

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY  
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY  
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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March 1, 1983

Docket No. 50-336  
B10712

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Attn: Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #3  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2  
Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) hereby proposes to amend its Operating License, No. DPR-65, for Millstone Unit No. 2 by incorporating the changes identified in Attachment 1 into the plant Technical Specifications.

The proposed change to action statement 3.4.6.2.b extends the time period by which the plant must be in a COLD SHUTDOWN following the determination that the unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage exceeded the 1.0 gpm limit.

Currently the plant is operating with a calculated total RCS leakage rate of approximately 1.7 gpm. Subtracting currently identified RCS leakage the unidentified leakage rate has been determined to be approximately 1.3 gpm. NNECO is currently aware of several valve packing leaks within the containment which, if quantified, would account for an additional portion of the unidentified leakage. The plant is presently operating in accordance with Action Statement 3.4.6.2.b which requires that the unidentified leakage be reduced to within the limits of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.b within 4 hours or the plant placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.

It is undesirable to proceed to a COLD SHUTDOWN at this time due to the uncertainty of what repairs are needed. RCS leakage is more likely to manifest itself at the HOT STANDBY condition. The potential for identifying and quantifying the unknown leakage and assessing possible repairs would be decreased by immediately proceeding to COLD SHUTDOWN. NNECO's ability to compare unidentified leakage data obtained during the past several weeks with data to be obtained during the HOT STANDBY inspection will be significantly enhanced as compared to data obtained during a COLD SHUTDOWN.

*Foot  
w/check  
\$4,000*

It is NNECO's intention to comply with the Action Statement, place the Plant in HOT STANDBY, and enter containment in an attempt to quantify that portion of the unidentified RCS leakage which is currently not being measured. The location of a valve, which from past inspections is known to be leaking, necessitates the assembly of staging within containment in order to determine the magnitude of leakage. This effort by itself would consume a majority of the time allotted in the present Technical Specifications for achieving COLD SHUTDOWN and thus it would be difficult to assure that repair of this valve is addressing the source of leakage. Proper identification of the leakage source will minimize the thermal cycling of the RCS.

As such, NNECO is proposing a one time extension to the Action Statement to permit an additional 24 hours to identify, quantify, and/or reduce the leakage from the RCS. A walkdown of the RCS will also be performed to ensure no pressure boundary leakage exists. In the event pressure boundary leakage is detected Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.6.2.a would immediately be invoked and the plant brought to COLD SHUTDOWN.

It is noted that the current leakage from the RCS is within the make up capabilities of the Millstone Unit No. 2 charging pumps.

NNECO has reviewed the attached proposed changes pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and has determined that it does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The basis for this determination is that the proposed change does not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the plant safety analysis report. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report is not created and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

The Millstone Unit No. 2 Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and approved this change and has concurred in the above determination.

NNECO has reviewed the attached change pursuant to 10 CFR 170 and has determined that the change constitutes a Class III License Amendment. The basis for this determination is that the proposed License Amendment involves a single safety issue and does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Therefore attached is the appropriate Class III License Amendment fee of four thousand dollars (\$4,000.00).

