This report is submitted in accordance with Sequoyah unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.b.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

H. J. Green

Director of Nuclear Power

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Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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