TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY

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R. J. GARY
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
AND GENERAL MANAGER

Mr. G. L. Madsen, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76012 February 15, 1983

TXX-3623

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Docket Nos.: 50-445
50-446

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION BORG-WARNER CHECK VALVE MALFUNCTION QA FILE: CP-83-01; SDAR 101 FILE NO. 10110

Dear Mr. Madsen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e), we are submitting the enclosed report of actions taken to correct a deficiency regarding a Borg-Warner check valve malfunction. We had previously informed your Mr. Tom Westerman of the deficiency on January 20, 1983.

Supporting documentation is available at the CPSES site for your Inspector's review.

Bulg Rolement

RJG:eaq

Enclosure

cc: NRC Region IV - (0 + 1 copy)

Director, Inspection and Enforcement - (15 copies) c/o Distribution Services Branch, DDC, ADM.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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BORG-WARNER CHECK VALVE MALFUNCTION

DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCY

During disassembly of the containment spray heat exchanger, disengaged parts of the upstream check valves were discovered. The condition was reported per a site nonconformance report.

The valve disc is connected to the operating arm by a stud welded to the disc. The disengaged parts resulted from a broken tack weld securing the stud. Further inspection of two (2) similar valves indicated typical faulted tack welds. A third valve was observed to have the stud securely fastened by a fillet weld. The supplier (Borg-Warner) has advised fillet welds are currently standard design.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

Failure of the check valves could result in reduced supply to the containment spray nozzles which would restrict operator ability to limit containment pressure and temperature in a LOCA event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Per the recommendation of the supplier, all valves supplied prior to the design change requiring fillet welds will be disassembled, inspected, and repaired. In addition, valves supplied after the implementation of the design change will be inspected. Similar corrective actions will be implemented as required.

All corrective actions will be completed by June 1, 1983.