UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-335/82-43

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company

Facility Name: St. Lucie 1

Docket No. 50-335

License No. DPR-67

Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida

Inspector: G. N. Huffman — 2/1/83 Date Signed

Approved by: G. R. Jenkins, Section Chief — 2/2/83 Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Operational Support

SUMMARY

Inspection on November 22-24, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved six inspector-hours on site in the area of emergency preparedness with respect to the Technical Support Center.

Results

Of the area inspected, one deficiency was identified related to inoperability of the Technical Support Center.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

   Licensee Employees

   *J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
   *H. E. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
   *R. E. Cox, Chemistry Department
   *J. J. Walls, Quality Control
   *P. G. Bailey, Emergency Planning Coordinator

   NRC Resident Inspector

   *S. A. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
   *H. E. Bibb, Resident Inspector

   *Attended exit interview

2. Management Interviews

   The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 24, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. Plant personnel acknowledged the findings.

   The NRC concerns with this deficiency were discussed in an enforcement conference on December 17, 1982, between Mr. L. W. Williams, Vice President, Nuclear Energy, Mr. R. D. Martin, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II and staff. FP&L personnel explained the corrective actions being taken to strengthen management controls and assure that the TSC is maintained at an appropriate level for response to emergencies while under construction.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

   Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

   Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Technical Support Center (TSC)

   At 9:45 a.m. on November 24, 1982, the TSC was inspected at the request of the resident inspectors. The inspector found the TSC to be under construction modifications in a manner which precluded its use as designed.

The TSC consists of two large rooms. The Unit 1 Control Room is on one side and four small offices are along the other. The walls had been removed between three of the smaller offices to make space for the Safety Assessment System (SAS) computer body (FP&L's equivalent of the NRC SPDS system). The last small room is designated for use by the NRC emergency response staff during emergencies and was intact with all equipment.

The false floor and drop ceilings had been removed from both TSC rooms to facilitate installation of cable trays and wiring in the ceilings for the SAS computer. The main room of the TSC was more than 60% occupied by scaffolding. The second room was about 30% occupied by scaffolding. All of the original furniture was gone from both rooms and most of the floor space was occupied by piles of scrap and construction materials. All remaining open spaces were littered with construction debris making the TSC generally unusable.

In the main room, the mini-computers which provided for meteorological and plant status data had been disconnected and removed. The vital power was disconnected. The status boards were blocked by scaffolding and inaccessible due to the scrap piles and debris. The radio for communications with the field monitoring teams had been disconnected and removed. In addition, no interim emergency plan implementation procedures had been established for using redundant equipment in the Unit 1 Control Room.

Four telephones were sitting on a box and scrap pile in the center of the main room; two telephones with five extensions each and two direct outside line telephones. One of each was not working. Originally, there were plug-ins which provided two extensions for each button on the telephones plus a kick panel for adding two more phones as needed. All of the plug-ins in the main room appeared to have been removed. The licensee later discovered that more telephones were operable than originally determined. However, it was also learned that some lines had accidentally been damaged by the construction effort causing those lines to be out of service.

The second room in the TSC was less impacted by the construction, but it is also less important to the function of the TSC. This room serves as an engineering support area and all the required records, procedures and drawings were protected inside locked cabinets. Plug-ins were available for four telephones and they tested as operating.

In a meeting at 11:00 a.m., the inspector informed the licensee that the TSC could not be considered functional within a reasonable time frame when considered against the 30-minute criteria for staff augmentation in NUREG 0654. It was agreed that the TSC could not be maintained 100% operational while undergoing modifications and the licensee agreed to commence immediate corrective actions to restore the facility to the extent reasonable.

At 3:45 p.m., the licensee requested that the inspector re-inspect the TSC. All construction materials, scrap and debris had been removed from both TSC rooms and the adjacent SAS computer area. Vital power was restored for the lights, the radio and the dose assessment computer during the inspection. Most of the telephones were operating and accessible and the licensee had committed to completing repairs by 6:00 p.m. The licensee also committed to completing re-installation of the radio before midnight and establishing the Shift Technical Advisor on each shift as responsible for overseeing construction in the TSC to assure no recurrence of the problem.

During the second inspection, a licensee representative stated that the corrective actions to that point had required three hours. It was later stated that all actions committed to were completed by 6:30 p.m. on November 24, 1982. Completion of these actions was confirmed by the resident inspector on November 26, 1982.

Discussions with the resident inspectors and licensee representatives revealed the following facts on actions prior to November 24. FP&L emergency planning personnel stated that they briefed the Backfit Construction management on the need to maintain the TSC in operable condition during construction about two months prior to commencement of construction. Construction began about November 8, 1982. The Resident Inspector did not notice any unusual construction activity in the TSC while performing a routine walkthrough on Tuesday, November 16. FP&Ls Emergency Planning Coordinator (EPC) was the first to note a problem late in the day on Thursday, November 18, and discussed it with the Health Physics Supervisor (HP) on Friday morning, November 19. The EPC attempted to find an alternate facility and the HP Supervisor talked to the Backfit Construction manager that same day. On Monday, November 22, the Health Physics Supervisor wrote a letter to the Backfit Construction manager to be signed by the Plant Manager. Also on November 22, a representative from NRR HQ visited the area and expressed his concern for the conditions with respect to the emergency preparedness functions of the TSC. His concerns were brought to the attention of the Senior Resident Inspector and Resident Inspector in a SALP meeting at FP&L's corporate office in Miami on Tuesday, November 23, 1982. The plant manager signed the letter to Backfit Construction on that same day (Ltr. Bk. #1754). That letter served as the basis for the corrective actions taken on Wednesday, November 24.