NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 09-14-81

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	V A S P S 2 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)	
	LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	CAT	

CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 (7)	0 8 1 5 8 1 (8)	0 1 3 1 8 3 (9)
		DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

With the unit at full power, during the performance of Periodic Test 25.1, MOV-SW-202A (service water to the flash evaporator, vacuum priming and condensate polishing building) failed to close due to a grounded motor. This is contrary to T.S.-3.4.A.5 and reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). Since manual isolation of the flow path remained available and the intake canal level was more than 7 feet greater than the minimum required level of 18 feet, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	S B (11)	E (12)	A (13)	V A L V E X (14)	B (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
	8 1	—	0 5 2	/	0 3	X	— 1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	P 3 4 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

The grounding of MOV-SW-202A's motor was due to flooding in its sump. The pump motor was replaced and the valve cycled to verify operability.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	N/A	B (31)	Performing Periodic Test

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	N/A

8302140069 830131
PDR ADOCK 05000281
S PDR

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	N/A	

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE (804) 357-3184

UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 09-14-81

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 81-052/03X-1
EVENT DATE: 08-15-81

TITLE OF THE EVENT: MOV-SW-202A FAILED TO CLOSE

1. Description of the Event

With the unit at full power, during the performance of Periodic Test 25.1, MOV-SW-202A (Service Water to the Flash Evaporator, Vacuum Priming and the Condensate Polishing Building) failed to close due to a grounded motor.

The valve would not have closed automatically if required. This is contrary to T.S.3.4.A.5 and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

Following a DBA, water in the intake canal would be used to cool the recirculation spray heat exchangers. The service water valves to vacuum priming, condensate polishing and flash evaporator are designed to close automatically on a CLS Hi-Hi signal in coincidence with a station blackout to conserve water in the intake canal for the recirculation spray heat exchangers. During the time of valve inoperability, the intake canal level was more than 7 feet greater than the minimum required level of 18 feet. In addition, manual isolation of the flow path remained available. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

The motor operator for MOV-SW-202A was grounded due to flooding in the sump. Water from an equipment leak in the turbine building had collected in the valve pit, and was found to be in contact with the motor operator.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The sump was drained, the motor operator was replaced and the valve cycled to verify operability. The valve responded properly.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

None required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Dikes have been constructed around some valve pits to minimize water entering the valve pits. An engineering study was performed to determine the cause of false alarms in the control room by flood control relays. It was determined that the 12 Megohm resistors in the relays should be replaced with 22K Ohm resistors to make the relays less sensitive to moisture, thereby minimizing spurious alarms.

The 12 Megohm resistors were replaced with 22K Ohm resistors. This provided more accurate information to plant personnel for more effective response to accumulation of water in the valve pits.

7. Generic Implications

None.