

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY  
HARTFORD WATER POWER COMPANY  
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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April 5, 1991

Docket No. 50-245  
B13760

Re: I&E Bulletin No. 80-06  
NUREG/CR-5288

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1  
Engineered Safety Feature Reset Controls

By letter dated June 13, 1980, (1) Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), on behalf of Millstone Unit No. 1, submitted information in response to I&E Bulletin No. 80-06, "Engineered Safety Feature [ESF] Reset Controls." The purpose of this letter is to provide the Staff with updated information on this issue.

Background

In the June 13, 1980, submittal it was noted that for Millstone Unit No. 1, four valves were determined to be in noncompliance with the acceptance criteria of I&E Bulletin No. 80-06. These valves were identified as follows:

- 1-IC-1 Reactor Vessel to Isolation Condenser (IC)
- 1-IC-2 Reactor Vessel to IC
- 1-IC-3 IC to Reactor Vessel
- 1-IC-4 IC to Reactor Vessel

Circuitry modifications to the above valves, which would fulfill the provisions of I&E Bulletin No. 80-06, were to be completed by January 1, 1981.

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(1) W. G. Council letter to B. H. Grier, "I&E Bulletin No. 80-06 - Engineered Safety Features Reset Control," dated June 13, 1980.

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### Discussion

During development of the Design Basis Reconstruction Program module for the Reactor Protection System (Containment Isolation System and Anticipated Transient Without Scram System), it was discovered that the following valves require circuitry modifications to bring them into compliance with the provisions of I&E Bulletin No. 80-06. Under various conditions these valves may not remain in their emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal.

<u>Valve Identification Number</u>	<u>Equipment Description</u>
1-IC-6	Vent to Main Steam Line
1-IC-7	Vent to Main Steam Line
1-RR-36	Inboard Recirculation Loop Sample Valve
1-RR-37	Outboard Recirculation Loop Sample Valve
1-CU-2A	Reactor Outlet Bypass Isolation Valve

NNECO performed an evaluation regarding the above-mentioned valves and has determined that the current logic configuration is safe and does not jeopardize the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactivity, nor mitigate the consequences of an accident. Nevertheless, NNECO will be performing the appropriate circuitry modifications necessary to ensure these valves remain in their emergency mode upon reset of an ESF per the provisions of I&E Bulletin No. 80-06. These modifications are scheduled for completion during the Cycle 13 refueling outage which is currently scheduled to begin on April 6, 1991.

During the evaluation of these five valves, it was discovered that, although the circuitry modifications for Valves 1-IC-1 through 4 have been completed, Valve 1-IC-3 does not fully meet the provisions of I&E Bulletin No. 80-06 for the following reasons:

I&E Bulletin No. 80-06 states, "If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modification, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem."

It appears that the modification to Valve 1-IC-3 completed in 1980 only addressed a Group IV Isolation Signal and did not encompass the IC Initiation Signal. This is apparent because the current control logic for 1-IC-3 is to reposition following the reset of the IC Initiation Signal. NNECO has completed a review of the control logic for 1-IC-3 and has determined that the above configuration is safe and does not pose a significant risk to public health and safety. However, NNECO currently plans to perform the modifications necessary to bring Valve 1-IC-3 into full compliance with I&E Bulletin No. 80-06. Specifically, circuitry modifications which will prevent

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1-IC-3 from repositioning following the reset of the IC Initiation Signal are also scheduled to be completed during the Cycle 13 refueling outage.


As part of the Design Basis Reconstruction Program, NNECO reviewed all other valves encompassed under the scope of I&E Bulletin No. 80-06 and has determined that all valves meet the acceptance criteria with the exception of those valves identified above. As outlined in NUREG/CR-5288, "Closeout of IE Bulletin 80-06: Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls," Millstone Unit No. 1 has an open status on this issue.

Upon completion of the modifications to Valves 1-IC-3, 1-IC-6, 1-IC-7, 1-RR-36, 1-RR-37, and 1-CU-2A, Millstone Unit No. 1 will be in full compliance with the acceptance criteria outlined in I&E Bulletin No. 80-06. After completion of the modifications during the 1991 refueling outage, NNECO will notify the Staff and propose closeout of I&E Bulletin No. 80-06 for Millstone Unit No. 1. If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

FOR: E. J. Mroczka  
Senior Vice President

BY:   
E. A. DeBarba  
Vice President

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator  
D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit Nos. 1 and 3  
W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3