



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 139 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-46

NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-298

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 1, 1988, Nebraska Public Power District (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise the TS to (1) delete the 1000 pound pressure permissive from the Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure Scram Trip Setting, (2) revise the replacement criteria for the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System explosive valves, (3) correct an editorial error in the identification numbers and configuration descriptions of the Drywell Floor Drain Isolation Valves and the configuration description of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste Isolation valves in Table 3.7.1, and (4) deletes the calibration requirements for reactor low water level and under-voltage intermediate relays.

2.0 DISCUSSION

Each of the proposed changes is discussed below:

(1) Pressure Requirement for MSIV Closure Scram Trip Setting: This proposed change modifies the TS by deleting a specification that was made superfluous by the relief valve Low-Low Set modification that was previously approved by the NRC staff in Amendment No. 83 to the Cooper Nuclear Station Operating License, issued by letter dated May 4, 1983. In that amendment, the staff approved the removal of the 1000 psig pressure permissive interlock from the MSIV closure scram trip setting and the use of these pressure switches in the Low-Low Set logic. Although the Low-Low Set logic was modified pursuant to the approval given in Amendment No. 83, the licensee inadvertently failed to request the removal of the TS reference to the 1000 psig permissive at that time.

The proposed change does not involve any change to hardware or operating procedures. The staff reviewed the modification that eliminated this interlock from the MSIV Closure Scram Trip Setting during the review associated with Amendment No. 83 and found the change to be acceptable. This proposed change is editorial in nature and only serves to make the TS reflect the design of the plant as it was modified in accordance with Amendment No. 83. This change is acceptable to the staff.

(2) Testing Requirements for Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System Explosive Valves: This proposed change revises a statement in the surveillance requirements associated with the SLC explosive valves. The existing criteria requires

that the replacement charges installed be selected from the same manufactured batch as the tested charge while the revision allows replacement charges from batches which have been shown to be acceptable by previously conducted test firings. The proposed change is intended to reduce the number of required test firings associated with the replacement of charges. The frequency of testing the firing circuit and overall SLC system is unaffected by the proposed change. The current requirement is not deemed to improve the system reliability and is more restrictive than the specification used at other BWRs.

Based upon his review, the staff agrees that the change does not reduce the reliability of the SLC system and is therefore acceptable.

(3) Editorial Changes Regarding the Identification and Configuration of Isolation Valves: The licensee has requested a correction to the location listed in TS Table 3.7.1 "Primary Containment Isolation Valves" for the Drywell Floor Drain and Equipment Drain Isolation Valves and the RHR Discharge to Radwaste Isolation Valves. The Table incorrectly lists these valve pairs as being located one inside of containment and one outside containment, while they are actually both located outside of the containment. An additional change that corrects a typographical error by changing the designation of Valve "RW-AC-83" to "RW-AO-83" is also requested.

These changes correct editorial and typographic errors that exist in the TS. No changes are being made to the location or method of operation of any components at the facility. These changes do not affect the safety of the facility and are acceptable to the staff.

(4) Auxiliary Relay Calibration: This change would delete the calibration requirement for low reactor water level relays 10A - K79 A & B and 10A - K80 A & B, and undervoltage relays 27X1 - 1F & 1G, 27X2 - 1F & 1G, and 27X3 - 1A & 1B in Table 4.2.B. These relays are "on" or "off" type relays that have no variable output. This type of relay cannot be calibrated, instead they are functionally tested in accordance with the existing TS, for the Reactor Low Water Level Relays and the Undervoltage Relays.

These changes correct a technical discrepancy that exists in the TS. No changes are being made to the location or method of operation of any components at the facility. The components will continue to be functionally tested and therefore the changes are deemed acceptable to the staff.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Nebraska State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comment.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The NRR staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (53 FR 4833). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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