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MEMORANDUM FOR FILES

COCKET NUMBER

James K. Joosten, Technical Assistant FROM: to Commissioner Gilinsky

SUBJECT: VISIT TO SAN ONOFRE 3

# IN'L RODUCTION

On Menday, February 14, 1983, Commissioner Gilinsky and I arrived onsite and met with Resident Inspectors: Bob Pate (Senior Resident), Lew Miller (Unit 1 Resident), and Al Chaffee (Unit 2 Resident). We discussed their views on auxiliary feedwater reliability, the need for PORV's, and the loss of power to the feedwater controls incident on November 9th. The residents commented that both the shift staffing and the security system at the site had improved since the Commissioner's last visit.

Additionally, we reviewed a chain of 28 repeated violations of the Tech. Specs. requiring a minimum water level in the Condensate Storage Tank, T121. This tank is the sole safety grade water supply to the suction of all three auxilliary feedwater pumps. Another item discussed was a proposed enforcement action item.

# PLANT TOUR

Following the briefing, the Resident Inspectors, escorted Commissioner Gilinsky, myself, Mr. R. Dietch, Vice President - Nuclear Operations & Engineering, (SCE), and Mr. H. Morgan, Station Operations Manager (SCE), through the following areas of the plant:

- Security system 1.
- Unit 2 and 3 Turbine Buildings 2.
- Unit 3 Diesel Generator Building 3.
- Aux. Feedpump Room and Condensate Storage Tank Bldg. 4.

The licensee noted that modifications were in progress to give them an automatic makeup capability to the storage

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tank. All three auxiliary feedpumps were located side by side in the same room with the steam driven pump between the electric pumps. A recent bearing failure on one AFW pump was discussed. The babbitt bearings that were replaced in both electrical pumps lack environmental qualification for a local steamline break. The licensee, however, indicated that they believed sufficient margin exists in the bearing design. A study is underway to demonstrate this.

5. Safety Pump Rooms

All safety pumps were located 15 feet below sea level. To protect against flooding, the safety pump rooms are equipped with watertight doors.

6. Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve and MSIV area

- 7. Tendon Tunnel
- 8. Containment

The containment was found to be very clean and well maintained.

Because of our interest in whether the plant should have PORV's I examined the length of pipe -- about 4 to 5 feet long -- between the pressurizer and the safety valve.

The licensee indicated that San Onofre had experienced a number of reactor coolant pump seal failures in recent months and was currently investigating the specific cause.

- 8. Component Cooling Tank Rooms
- 9. NaOH Injection Room

San Onofre uses a pumped injection system for pH control of the containment spray water. Mr. Chaffee pointed out that the station has had problems with the highly corrosive nature of the fluid acting on components in the system.

10. Technical Support Center

The Technical Support Center was still under construction, however all required emergency equipment appeared to be available. The center provided a nice overview of the control room. The licensee felt that the operators were fully aware of the chain of command during both normal and accident situations. An operating procedure was produced which illustrated the line management structure and defined personnel responsibilities. An operator in the control room confirmed that his understanding of the line management was in agreement with the procedures.

# 11. The Control Room

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The control room was very small. However, the presence of system drawings, color coding, and mimic boards clearly indicated that human factors had been considered in the design.

#### MANAGEMENT MEETING

Following lunch with the inspectors, a meeting was held with the utility management. The following items were discussed:

# a. The status of San Onofre's startup program. (Mr. Nunn)

Two items were identified which are expected to have adverse effects on the startup schedule: (1) gap tolerance resizing on the reactor upper vertical supports and (2) CRDM gripper monitor engagement card troubleshooting. The latter item has resulted in dropped rods during rod exercising.

#### b. The shift staffing status. (Mr. Morgan)

The licensee indicated that they had made substantial improvements in their operator salaries, shift differential pay, and license bonuses. Operator overtime had been cut down.

#### c. The security system. (Mr. Elle)

The security access had improved. Many vital barrier doors had been combined into larger areas to speed access. Additional pass keys were assigned, the locks on a number of doors were modified, and they issued emergency access cards to select people to allow rapid access during an accident.

# d. Emergency preparedness. (Mr. Ray)

During a quickly escalating release such as a waste gas tank rupture, the watch engineer has the responsibility of assessing off-site doses and determining appropriate action levels until the TSC is manned. Of concern was that the watch engineer was not capable of accomplishing this without the help of a health physicist. While an HP is generally onsite at all times, the licensee stated that they knew of no requirements that would mandate the HP's presence. Additionally, once the TSC and EOF were manned, there appeared to be some vagueness as to whose off-site dose calculation would be used for evaluating shelter recommendations. A "quick estimate" procedure for the watch engineer might be useful.

# e. The Nov. 9, 1982 RCS Cooldown Incident. (Mr. Phelps)

The event, consequences, and conclusions were discussed. It was not clear whether or not the cooldown rate exceeded the value used in their FSAR. The thermal cycle usage factor for the event was unknown by the licensee.

# f. <u>Auxiliary Feedwater Integrity and PORV Study</u>. (Mr. Nandy)

The features of San Onofre's AFW system were discussed along with the two AFW vent line failures. The history and direction of the CEOG PORV study was also discussed. Of concern to us was the fact that the study seems to focus almost exclusively around depressurization capability (PORV's vs Aux. Spray) to the neglect of key issues such as diversity in decay heat removal, and low temperature overpressure protection.

#### EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER TOUR

The facility doubles as a training facility and it appeared to be well equipped for both uses.