

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/1/1/2/8/3/ (8) /0/1/3/1/8/3/ (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On January 12, 1983, with Unit 2 at 100% power, the Train "A" Reactor Trip Break- /
/0/3/ / er (RTB) was bypassed for more than the allowed two hours during Solid State /
/0/4/ / Protection System (SSPS) surveillance testing. Since all of Train "B" automatic /
/0/5/ / and Train "A" and "B" manual reactor trips remained operable throughout the event /
/0/6/ / the public health and safety were not affected. This event is contrary to /
/0/7/ / T.S. 3.3.1.1 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /
/0/8/ /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /I/A/ (11) /X/ (12) /Z/ (13) /I/N/S/T/R/U/ (14) /Y/ (15) /Z/ (16)
(17) I.E.R./RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
NUMBER /8/3/ /-/ /0/0/9/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANI METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/A/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /N/ (25) /W/1/2/0/
(26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The "A" RTB was out of service for longer than two hours because it was necessary /
/1/1/ / to replace a Universal Logic Card that was apparently damaged while adjusting a /
/1/2/ / time delay relay for the safety injection reset function. The card was replaced /
/1/3/ / and the SSPS surveillance test was restarted and satisfactorily completed. The /
/1/4/ / "A" RTB was restored to service 3 hours after its removal from service. /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

/1/5/ /E/ (28) /1/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /B/ (31) /During Surveillance Testing/

ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION

/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA / 8302140095 830131 PDR ADOCK 05000339 S PDR

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA / NRC USE ONLY / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company  
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-339  
Report No. LER 83-009/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

#### Description of Event

On January 12, 1983, with the Unit 2 at 100% power, the Train "A" Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) was bypassed for longer than the allowed two hours during Solid State Protection System Surveillance Testing.

#### Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The Train B automatic and the manual Reactor Trips for Train "A" and "B" remained available during this event. Therefore, the public health and safety were not affected.

#### Cause of Event

The "A" RTB was bypassed for Solid State Protection System Surveillance testing. The testing was then stopped so the safety injection reset time delay relay could be reset toward the center of its acceptable range. The relay was removed from service, the timer reset, the relay tested and returned to service. However, when the surveillance test was restarted the safety injection reset would not function. Trouble shooting procedures eventually led the technicians to a damaged universal card fed directly from the time delay relay. The card had apparently been damaged while removing the relay from service. After the card was replaced the surveillance test was restarted and satisfactorily completed. However, by this time the two hour time limit for having a RTB out of service was exceeded by one hour.

#### Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate action taken was to repair the damaged Universal Card and to complete the Solid State Protection System surveillance test. Subsequent to testing the "A" RTB was returned to service three hours after its removal from service.

#### Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective action is required.

#### Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required.

#### Generic Impl ications

There are no generic implications to this event.