

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

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O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

83 FEB 25 10:34  
February 22, 1983

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
Thirty Day Written Report  
LER 83-006, Revision 1

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #83-006, Revision 1, for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.5.1, "Hydrogen Monitors," on January 13, 1983.

Revision 1 to this LER corrects administrative errors discovered by the Licensee. Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD:dwf/fjc  
Attachment

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#### DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On January 13, 1983, with the Plant in Mode 1, a Common Failure alarm was received on Post Accident Hydrogen Analyzer "A". The unit was declared inoperable because of a possible heater failure in the sample compartment. The containment hydrogen monitors are required to be operable while in Modes 1 and 2 in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.5.1.

#### PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

No adverse consequences resulted from this event. Hydrogen Analyzer "B" remained operable during the period of time covered by this event. The satisfactory results obtained from previously performed monthly operational tests provides assurance that Hydrogen Analyzer "A" was operational up until the documented failure on January 13, 1983.

#### CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE

The cause of Hydrogen Analyzer "A" failure was due to heat damaged wiring in the sample compartment. A temporary cover previously installed on the sample compartment was inadequately insulated. The thermostat for the compartment heaters did not detect the high temperatures present in some areas of the compartment because of the excessive heat loss through the temporary cover.

#### IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

The hydrogen analyzer detector cell was found to be inoperable because of heat related damage to the component wiring and detector cell. A temporary cover previously installed on the heated sample compartment did not provide adequate insulation. The thermostat for the heaters failed to detect the high temperatures present in some areas of the compartment because of the excessive heat loss in the vicinity of the thermostat. The damaged wiring and detector cell were replaced, and Hydrogen Analyzer "A" was returned to operable status on January 18, 1983, upon the completion of a satisfactory operational test with the appropriate surveillance test procedure.

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IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN (Cont'd)

On February 4, 1983, Hydrogen Analyzer "A" was again removed from service in order to install a new cover and wiring (rated for 275°F environment). The components were replaced, and Hydrogen Analyzer "A" was returned to operable status on February 5, 1983, upon the completion of a satisfactory operational test with the appropriate surveillance test procedure.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The Licensee plans no further action in regards to this event other than performance of the normal surveillance requirements.