

MAR 01 1983

DISTRIBUTION
Docket
NRC PDR
L PDR
NSIC
ORB#1 Rdg
DEisenhut
OELD
JMTaylor
ELJordan
ACRS-10
CParrish
PTam
Gray
RGoel

Docket No. 50-334

Mr. J. J. Carey, Vice President
Duquesne Light Company
Nuclear Division
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Dear Mr. Carey:

SUBJECT: CORRECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR IN THE APPENDIX R SER,
DATED JANUARY 5, 1983

Enclosed please find revised pages for our January 5, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report on Fire Protection. The errors were inadvertently introduced during our transfer of technical information.

The revision does not affect the conclusion we made in the subject SER.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED

Peter S. Tam, Project Manager
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

8303080523 830301
PDR ADOCK 05000334
F PDR

OFFICE	ORB#1:DL	ORB#1:DL					
SURNAME	PTam/dm	SVarga					
DATE	02/28/83	MAY 1983					

Mr. J. J. Carey
Duquesne Light Company

cc: Mr. W. S. Lacey
Station Superintendent
Duquesne Light Company
Beaver Valley Power Station
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Charles A. Thomas, Esquire
Thomas and Thomas
212 Locust Avenue
Box 999
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108

Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
Jay E. Silberg, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Karin Carter, Esquire
Special Assistant Attorney General
Bureau of Administrative Enforcement
5th Floor, Executive House
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Marvin Fein
Utility Counsel
City of Pittsburgh
313 City-County Building
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Mr. John A. Levin
Public Utility Commission
P.O. Box 3265
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Irwin A. Popowsky, Esquire
Office of Consumer Advocate
1425 Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Mr. K. Grada, Superintendent
of Licensing and Compliance
Duquesne Light Company
Nuclear Division
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Post Office Box 298
Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Ronald C. Haynes
Regional Administrator - Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

The licensee has provided safe shutdown analyses for the fire events and has demonstrated adequate redundancy in the proposed design of the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station Unit 1. The proposed modifications resolve previous SER open items on alternate shutdown. Our analysis and evaluation of this follows.

SYSTEMS USED FOR POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN

A. Systems Required for Safe Shutdown

Safe shutdown of the reactor is initially performed by rod insertion from the control room. Insertion can also be accomplished by removing power to the rod drive in the motor-generator set area.

Reactor coolant inventory and subsequent reactivity control are maintained by two of the three high pressure charging pumps which discharge borated water through the boron injection tank, taking suction from the refueling water storage tank.

Reactor coolant pressure can be maintained by one set of pressurizer heaters and one of three charging pumps. Overpressure protection is provided by safety/relief valves and code safeties on the pressurizer venting via pressurizer relief tank to the containment.

Due to the close proximity of the three existing auxiliary feedwater pumps in the pipe tunnel area (PT-1), the licensee has committed to install a new 100-percent capacity auxiliary feedwater pump located in a separate fire area in the turbine building. This new pump will tie into the existing feedwater headers.

Also due to close proximity of motor-operated valves on the river water supply to the diesel generators, in the CO₂ storage/PG pump room (CO₂), the licensee committed to relocate one of the motor-operated valves to a separate fire area to eliminate the possibility of coincident loss of cooling water to both diesel generators in the event of a fire.

The licensee has proposed to use portable, gasoline-powered fans as a means of providing essential ventilation in three areas in the event of fire damage to the normal HVAC equipment. These three areas are the primary auxiliary building area (PA-1A) the emergency switchgear rooms (ES-1 and ES-2) and the control room A/C room (CR-2).