

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/82-20(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-409

License No. DPR-45

Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative
2615 East Avenue - South
La Crosse, WI 54601

Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor

Inspection At: La Crosse Site, Genoa, WI

Inspection Conducted: November 1 through December 31, 1982

Inspector: *L. Reyes for*
M. W. Branch

1/20/83

Approved By: *L. Reyes*
L. Reyes, Chief
Projects Section 2B

1/20/83

Inspection Summary

Inspection on November 1 - December 31, 1982 (Report No. 50-409/82-20(DPRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspector of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; Licensee Event Report; IE Circular; IE Bulletin; plant trip; onsite review committee; and Plant Operations. The inspection involved a total of 150 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including a total of 15 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the ten items inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in eight of the areas. Two items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (Failure to conduct proper shift turnovers - Paragraph 3; failure to properly document testing after maintenance Paragraph 4).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. Parkyn, Plant Superintendent
- G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor
- *L. Goodman, Operations Engineer
- S. Raffety, Reactor Engineer
- M. Polsean, Shift Supervisor
- W. Nowicki, Supervisor, Instrument & Electric
- *R. Wery, QA Supervisor
- *G. Joseph, Security Director
- *L. Kelley, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- *P. Shafer, Radiation Protection Engineer
- *B. Zibung, Health & Safety Supervisor
- R. Brimer, Electrical Engineer
- D. Rybarik, Mechanical Engineer

*Denotes those persons present at the exit interview.

2. Followup on Open Inspection Items

(Closed) Unresolved Item (409/82-18-02): Documentation of testing after the completion of maintenance.

This item was found to be an item of noncompliance, see Section 4 of this report for details.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (409/81-01-01): Licensee response to IE Bulletin 80-24.

This bulletin was issued due to an undetected accumulation of water at Indian Point 2 which wetted the lower nine feet of the reactor vessel while the reactor was operating. The bulletin responses will enable the NRC headquarters staff to consider requirements for long term generic corrective actions. Although the licensee's response did not address all the items in the bulletin a review of the information that was provided and installed equipment in conjunction with the facility requirement for two containment entries per shift should ensure that a leak into containment would not go undetected for more than a few hours.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (409/81-21-03): Concerns with the effectiveness of the Operations Review Committee (ORC).

The Annual Inspection in this area verified that meetings have become more formal and productive. See Paragraph 10 of this report for details.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the

month of November and December 1982. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of November and December, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the High Pressure Core Spray and Boron Injection systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with liquid radwaste discharges.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

On several occasions the inspector noted that shift turnovers were not being conducted in accordance with LACBWR Administrative Control Procedure (ACP) 2.3. There continues to be a problem of the oncoming shift supervisors not reviewing and signing the turnover checklist prior to assuming the watch as required by Section 5.1.4 of the ACP. Also the oncoming plant operators are not always reviewing and initialling the plant operators log book prior to assuming their respective duties as required by Section 4.2.4 of ACP 2.3. This item is considered to be an item of noncompliance (409/82-20-01).

A containment building ventilation isolation occurred at approximately 7:40 a.m. on December 14, 1982, when the 6 hour delayed particulate air monitor for the containment building reached its 5x background setpoint. The elevated containment building air activity was caused by a small steam leak inside the containment building of approximately (.009 GPM) that was discovered and isolated at approximately 12:20 a.m. on December 14, 1982. The leak was at a weld joint on the CRD seal water effluent sensing line and was isolated by shutting the manual isolation valves. The containment building gaseous and immediate particulate monitor increased slightly at the time of the leak but they never reached their setpoints. There was no significant radioactive release from the plant. The stack monitor which monitors the diluted ventilation discharge, did not show a noticeable increase during the entire shift. At approximately 9:30 a.m., December 14, 1982, the containment ventilation system was unisolated after a sample verified a normal containment building air activity concentration.

No other items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

- a. Repair to the engine heater for the No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (MR 924).
- b. Replacement of manhole gasket on the water level tank for the turbine generator moisture separator (MR-835).
- c. Recalibration of water level Channel No. 3 (MR 959).
- d. Repairs to card reader for zone 19 (MR 957).
- e. Replace feedback control arm on the MSIV bypass valve (MR 961).

Following completion of maintenance on the water level tank for the turbine generator moisture separator and the engine heater for the No. 1A Emergency Diesel Generator the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.

In Inspection Report 50-409/82-20, the inspector identified a problem with the documentation of testing after maintenance was performed and the licensee immediately conducted an audit of the Maintenance Request Program. Audit 02-82-1 conducted on October 27, 1982, indicated that there were discrepancies in the documentation of testing after maintenance. These discrepancies were identified to the Operations Department for corrective action and the response dated November 17, 1982, from the Operations Supervisor indicated that the Shift Supervisors had been re-instructed on the proper method of documenting testing.

On December 17, 1982, the inspector noted the MR's 957, 959 and 961 were signed off by the Shift Supervisor and the required testing was

not recorded in the Maintenance Request. This is considered to be an item of noncompliance (409/82-20-02).

No other items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Main Condenser Vacuum Scram (December 2, 1982), the monthly test of No. 2 Safety Channel (December 2, 1982) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities: Timing test of the No. 1B Forced Circulation Pump Discharge Valve (December 2, 1982), the monthly test of the No. 1B High Pressure Service Water Pump (December 15, 1982).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

6. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

- a. (Closed) LER 82-13, including revision No. 1 (High Conductivity in the Primary Coolant).
- b. (Closed) LER 82-17 (High Pressure Service Water Isolation Valve failed to shut isolating the containment building fire suppression system).
- c. (Closed) LER 82-18 (Failure of the Mechanical Interlock on the containment building airlock).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

7. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.

(Closed) IEC 81-10 (Steam Voiding in the Reactor Coolant System During Decay Heat Removal Cooldown).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

8. IE Bulletin Followup

For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facility. If the Bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.

(Closed) IEB 80-24 (Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

9. Plant Trips

Following the plant trips on December 16, 1982, caused by a failure of Instrument Power Supply (PS-2), the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.

All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on December 17, 1982.

There appeared to be too many non-essential people in the control room during the recovery from the plant trip. This observation was provided to the Plant Superintendent who indicated that he will evaluate the number of persons needed for recovery and will ensure all non-essential personnel are restricted access to the control room. Plant Procedure ACP 2.1 provided the authority for the Shift Supervisor to restrict access as he feels necessary.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

10. Onsite Review Committee Activity

- a. The inspector attended the onsite Operations Review Committee (ORC) meeting of December 13, 1982, as a non participating member and observed the following:

The meeting was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Plant's Technical Specifications and the members in attendance provided expertise in the areas that was discussed and constituted a quorum.

The atmosphere at this meeting was an improvement over the meeting of November 12, 1981. The inspector had noted during Inspection 50-409/81-21 that the ORC meetings were very informal with members coming and going at will.

- b. The inspector reviewed the minutes from the following ORC meetings and verified that Charter and Technical Specification required information was recorded:

The meetings reviewed were ORC 82-72, ORC 82-71, ORC 82-61 and ORC 82-53.

- c. In Inspection Report 50-409/81-21, the inspector expressed a concern with the effectiveness of the ORC. Subsequently the licensee has strengthened their committee review and this is evidenced by a reduction in the amount of defective procedures issued, and taking a conservative approach to safety related problem resolutions.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

11. Semi-annual Review of Plant Operations

- a. Review and Audits

On December 13, 1982, the inspector sat in on a safety review committee meeting. The inspector verified that provisions of Technical Specifications dealing with membership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were met.

- b. Training

The inspector attended the December 16, 1982, Mitigating Core Damage Lecture of the licensee's operator requalification lecture series and verified that lesson plan objectives were met and that training was in accordance with the approved operator requalification program schedule and objectives.

The inspector verified by direct questioning of one new, one existing, and one temporary employee that administrative controls and procedures, radiological health and safety, industrial safety, controlled access and security procedures, emergency plan, and quality

assurance training were provided as required by the licensee's technical specifications; verified by direct questioning of one craftsmen and one technician that on-the-job training, formal technical training commensurate with job classification, and fire fighting training were provided.

12. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period, and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.