

APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Entergy Operations, Inc.
Arkansas Nuclear One

Dockets: 50-313
50-368
Licenses: DPR-51
NPF-6

During an NRC inspection conducted on April 18-22, 1994, three violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violations are listed below:

License Condition 2.D (Unit 1) and License Condition 2.c(4) (Unit 2) of the licensee's facility operating licenses require that the licensee fully implement and maintain the Commission approved Physical Security Plan, including amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p).

A. Inadequate Access Control - Vehicles

Paragraph 1.6 of the Physical Security Plan requires that all licensee designated vehicles shall have the ignition locked and the key removed while unattended.

On April 21, 1994, the inspector found an unattended licensee designated vehicle unsecured with the ignition keys in the vehicle.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (313/9416-01; 368/9416-01) (Supplement III).

B. Inadequate Detection Aids - Protected Area

Paragraph 1.4C of the Physical Security Plan requires that the protected area perimeter is protected by a single intrusion detection system. Paragraph 3.1.4A4 requires that the perimeter intrusion alarm system generate an alarm upon detection of stimulus or a condition for which the system was designed to react. Paragraph 3.1.4A5 states that the perimeter alarm system shall be located on the exterior side of the perimeter physical barrier.

Contrary to the above, on April 21, 1994, the inspector determined that the design of the perimeter detection system failed to provide adequate detection to two sections of the protected area perimeter.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (313/9416-02; 368/9416-02)
(Supplement III).

C. Failure to Follow Safeguards Information Control Procedure Requirements

10 CFR 73.21(e) requires documents or other matter that contains safeguard information to be marked in a conspicuous manner. 10 CFR 73.21(d)(2) requires that knowledge of lock combinations protecting safeguards information be limited to a minimum number of personnel.

Paragraph 6.3.2 of Station Procedure 1000.044 requires that a label be attached to each safeguards storage container with the names of the individuals authorized uncontrolled access to the safeguards container and who have the combination to the locking device. Paragraph 6.9.1 of the same procedure requires that the covers of all documents containing safeguards information be marked on the front and back as safeguards information.

Contrary to the above, on April 21, 1994, the inspector identified that one of the safeguards container labels did not have all the names of the individuals granted uncontrolled access to the container and the combination. Further, containers contained safeguards documents without required marking on the front and rear covers of the documents.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (313/9416-03; 368/9416-03)
(Supplement III).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy, Inc. is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, with a copy to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, the Commission may issue an Order or Demand for Information as to why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Dated at Arlington, Texas
this 12th day of May 1994