

Alabama Power Company
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
Telephone 205 868-5086

J. D. Woodard
President-Nuclear
Project



Alabama Power

The Southern Electric System

March 27, 1991

10CFR50.59

Docket No. 50-364

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2
10CFR50.59 Annual Report

Gentlemen:

Attached for your review is the annual report required by 10CFR50.59 for 1990. This report summarizes changes to the plant performed in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.59 for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,


J. D. Woodard

JDW/DRC:map13.24

Attachment

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebner
Mr. S. T. Hoffman
Mr. G. F. Maxwell

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ALABAMA POWER COMPANY
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT
UNIT 2 - ANNUAL REPORT
REQUIRED BY 10CFR50.59

Section 59 of Title 10, Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," of the Code of Federal Regulations, states that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility may (1) make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and (2) make changes in the procedures as described in the safety analysis report, and (3) conduct tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report, without prior commission approval, unless the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change in the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question (as defined in 10CFR50.59).

The licensee is required to maintain records of such changes, tests or experiments, and those records are required to include written safety evaluations which provide the basis for the determination that the changes, tests or experiments do not involve any unreviewed safety questions.

Brief descriptions and a summary of the safety evaluations for the changes, tests or experiments as described above, for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 which were completed in 1990, are provided in the following.

Also provided is a list of abbreviations and acronyms used in the summaries.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
FOR THE
1990 10CFR50.59 ANNUAL REPORT

| | |
|--------|--|
| ADIF | Author's Document Incorporated Form |
| APW | Auxiliary Feedwater |
| AHU | Air Handling Unit |
| ALARA | As Low As Reasonably Achievable |
| ANSI | American National Standards Institute |
| APC | Alabama Power Company |
| ASME | American Society of Mechanical Engineers |
| BAT | Boric Acid Tank |
| BTRS | Boron Thermal Regeneration System |
| CCW | Component Cooling Water |
| CDT | Chemical Drain Tank |
| CVCS | Chemical and Volume Control System |
| D/G | Diesel Generator |
| ECCS | Emergency Core Cooling System |
| EPFY | Effective Full Power Years |
| EOL | End of Life |
| EQ | Environmentally Qualified or Qualification |
| ES | Engineering Study |
| FAHA | Fire Area Hazard Analysis |
| FFRDS | Failed Fuel Rod Detection System |
| FNP | Farley Nuclear Plant |
| FPS | Fire Protection System |
| FSAR | Final Safety Analysis Report |
| GPM | Gallons Per Minute |
| HVAC | Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning |
| IEEE | Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers |
| LCO | Limiting Condition For Operation |
| LOCA | Loss of Coolant Accident |
| M/SVR | Main Steam Valve Room |
| NFPA | National Fire Protection Association |
| NNS | Non-nuclear Safety |
| NORB | Nuclear Operations Review Board |
| OD | Outside Diameter |
| ODCM | Offsite Dose Calculation Manual |
| PAP | Primary Access Point |
| P&ID | Piping and Instrument Drawing |
| PCN | Production Change Notice |
| PORC | Plant Operations Reviews Committee |
| PORV | Power Operated Relief Valve |
| RACA | Radiation Access Control Area |
| RCS | Reactor Coolant System |
| RHR | Residual Heat Removal |
| RTD | Resistance Temperature Detector |
| RWIS | River Water Intake Structure |
| RWST | Refueling Water Storage Tank |
| SER | Safety Evaluation Report |
| SG | Safeguards |
| SNC | Southern Nuclear Operating Company |
| SSD | Safe Shutdown |
| SWIS | Service Water Intake Structure |
| TDAFWP | Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump |
| TPNS | Total Plant Numbering System |
| TS | Technical Specification |
| TSC | Technical Support Center |
| UL | Underwriter's Laboratories |
| UT | Ultrasonic Inspection |

bc: Mr. R. P. McDonald
Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Mr. J. E. Garlington
Mr. L. B. Long
Mr. D. N. Morey
Mr. C. D. Nesbitt
Mr. J. W. McGowan
Mr. T. T. Robin
Mr. W. R. Bayne
Commitment Tracking System (2)

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-001, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2120, 01/30/90

DESCRIPTION: Updated FSAR Section 7.3.2.1.5 which discusses testing of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. This section had been written prior to the issue of the FNP Technical Specifications. It was changed to refer to the Technical Specifications. Redundant and conflicting information was removed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These proposed FSAR changes are considered administrative in nature since they represent a clarification to FSAR test and surveillance requirements rather than a physical change to the plant or to procedures. The Technical Specifications provide a detailed description of the testing requirements.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-004, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2140, 03/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Added a description of the AFW temperature monitoring system to FSAR Section 6.5.5 to describe the equipment used to monitor for AFW pump steam binding. The system was installed previously by PCNs B84-1-2518 and B84-2-2519. FSAR Figure 6.5-1 was updated by these previous PCNs, but no description of the system was added to the FSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change serves only to document an existing design in the FSAR text. The effects of the design on plant safety were evaluated in connection with the above PCNs. All design information included in the text change is covered by these safety evaluations.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-006, Rev. 0
PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90
DESCRIPTION: Updated Chapter 12.3 of the FSAR to reflect current practice in the health physics program.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The proposed change involves modifying the description of the health physics program to reflect current plant practice and equipment storage. These descriptions do not relate to the plant accident analysis. Equipment changes do not jeopardize the ability to mitigate the consequences of any accident.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-007, Rev. 0
PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2159, 05/11/90
DESCRIPTION: Re-wrote FSAR Sections 13.2.2 and 13.2.3 to give an updated discussion of the training program for Operations, Technical and Maintenance personnel.
SAFETY EVALUATION: This update of Sections 13.2.2 and 13.2.3 will ensure that the FSAR accurately reflects the current training programs at FNP. The training programs satisfy all applicable NRC and industry requirements.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-008, Rev. 0
PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90
DESCRIPTION: Corrected FSAR Paragraph 9.5.4.5 to indicate that each underground D/G fuel oil storage tank does not include a dipstick, but does include a dipstick insertion point. The FSAR had erroneously stated that each storage tank had a manual dipstick gauge.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Determination of fuel volume is performed in accordance with TS requirements and procedural guidance. The absence of a dipstick in the underground storage tanks does not adversely affect the ability to determine fuel level and comply with the TSS.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-009, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Changed Section 9.5.4.2 of the FSAR to agree with the as-built conditions of the vents on the D/G fuel oil storage and day tanks. These vents are not equipped with flame arrestors as it was stated in Section 9.5.4.2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The design documents for the tanks do not specify the fitting of flame arrestors on the tank vents. The D/G fuel has a low volatility and hence flame arrestors are not necessary. The existence of flame arrestors can restrict tank venting through accumulations of dust, insect nests or icing on their surfaces.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-010, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2131, 03/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Changed FSAR Section 3K.4.2.1.4 by deleting references to piping penetration room flood sensors. Previously, this section had indicated that level sensors were installed in the piping penetration rooms at the 100' elevation to detect flooding and provide a control room alarm. These sensors were never installed at FNP.

SAFETY EVALUATION: An analysis indicates that sufficient instrumentation has been installed to alert the operator of a flooding problem.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-012, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2156, 05/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Updated chapters 11.2, 11.5 and Appendix 9B of the FSAR to reflect current practices associated with the radwaste system.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The changes involve the description of various health physics practices related to storage of radwaste, demineralizer operation, and process parameters. These descriptions do not relate to the plant accident analyses. The equipment involved is not required to mitigate the consequences of any accident.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-016, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2156, 05/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Updated FSAR Section 11.4.2.20.0 to reflect actions taken with respect to the noble gas effluent monitors. The changes involve 1) the design of the monitors' power supply and 2) the development of procedures for the monitors since the section was written.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The changes to FSAR Section 11.4.2.20.0 reflect the fact that the monitors are powered from vital instrument busses and that procedures have been developed for the use and calibration of the system and for the dissemination of release rate information. The changes do not affect the design or design basis of the monitors. The information being changed is largely historical information concerning the design and installation process for these monitors.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-017, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Justified the adequacy of the current distribution of fire extinguishers in the plant and provided the basis for revision of FSAR Appendix 9B to clarify the fire extinguisher coverage requirements. FSAR Section 9B.4.1.17 states that Class A fire extinguishers are located throughout FNP. The section also states that the extinguishers and locations are in accordance with NFPA-10. However, Class A fire extinguishers are not located in the Turbine Buildings or cable tunnels of each unit or in the Low Level Radwaste Storage Building.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The existing fire protection arrangement is adequate and falls within the intent of NFPA 10.

The existing fire protection equipment which consists of various combinations of fire extinguishers, hose stations and sprinkler systems is adequate to meet NRC requirements and NFPA guidelines.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-019

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2146, 04/12/90

DESCRIPTION: Updated the combustible loading in several fire areas to reflect as-built conditions. The combustible loadings are listed in Appendix 9B to the FSAR in the individual FAHA. The combustible loading may also appear in the 10CFR50 Appendix R Exemptions discussed in Attachment B of FSAR Appendix 9B.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Despite the increases, the combustible loading and fire severities of all of the affected fire areas remain well below the fire ratings of their area boundaries. Furthermore, the increased fire severities do not adversely impact the background data which the NRC utilized in formulating their evaluations and conclusions regarding the Alabama Power Company Appendix R Exemptions. The exemptions granted for those rooms are not dependent on the combustible loading.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-054, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2140, 03/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Sections 8.3.1.4.3 and 8.3.1.4.10 to indicate that FSAR Figures 8.3-51, 8.3-52, 8.3-53, and 8.3-54 are examples of typical drawings and that these figures will not be updated for subsequent design changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The drawings that the subject figures are based on are, by nature, very active drawings and are now so crowded with information that they would not make good FSAR figures. Leaving the figures as they are would not violate their original intent which was to show typical FNP cable routing drawings. These changes to the FSAR do not involve physical changes to the plant and are editorial in nature.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-055, Rev. 0
PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2140, 03/27/90
DESCRIPTION: Changed FSAR Sections 8.3.1.4.4 and 8.3.1.4.8.1 to clarify the cable tray layout in the cable spreading room and electrical penetration rooms and address separation of redundant channels. Also, this ADIF corrected the size of the conduits used in the duct banks between the Cable Spreading Room and the Electrical Penetration Rooms.
SAFETY EVALUATION: The changes are editorial in nature and serve only to clarify the FSAR sections. The actual size of the conduits are adequate and reflect the as-built condition.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-056, Rev. 0
PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2129, 02/20/90
DESCRIPTION: Changed FSAR Section 6.2.4.2 to state the actual location of the containment isolation valve associated with the Unit 1 pressurizer pressure deadweight tester instrumentation line. Most containment isolation valves are in the penetration rooms as stated. However, this containment isolation valve (Q1B13V026B) is located in the Auxiliary Building. Also, this evaluation changed the pressurizer pressure deadweight tester penetration line size from 1/8 inch OD to 3/8 inch OD. The line consists primarily of 1/8 inch OD tubing except for the section where the line passes through the containment wall. Finally, valves Q1B13V026A and Q2B13V026B were deleted from the list of containment isolation valves in FSAR Table 6.2-39.
SAFETY EVALUATION: Having the containment isolation valve in the Auxiliary Building near the deadweight tester minimizes the amount of time the valve needs to be open during pressurizer pressure instrument calibration. In addition, a certain amount of operator radiation dose is avoided by not requiring an operator to enter the penetration room each time the tester is used. The dead weight tester is a closed system in containment and is a very small line. Thus transfer of a significant amount of radioactive material is very unlikely. General Design Criterion 57 requires only one isolation valve for this type of penetration.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-100, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2168, 06/05/90

DESCRIPTION: Added the computer uninterruptible power supply to the list of loads for 600V load center 2Q. This required a change to FSAR Figure 8.3-49. Changing power supplies for the computer was accomplished by PCNs B86-2-3925 and B87-2-4254, but FSAR Figure 8.3-49 was not updated as required by these PCNs. In the process of transferring FSAR drawings which required changing from PCN 4254 to PCN 3925, the figure above was inadvertently not listed in PCN 3925 as requiring revision.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change has no impact on plant safety. It was evaluated in the safety evaluation for PCN B87-2-4254, Rev. 8.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-230, Rev. 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2144, 04/06/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Section 9.2.9 to state the correct mode of operation of well #1 of the well water system. The FSAR indicates that well #1 is aligned for automatic starting. However, this is not the most desirable mode of operation. The well water system supplies both the sanitary (drinking) water and the fire protection water tanks.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The water quality of well #1 is not suitable for filling the sanitary water tank. However, the control for this pump was in the auto position which would have caused it to operate in the event of a fire. Therefore, it was desirable to remove well #1 from automatic control to ensure it did not contaminate the drinking water supply. This change requires the manual start of pump #1 in order for the well water system to maintain the required level in the fire protection water storage tanks or to refill the fire protection storage tanks following a fire. This change does not affect the capability of the well water system.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-237

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Changed FSAR Table 6.2-32, "Steam Generator Isolation Valve Information", by deleting the 5-second closure time for the valves which isolate steam flow to the TDAFWP Q1(2)N12V001A and - V001B.

SAFETY EVALUATIO. Valves Q1(2)N12V001A and - V001B are normally closed. Their principal safety function is to open automatically on a TDAFWP actuation signal to start the TDAFWP. Consequently, the deletion of the 5-second closure time value, from Table 6.2-32, for valves Q1(2)N12V001A and - V001B has no impact on the safety function performed by the valves.

SUBJECT: ADIF 89-247, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2145, 04/10/90

DESCRIPTION: Changed total integrated dose values of certain Auxiliary Building rooms listed in FSAR Table 3.11-1. Also, Note i of Table 3.11-1 was revised to clarify which Auxiliary Building rooms containing EQ components (equipment or cables) do not have detailed dose calculations whose results are listed in the table and to explain the basis for excluding those rooms.

SAFETY EVALUATION: To allow for possible additions of EQ equipment to the affected Auxiliary Building rooms in higher dose areas and to ensure a consistent methodology, it was decided to recalculate the total integrated dose levels of these rooms. In lieu of the calculations, a room total integrated dose value of 10^8 rads was assumed for rooms containing only cable. The clarification of Note i of FSAR Table 3.11-1 indicates that no detailed dose calculations were done for these rooms.

SUBJECT: Cycle 8 Reload, Revs. 0 and 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2216, 10/16/90
PORC Meeting 2232, 11/08/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Sections 4.2 and 15.2.4 to incorporate the Cycle 8 reload design based on the Cycle 7 end-of-life burnup within a range of 15,600 to 17,200 MWD/MTU. The Cycle 7 operation was completed on October 12, 1990, with a cycle burnup of 17,050.9 MWD/MTU. The Cycle 8 burnup is also limited to 16,400 MWD/MTU which may include a power coastdown beyond the end of full power capability. A total of 1 Region-5, 35 Region-8, 65 Region-9, and 5 fresh Region-10 fuel assemblies are used in the design. A total of 576 fresh Wet Annular Burnable Absorbers (WABAs) are used in clusters of 12 and 16. The Region-10 assemblies differ from the previous design in that they include rotated dimples on the inner grid straps of the top and bottom inconel grids, crowned dimples on the inner grid straps of the remaining grids, minor changes to the fuel assembly design due to Westinghouse implementation of Updated Fuel Assembly Design features, changes to the WABAs as a result of an Updated Core Component Program, and a Modified Debris Filter Bottom Nozzle (MDFBN).

SAFETY EVALUATION: The Unit 2 Cycle 8 design does not involve an unreviewed safety question. In addition, no Technical Specification changes will be required for Cycle 8. Hence, since no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specifications changes are involved, the Cycle 8 reload design is licensable under 10CFR50.59 and requires no prior NRC approval.

SUBJECT: ECCS Flow Modeling Inconsistencies

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2175, 07/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Evaluated the effects of charging/SI flow short-fall due to RCP seal injection and potential line resistance imbalance on previously analyzed LOCA analyses. The effect of excessive charging pump runout was also evaluated.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The analysis assumption changes resulted in no change to the limiting LOCA event calculated results. It was also determined that adequate NPSH exists, and CCP runout was evaluated and found acceptable. Therefore, all acceptance criteria are met.

SUBJECT: Effect of Open Containment Mini-Purge Valves on the Emergency Core Cooling System Analysis

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2167, 06/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Determined, using the Westinghouse 1981 Evaluation Model, that the effect of the containment mini-purge valves being open coincident with a LOCA would continue to be minor.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The 1981 Evaluation Model has demonstrated a reduced sensitivity to containment backpressure which would result in an increased calculated peak cladding temperature. This increase, when combined with other peak cladding temperature penalties reported by Westinghouse on Farley, results in PCT remaining below the 2200° F limit stipulated in 10 CFR 50.46.

SUBJECT: ES88-1223: Cable Rerouting

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2248, 12/18/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the FSAR by adding a footnote that when referring to a Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.75 "fire barrier" to indicate that these barriers are not required for compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R. The term "culvert" as found in Section 9B.4.1.3.2 was explained since culverts are not used to route cables at FNP. FSAR Appendix 3A and Section 8.3 were revised to explain how the inte. of the R.G. 1.75 requirement for 1" separation between redundant class 1E circuits and non-class 1E circuits is met. Information that was duplicated in FSAR Sections 8 and 9B was removed from the appropriate section.

SAFETY EVALUATION:

These changes do not involve any physical changes to the plant, but instead correct the descriptions of the plant within the FSAR. These changes are considered editorial in nature because they eliminate unnecessary duplication of information within the FSAR, clarify the term "barrier" with respect to its application to fire protection and R.G. 1.75, eliminate an incorrect statement concerning the routing of cables through culverts, and clarify FNP's conformance with R.G. 1.75 for separation between redundant class 1E circuits and non-class 1E circuits.

SUBJECT: FNP-0-AP-9, Rev. 16

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2127, 02/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Expanded the responsibility for procurement reviews to also assign the General Manager-Nuclear Plant responsibility for procurement reviews such that these reviews may be performed by either Nuclear Support personnel or FNP Staff personnel. Previously the FSAR assigned this responsibility to the General Manager-Nuclear Support.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The General Manager-Nuclear Support and the General Manager-Nuclear Plant are at the same level of management. Procurement reviews by either Nuclear Support personnel or FNP personnel are to be performed by qualified personnel utilizing administrative procedures or reviewed and approved by the same level of management. Procurement reviews performed by the FNP staff are the same level and extent of review as is being conducted by Nuclear Support personnel such that there is no decrease in the level or quality of the reviews.

Since this administrative change only involves allowing another organizational element the ability to perform procurement reviews under the appropriate controls, there is no effect on the accident analyses, equipment malfunction evaluations, and margins of safety as addressed in the FNP FSAR and Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT: FNP-O-EMP-1320.02, Rev. 1
PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2197, 08/31/90
DESCRIPTION: Provided guidance for transferring the feed for 600V load center 1B from its normal supply (4160V bus 1D) to load center 1F. Although not a routine evolution, such switching can be performed without deenergizing the load center, i.e. "hot bus transfer".

SAFETY EVALUATION: The protection schemes for the 600V load centers were reviewed and it was determined there is adequate protection to prevent a single failure from jeopardizing both "A" and "B" trains of power when performing a hot bus transfer. Faults occurring downstream, upstream or internal to load center breakers can be isolated by protective relaying associated with the incoming line breakers and feeder breakers for both the 4160V and 600V switchgear. In addition, adequate protection is provided to meet both IEEE 379 (single failure criteria) and IEEE 334 (Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits), therefore, no licensing or design concern exists.

SUBJECT: FNP-O-E7P-3016, Rev. 0
PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2198, 09/04/90
DESCRIPTION: Approved the addition of Oil Red B Liquid Dye, made by DuPont, to the diesel fuel to determine by test the time needed to achieve a homogeneous mixture in the D/G fuel oil storage tanks. This is part of a program to maintain the quality of the diesel fuel in long-term storage for use in the emergency D/Gs.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Based on the manufacturer's data, the addition of Oil Red B Dye to the diesel fuel will not adversely affect the energy content of the fuel or engine performance. Because the amount of treatment is small, 0.00037 weight % of the fuel, it will not affect any of the diesel fuel specifications. The Oil Red B Dye diesel fuel oil treatment chemical has been reviewed and found not to pose a threat to control room habitability as defined by Regulatory Guide 1.78.

SUBJECT: FNP-0-ETP-3660, Rev. 2: FFRDS-FSP-004(90)

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2218, 10/19/90

DESCRIPTION: Approved ultrasonic inspection of the fuel assemblies to detect leaking fuel rods. The ultrasonic technique is to be used in lieu of the methods previously used.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The responses of the inspected fuel assemblies, the RCS, the spent fuel pool, and the storage racks to postulated accident conditions are not adversely altered by the operation of the FFRDS. The most severe consequence which could be caused by improper operation of the FFRDS would be to cause damage to the cladding of an undamaged fuel rod or to miss indications of fuel rod cladding defects. These events could result in returning a fuel rod with a cladding defect to the reactor. Operation with fuel rod cladding defects is limited by existing plant Technical Specifications on primary coolant activity. Operation with a coolant activity level less than the Technical Specification limits is bounded by previous analyses. The potential for such an occurrence is minimized by the quality assurance provisions which are part of the FFRDS operating procedure. The consequences of dropping the FFRDS equipment in the spent fuel pool would be bounded by the analysis of a dropped fuel assembly. Any activity released as a result of a postulated fuel rod cladding defect resulting from inappropriate use of the inspection procedure would be much less than that assumed for a dropped assembly.

SUBJECT: FNP-O-ETP-3660, Rev. 2: Movement of UT Fuel Leak Detection Equipment

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2218, 10/19/90

DESCRIPTION: Addressed the structural aspects of the temporary installation of FFRDS equipment on top of the spent fuel racks as well as the movement of equipment across the spent fuel racks.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The largest piece of FFRDS equipment to be carried over the spent fuel pool weighs 1470 lbs., which is less than the weight of a fuel assembly. Therefore, FFRDS equipment is not subject to the NUREG-0612 requirements for movement of heavy loads. The structural analysis for the spent fuel racks has been reviewed to verify that the potential load drops associated with movement of the leak detection equipment do not result in damage to any fuel assembly or in damage to the spent fuel racks which could lead to criticality. Also, the mounting of the equipment on top of the empty spent fuel racks will not affect the structural integrity of the racks even during a postulated seismic event.

SUBJECT: FNP-O-M-72: Coating Manual

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2245, 12/11/90

DESCRIPTION: Approved the use of Ameron Amercoat 90 as an original coating system over bare steel and concrete and as a re-coating system over the existing steel and concrete coating systems in the FNP containment buildings. FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.6 and the appropriate FSAR tables have been revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Amercoat 90 contains no aluminum and therefore will not increase containment post-LOCA hydrogen levels. Accident analyses using the containment heat sink evaluation will not be affected. Additionally, Amercoat 90 has been qualified for containment use by a test which meets the requirements of ANSI-N101.2 and FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.6, thus providing assurance that no failure of the coating will occur post-accident which would adversely impact ECCS components.

SUBJECT: FNF-2-SOP-58.0, TCN 15A (Permanently incorporated under Rev. 16)

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2203, 09/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Approved running a radwaste exhaust fan while the radwaste supply fan is inoperable.

SAFETY EVALUATION: A log will be established to maintain boric acid tank room temperatures to ensure this area stays greater than 65° F while the exhaust fan is running and the outside temperature is less than 65° F. Administrative controls were instituted that required the exhaust fans to be shut down if the outside air temperature dropped to less than 20° F. The doors from the RCA entrance to outside air located in the dosimetry area will also be propped open to allow a source for makeup air to the Auxiliary Building to help decrease the pressure differential between the Auxiliary Building and outside air.

SUBJECT: Formation of Southern Nuclear Operating Company

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2226, 10/31/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Chapters 13 and 17 to reflect the various organizational changes made for the formation of SNC Phase II.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The changes to be made are strictly administrative in nature so no change will be made to the basic organizational structure that currently exists. The responsibility of the individuals that provide support services for plant operation will not change. No changes will be made to the design, operation, maintenance, or testing of the plant. There will be no degradation in the current quality assurance program. Clear reporting lines of communication within the structure are maintained.

SUBJECT: Grout Repair

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2248, 12/18/90

DESCRIPTION: Approved gaps/cracks backed by a depth of at least 6" of concrete/grout to be acceptable 3 hour fire barriers as installed. Small gaps/cracks (less than 1" wide) and not backed by a minimum depth of 6" of concrete/grout are acceptable when filled with a minimum of 2" depth of either 3M Fire Dam 150 Caulk or Dow Corning Fire Stop Sealant Cat. No. 2000.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The U.L. Fire Resistance Directory and the Society of Fire Protection Engineers Fire Protection Handbook indicate that structural concrete that is at least 6" thick has a fire endurance rating of 3 hours. Since the fire resistance properties of grout are assumed to be similar to concrete, a 6" thickness of grout constitutes a 3 hour fire barrier. Also, 3M Fire Dam 150 Caulk and Dow Corning Fire Stop Sealant Cat. No. 2000 have demonstrated 3 hour fire performance characteristics at depths of less than 2" and widths less than 1". Therefore, these conditions are acceptable at the penetration seal assemblies because they satisfy the requirements of the original as-designed condition.

SUBJECT: MD 90-2199

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2140, 03/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Modified the basic cork joint seal design which is used in various places in the Auxiliary Building. The modifications were performed because of degradation due to mechanical wear of the cork. The modifications incorporate the addition of sheet metal flashing and insulation material to cover the cork seal and minor gaps that have developed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: In accordance with the requirements of Generic Letter 86-10, it was concluded that the cork joint assembly is adequate to withstand the effects of a fire and prevent propagation of a fire. Therefore, this modification will not decrease the effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program and will not adversely affect the safety of the plant.

SUBJECT: MD 90-2298

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2235, 11/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Added temporary extensions from phones 2448 and 6014. These lines are to be pulled from junction box N2R51G395-N located in the stairwell beside the TSC.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The addition of the two extensions will enhance the overall communication system and will not adversely affect its performance. The telephone lines added are not safety related nor do they have any effect on any safety related equipment.

SUBJECT: Nonconformance Disposition Report NDR-80

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2154, 04/30/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR page 6.2-54 to implement the use of a replacement motor in the 2B containment cooler fan on a temporary basis for purposes of cooling the containment during normal operation. Review of the replacement motor documentation revealed that the motor windings were coated with an epoxy that is different from that described in the environmentally qualified test report. The 2B containment cooler will be considered inoperable for accident mitigation purposes and technical specification LCO requirements for one inoperable containment fan cooler will be applied.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The consequences of a motor failure due to lack of environmental qualification of the epoxy coating applied to windings does not create any failure mechanism not previously evaluated and is adequately compensated for by the existing electrical protection design.

SUBJECT: PCN B84-2-2684, Rev. 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Documented the replacement of temperature transmitters N2N11TET525 and N2N11TET526 on the main steam lines with remote temperature transmitters. This change decreases the unsupported load mounted on the steam lines and should reduce the probability of a steam line break. This change was made by Minor Departure 83-532. Because the temperature transmitters are no longer mounted with the temperature elements, they have been assigned separate TPNS numbers. This requires a revision of FSAR Figure 10.3-1 to show the transmitters and elements as separate instruments.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN B85-2-3236, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2114, 01/11/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205004 and D-205208 to provide an option for capping one leg of the equipment drain and one leg of the floor drain "running traps" located in the CDT room. This will facilitate exhausting the drains to the radwaste area ventilation system. FSAR Figure 9.3-4 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The modification will facilitate the exhaust of the radioactive gases to the Radwaste Area Ventilation System, which will result in reduced contamination of plant areas and provide less radiation exposure to maintenance personnel. This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN B86-2-3857, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Corrected the discrepancies between single line drawings and their corresponding connection diagrams for the 120V A.C. instrumentation distribution system. FSAR Figure 8.3-23 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B86-2-3932, Revs. 1 & 2

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2216, 10/16/90

DESCRIPTION: Modified the design of the temperature cutout switches that provide over-temperature protection for the blast coil heaters which are part of the penetration room filtration units. The original design of the units call for manual and automatic cutout switches, but no setpoint was established for the switches. This PCN removed the manual reset temperature cutouts and provided setpoints and TPNS numbers for the automatic temperature cutout switches.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The cutout switches which were removed are not required by the ANSI/ASME standard to which FNP is committed. The setpoint was provided by the heater vendor.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-0-4186, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-175046 for the control room HVAC to show that the control room utility exhaust fan and discharge damper are tripped by the "B" train chlorine analyzer, not the "A" train analyzer. FSAR Figure 9.4-1, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-0-4486, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2159, 05/11/90

DESCRIPTION: Documented the replacement of a commercial grade Agastat relay, part number 7012PC, in the B1G sequencer with a nuclear grade Agastat relay, part number E7012PC001 per Minor Departure 87-1708. FSAR Figure 8.3-40 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4082, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the safety classification of valve N2E13V002 from 2B to NNS to correct an inconsistency with the NNS classification of line 1"-HCD-104. The valve is installed in the nitrogen supply line to the spray additive tank 1"-HCD-104.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The loss of the nitrogen supply line to the spray additive tank does not impact the safety function of the spray additive tank.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4125, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2136, 03/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the combustible loading and fire severity tables in Appendix 9B of the FSAR for fire areas 2-12 and 2-15 to reflect the addition of combustible material in the form of paper in rooms 2202 and 2254. Desks were also added to these rooms. These rooms contain the hot shut-down panels.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The combustible material added will be approximately 200 lbs. of paper at 8000 BTU/lb and will not increase the fire severity of rooms 2202 and 2215. The new desks are seismically mounted so that they will not damage the hot shut-down panels during a seismic event. The implementation of this PCN will not be in conflict with the requirements of Section 9.B.3, Appendix 9B of the FSAR and will not decrease the effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program at FNP.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4130, Revs. 0, 2, and 4

PORC REVIEW: PCRC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90
PORC Meeting 2177, 07/10/90

DESCRIPTION: Modified the design of the mechanical seal of the 2B charging pump. The modified seal design eliminates the need for CCW cooling water to the seals as well as the mechanical seal heat exchangers and the external piping associated with the seals. The internal seal components were reconfigured so that the quantity of internal parts have been reduced. The seal housing design and the shaft sealing design were modified. FSAR Sections 9.2.2.2 and 9.2.2.5 and Figure 9.3-6 were revised to delete references to the seal cooling.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These modifications are an enhancement to the charging pumps. This simplified design improves charging pump reliability and availability. Thus, these modifications do not degrade the operation or safety performance of the charging pumps.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4146, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Added TPNS numbers for the containment spray additive tank vacuum release valves to the system P&ID. FSAR Figure 6.3-3B was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4177, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Made the appropriate valve line up changes to change the flow path of the steam generator blowdown effluent. The FSAR had indicated that the normal flowpath was to return the blowdown effluent to the main condenser. However, in practice, the effluent is normally released to the environment consistent with ODCM limits. P&ID D-205071, Sheet 2, Rev. 12 incorporating these changes has been issued. The following sections of the FSAR were revised to incorporate the preceding changes: 10.4.8.1, 10.4.8.2, 10.4.8.3.1 and 11.2.6.4. FSAR Figure 10.4-5A was also revised to reflect these changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The change in valve line-ups requested by the PCR will not result in the release of radioactive materials in excess of FSAR allowables and will have no affect on the safe shut-down capability of the plant. FSAR Sections 10.4.8.1, 10.4.8.2, 10.4.8.3.1, 11.2.6.4 and Figure 10.4-5A will have to be revised to delete reference to the discharge to the main condenser as the normal flow path for steam generator blowdown effluent. Continuous release of steam generator blowdown to the environment is permitted by the FSAR (see Section 10.4.8). On this basis, the valve line up requested by the PCR is acceptable.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4267, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Corrected the Westinghouse identification numbers for the RHR mini-flow valves FCV-602 A & B on the RHR system P&ID, D-205041, and FSAR Figure 5.5-6B. These valves were changed from globe to gate type under a previous design change. The P&ID and FSAR figure were changed to show the different valve type as a part of the design change, but the identification numbers were not changed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4430, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Table 9.2-3, Sheet 1, to provide the correct service water flows through the steam generator blowdown heat exchanger during various modes of operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4453, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Table 6.2-38, Sheet 3, and Figure 5.1-2B to show that the penetration that was previously listed as penetration number 64 is actually two penetrations. The table now lists penetration 64A (nitrogen supply to the pressurizer relief tank) and 64B (pressurizer dead-weight pressure tester).

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4493, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Figure 5.1-3, Sheet 2, to show the correct TPNS number for an isolation valve on the RTD manifold. Valve QV044A was incorrectly shown as QV044B, a designation inconsistent with the other valves shown in the typical RTD loop illustrated.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B87-2-4577, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-205002, Sheet 2, for the CCW system to add sample/drain valves on each side of flow indicator FI-3036. This was necessary in order for the drawing to depict the actual plant conditions. FSAR Figure 9.2-6, Sheet 1, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-0-5377, Rev. 0 , 1, 2 & 5

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2127, 02/13/90
PORC Meeting 2185, 07/31/90

DESCRIPTION: Replaced the existing eyewash stations in the Auxiliary Building with combination eyewash/safety shower stations. Identification of eyewash stations and eyewash/shower stations were deleted from the following FSAR Figures: 12.1-13, 12.1-23, 12.1-24, 12.1-25, 12.1-28 and 12.1-29. P&IDs D-175047 and D-205047 were revised to provide TPNS numbers to the emergency eyewash/shower stations and updated to show the actual configuration of the piping leading to the stations. FSAR Figures 9.2-7, Sheet 1, and 9.2-7, Sheet 2, were revised to reflect these changes. Also, P&ID D-175047 and FSAR Figure 9.2-7, Sheet 1, were revised to reflect current piping materials, sizes and arrangements.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-0-5476 (SG), Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2159, 05/11/90

DESCRIPTION: Provided design to modify the cardkey reader system and other miscellaneous equipment to work properly with the PAP modification. The combustible loading and fire severity tables were affected due to changes in room sizes and the addition of combustible material in the form of cable insulation.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The cable insulation added is considered in NFPA 803 to have a low or slow rate of combustion. The automatic suppression system is designed in accordance with applicable codes and is sized to accommodate more severe fire types than those postulated here.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-0-5479, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2159, 05/11/90

DESCRIPTION: Incorporated charging flow control valves Q1E21V347 and Q2E21V347 (FCV 122) into the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program. Also, the FAHA in the FSAR were revised for fire areas 2-1 and 2-5.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change adds components to the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program. The effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program is not decreased.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-0-5480, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2159, 05/11/90

DESCRIPTION: Incorporated service water dilution valves Q1P16V549-A and Q2P16V549-A and their associated circuits and equipment into the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program. Also, FAHA were added to the FSAR for fire areas 1-SVB3 and 2-SVB4.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change adds components to the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program. The effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program is not decreased.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-4832, Rev. 4

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2186, 08/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Provided design for a double leaf door (door #2487) in the Drum Storage Room in lieu of a single leaf door. A fence barrier with a single leaf door had been installed previously to prevent unauthorized entry to an exclusion area. The door was intended to facilitate crane operation and material handling. However, the single leaf door in the Drum storage room did not allow adequate clearance for crane operations. The FSAR was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The modification incorporated by this revision will prevent unauthorized or inadvertent entry into an exclusion area and will have no adverse impact on plant safety or the safe shut-down capability of the plant.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-4832, Revs. 0, 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 1973, 03/02/89

DESCRIPTION: Extended the installed chain link fence across the Unit 2 Drum Storage Room to a height of thirteen feet, which includes 3 strands of cantilevered barbed wire. Installed a vertical barrier at the southeast corner of the exclusion area. The vertical barrier runs up the walls to the underside of the slab to prevent someone from scaling the fence and using structures above the fence to gain access. Added combustible loads, in the form of cable insulation, to fire area 2-92. Changed the original door opening from 3' 3 1/2" to 7' 5" to allow full travel of the trolley for handling of materials within the exclusion area.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The enhancement of the existing barrier and the installation of additional barriers to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent entry into the exclusion area has no adverse impact on the safe shutdown of the plant. The additional combustible loads have not changed the maximum fire severity for fire area 2-92.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-4967, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate drawings to show the as-built arrangement for sampling the recycle evaporator. Drawings D-205039, Sheets 4 & 5, and FSAR Figure 9.3-8, Sheet 2, have been revised to depict the as-built configuration.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-4972, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/20/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate drawings to depict the removal of a temporary wall in the Unit 2 west cable chase. Temporary block walls were added to the plant for separation of Units 1 & 2 during construction and were removed when Unit 2 construction was completed. Several FSAR figures were revised to show this change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-5425, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205033, Sheet 2, to show the instrument air valves, valve numbers and test connections for the pneumatic controls of valves HV-3235A & HV-3235B, the steam admission valves for the TDAFWP. This information was added for completeness. FSAR Figure 10.3-1 was revised to incorporate this change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-5472, Rev. 0

FORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2159, 05/11/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205011, Sheet 3, D-205063 and D-205070, Sheet 2, to correct several errors dealing with the RHR pump room coolers. The drawing errors involved the two coolers being labeled backwards and an incorrect cooler TPNS number was referenced.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-5509, Rev. 0

FORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2170, 06/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205038, Sheet 2, and D-356355, Sheet 2 for the safety injection system to show the correct location of the tie-in of 10" line ECB-27. This line connects the low pressure safety injection header and the RWST. The tie-in is upstream of relief valve Q2E11V040 and vent valves Q2E11V057A & Q2E11V057B rather than downstream. This was necessary to reflect the as-built condition of the plant. FSAR Figure 6.3-2, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B88-2-5537, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2041, 08/01/89

DESCRIPTION: Blocked the opening into the Primary Spent Resin Storage Tank Valve Compartment Room, Room #2220. The existing half-height door was replaced with a wire mesh door. This room is an exclusion area due to radiological conditions.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This modification provides positive control of access to this exclusion area. The installation of the lockable door has no impact on the safe shut-down capability of the plant.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-0-5652 (SG), Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2046, 08/10/89

DESCRIPTION: Changed the power supply of the existing high mast lights to a diesel backed distribution panel.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The additional load to the motor control center was reviewed from voltage drop and short circuit considerations and found acceptable. The additional loading on the diesel generator during all design basis events was also reviewed and found acceptable.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-0-5652 (SG), Rev. 8

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2097, 11/28/89

DESCRIPTION: Reduced the vent area that existed from the MSVR penthouse to atmosphere. A portion of the south wall was blocked by installation of conduits, conduit supports and associated lighting. The total amount of vent area blockage is less than three square feet.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The safety evaluation concluded that the vent area blockage has negligible effect on MSVR post - main steam line break accident analyses, will not affect the seismic qualification of the wall, and will not adversely affect any safety related components.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-5615, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised steam generator blowdown processing system P&ID D-205071, Sheet 3, to include the equalizing valve for level transmitter LT-1165. This valve had not been shown on the drawing. The alignment of several valves was also corrected. Several normally closed valves had been shown as open and several normally open valves had been shown closed. FSAR Figure 10.4-6, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN BE9-2-5616, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205038, Sheet 2, for the safety injection system to show the correct location of a 3/4 inch test connection and drain line. The subject 3/4 inch line has isolation valves Q2E21V420A & Q2E21V420B and is attached to the accumulator nitrogen supply line. The as-built location is inside of containment, upstream of check valve Q2E21V058, rather than outside of containment as had been shown. FSAR Figure 6.3-2, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-5706, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2169, 06/07/90

DESCRIPTION: Modified the RHR pump miniflow control valve switches setpoints to account for the post-seismic setpoint shifts of up to $\pm 10\%$ determined during the Barton flow switch qualification test.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The revised setpoints ensure that the miniflow valves open when the actual flow falls below 500 gpm and that the valves close before the range of the flow switch is exceeded. The revised setpoints have no impact on the RHR system capability to perform its safety functions. These functions include controlled reduction in temperature of the reactor coolant during the second part of normal plant cooldown and low head safety injection and recirculation during a loss of coolant accident.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-5725, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-205039, Sheet 2, for the CVCS to show the two drain valves, Q2E21V906 and Q2E21V907, which are installed approximately 8 inches downstream of valve HCV-142. These valves had not been shown on the drawing previously. FSAR Figure 9.3-6, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-5811, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205039, Sheet 2, and D-356356 for the CVCS to depict the correct location of vent valve Q2E21V433. The valve is located on 8" line HCB-17 downstream of 8" line HCB-15. FSAR Figure 9.3-6, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-5812, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205041 and D-356358 to depict the as-built valve arrangement of vent valves Q2E11V072 A&B and drain valves Q2E11V074 A&B on the RHR piping in containment. FSAR Figure 5.5-6, Sheet 2, was revised. The two sets of valves had been shown at the same location. The revision shows that the vent valves are actually upstream of the drain valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-5813, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-204038, Sheet 1, and D-356355 to depict the actual arrangement of through vent and drain connections in the safety injection system. Also, the location of the containment missile barrier with respect to several components was corrected.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-5845, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2156, 05/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Downgraded the containment sump pumps from ASME code safety class 3 to safety class NNS. The pumps can be downgraded because the failure of the sump pumps would not result in releasing gaseous radioactivity to the environment. Also P&ID D-205004, Sheets 1 & 2, which show the containment sump pumps, were added to the FSAR as figures in Section 9.3. D-205004, Sheet 1, and FSAR Table 9.3-4 were revised to show the downgraded containment sump pump status.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-6124, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2175, 07/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings A-203582, Rev. 8, D-203267, Rev. 14 and D-203281, Rev. 14, to delete raceway AID258 from the Safe Shutdown (SSD) Report and other SSD raceway drawings. FSAR page 9B.B-200 was revised to incorporate the change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Although conduit AID258 was included in exemption request 2-B for fire area 2-005, a subsequent review of the cables in the raceway indicates that these cables are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. This PCN does not decrease the effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. Therefore, conduit AID258 may be deleted from the Appendix R safe shutdown list of raceway.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-6297, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised several CCW system drawings to show the piping downstream of Q2P17V014B, CCW to the 2B spent fuel pool heat exchanger inlet drain isolation valve, as cut and capped rather than routed to the floor drain tank. This work was performed under Minor Departure 89-2162 to allow the chromated water to be drained into drums in order to facilitate its management. FSAR Figure 9.2-6, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN B89-2-6308, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2172, 06/21/90

DESCRIPTION: Corrected drawing D-205047 by deleting one of the demineralized water drain valves, N2P11V896, which was erroneously shown twice. This valve is on the condenser seal water supply. FSAR Figure 9.2-7, Sheet 2, was revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN B90-2-6386, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2195, 08/23/90

DESCRIPTION: Deleted eight main control board annunciators and their associated circuitry. This was done as part of the control room design review. These annunciators included items associated with the boron injection tank and the associated heat tracing, the spray additive tank, the boric acid tanks, the boric acid batching tank, and the BTRS demineralizer.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These annunciators do not provide input to the plant protection system. They are not used in emergency operating procedures. Removal of these annunciators does not increase the probability of failure of any other plant equipment. These eight annunciators are not required for normal operation or during accident situations. The boron injection tank no longer contains concentrated boric acid, so the associated annunciators are no longer needed.

SUBJECT: PCN B90-2-6527, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2189, 08/07/90

DESCRIPTION: Changed the alarm setpoints for high and low pressure and level indicators in the accumulators.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Changing the alarm setpoints to a more conservative value will alert the operator that parameters are approaching TS limits. Currently, no alarm occurs until the TS limit is reached. Thus, corrective action can be initiated at a more conservative point, in most cases prior to entry into a TS Limiting Condition for Operation. The setpoint changes initiated by this PCN are used for annunciation only, and do not affect plant safety.

SUBJECT: PCN P90-2-6585, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2165, 05/29/90

DESCRIPTION: Conducted combustible loading analysis on the TSC (Rooms 2453, 2454, 2455 and 2456). This loading analysis included current combustible loading and the proposed installation of carpeting and wall covering, including wall adhesives.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Installation of carpeting and wall covering in the TSC does not significantly alter the area's combustible loading or adversely impact any safe shut-down capabilities. Additionally, the resultant increase in combustible loading will not adversely impact any FNP structure or system.

SUBJECT: PCN P90-2-6976, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2246, 12/12/90

DESCRIPTION: Added test connections adjacent to the turbine steam chest to allow data acquisition by plant personnel. New piping test connections were added to existing instrument roots on the steam chest, existing sample roots on the turbine inlet piping and stud welded test connections on the steam chest inlet piping.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The new piping test connections meet the requirements of SS-1109-2 and approved configurations in FNP-O-PMP-302. The stud welded connections are surface mounted and do not penetrate the pipe wall. Plant safety will not be adversely affected.

SUBJECT: PCN S86-0-3667, Rev. 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Updated FSAR Section 9.5.2 to reflect the communications equipment available to complete a safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire. This change was based on the Fire Protection Communications By Fire Area Reports (A-180583 and A-203583) which contain the results of a study to determine the communications equipment (public address, telephone, and sound powered systems) that could be inoperable due to a fire in any given area of the Auxiliary Building, the Diesel Building, the SWIS and the RWIS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes are editorial in nature and serve only to clarify the FSAR sections. These changes do not result in a physical change to the plant or functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S87-0-4393, Revs. 0, 1, 2

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2103, 12/12/89
PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Deleted the existing high point vent path from the fuel oil system for D/G 1-2A and added a new vent path from the fuel oil filter to a vent line utilized by the D/G day tank. Check valve QSR43V769 in the old vent path was deleted since it was no longer needed. A pipe guard was installed to prevent fuel oil from spilling into the Diesel Building hallway should a line failure occur. The pipe class for this pipe guard was downgraded from class HBC to HBD per revision 2 of this PCN.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change will have no adverse effect on the seismic qualification or safety related function of the D/G, either in its emergency standby mode or its operational mode. The vent line will be seismically supported and the pipe guard will be seismically qualified.

SUBJECT: PCN S87-0-4494, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised several nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen system P&IDs to agree with the piping drawings. Revisions were necessary because some valves were not properly shown as being in a valve box and others were not shown on the P&IDs at all. FSAR Figure 11.3-3, Sheets 1 and 2, were revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S87-0-4556, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Documented new setpoints for the air compressors associated with the 2C D/G. Minor Departure 87-1729 provided new setpoints to prevent overlap between the start/stop setpoints for the air compressors and the setpoint for the normal air receiver pressure status light. FSAR Figure 9.5-20 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN S87-0-4567, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Documented changing the "A" train river water system flow transmitter, NSP25FT504, from an L&N Century Model 470 to a Rosemount 1151DP per Minor Departure 87-1751. This requires a revision of FSAR Figure 9.2-1, Sheet 2, because the instrument number has been changed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

SUBJECT: PCN S87-2-4394, Revs. 0, 1, 2

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2103, 12/12/89
PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Deleted the existing high point vent path from the fuel oil system for diesel generator 2B and added a new vent path from the fuel oil filter to a vent line utilized by the diesel generator day tank. Check valve Q2R43V582 in the old vent path was deleted since it was no longer needed. A pipe guard was installed to prevent fuel oil from spilling into the Diesel Building hallway should a line failure occur. The pipe class for this pipe guard was downgraded from class HBC to HBD per revision 2 of this PCN.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change will have no adverse effect on the seismic qualification or safety related function of the diesel generator, either in its emergency standby mode or its operational mode. The vent line will be seismically supported and the pipe guard will be seismically qualified.

SUBJECT: PCN S87-2-4531, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Changed setpoints for the air compressors associated with D/G 2B per Minor Departure 87-1731 to prevent overlap between air compressor start/stop pressures and the pressure range at which the normal air receiver pressure status light operates. FSAR Figure 9.5-19 was revised to reflect these changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN S87-2-4707, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Removed the mark number "In. 642-6" from main feed pump suction pressure switch N2N21PS627 on P&ID D-200011. The original pressure switch, which had the mark number, was replaced due to maintenance problems. This modification of the mark number required a revision of FSAR Figure 10.4-3, Sheet 7.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-4768, Revs. 0 and 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised domestic physical drawings (D-170331, D-170332 and D-170339) and the associated FSAR figures (Figures 9.4-10, Sheet 2, 9.4-9, Sheet 1, and 9.4-14) to show the as-built configuration of HVAC damper actuators in the Diesel Generator Building, RWIS and SWIS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-4772, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the existing documentation for the sanitary water system to reflect as-built conditions. The documentation referenced drawings that did not exist. Also, the sanitary water storage tank drain valve was incorrectly shown open and the "C" sanitary water pump was duplicated on two separate P&ID's. Finally, the valving at the sanitary water supply to the water treatment plant was incorrectly shown. FSAR Figure 9.2-8 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-4779, Rev. 1

PORC REVIEW: FORC Meeting 2169, 06/07/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Tables 6.2-31 (Containment Isolation Valve Information) and 6.2-38 (Containment Penetrations), various FSAR figures, and the applicable P&IDs and drawings to reflect the correct penetration numbers and service information. There were no changes to valve arrangements, valve types, isolation signals, normal post-LOCA positions, valve positions with power failure, or valve closure times.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-4920, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2150, 04/19/90

DESCRIPTION: Documented new setpoints for the air compressors associated with the 1C diesel generator. Minor Departure 88-1812 provided new setpoints to prevent overlap between the air compressor start/stop pressure and the normal air receiver pressure status lights. FSAR Figure 9.5-20 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-4980, Revs. 0 and 3

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2169, 06/07/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised plant documentation to show that old model HFA relays have been replaced. 462 of 500 General Electric HFA51 auxiliary relays in use throughout the plant have been replaced with new "Century Series" HFA 100 relays. The old model HFA51 relays cracked under severe service conditions causing the coil insulation to melt and short to ground, preventing the relays from tripping properly. The associated FSAR figures were revised to reflect the preceding changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-5038, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2156, 05/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-170110 and FSAR Figure 9.2-25 for the well water system to show an additional existing isolation valve in the discharge line of well water pump #2. This valve is on the underground portion of the piping and had not been shown previously. Also, the label on tank NSP27T501 was changed to "Filtered Water Storage Tank" for consistency with other references.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-5156, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Redrew plant general arrangement drawing D-170084 to a quality such that legible prints can be made. This drawing had deteriorated over the years and had become illegible. FSAR Figure 1.2-1 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes are editorial in nature and serve only to clarify the FSAR sections. These changes do not result in a physical change to the plant or functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-5331, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2156, 05/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Approved Automatic Switch Company model S111AR-TF10A44R for use to replace river water header pressure switches QSP25PS512, PS513, PS514 and PS515. Replacement parts are no longer available and the vendor who originally supplied the existing switches can no longer provide a seismically qualified switch. The replacement switches have seismic and performance specifications which meet or exceed those of the existing switches. FSAR Figure 9.2-1, Sheet 1, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-5350, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/20/90

DESCRIPTION: Installed a 4" sample connection with threaded cap on the manway of the 2C D/G fuel oil storage tank, QSY52T504. This connection provides a method to perform routine bottom sampling of the tank without removing the manway.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The addition of a 4" threaded sample connection has been evaluated and meets the requirements of the applicable codes. Therefore, this modification will not invalidate the existing seismic qualification of the tank nor adversely affect its safety related function.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-5352, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/20/90

DESCRIPTION: Installed a 4" sample connection with threaded cap on the manway of the 1-2A and 1C D/G fuel oil storage tanks, QSY52T501 and QSY52T503. This connection provides a method to perform routine bottom sampling of the tank without removing the manway.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The addition of a 4" threaded sample connection has been evaluated and meets the requirements of the applicable codes. Therefore, this modification will not invalidate the existing seismic qualification of the tanks nor adversely affect their safety related function.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-0-5559, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2163, 05/18/90

DESCRIPTION: Corrected computer room and control HVAC P&ID D-205012 to show actuator HV3622 installed on QSV47V002A and actuator HV3623 installed on QSV47V002B. The drawing had actuators HV3622 and HV3623 swapped. QSV47V002A and QSV47V002B are the isolation dampers for the computer room HVAC return fan. FSAR Figure 9.4-1, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-4884, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2148, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Figure 9B-44 to correct the description of room 2168 in the Auxiliary Building. The figure had shown a laundry and hot shower tank pump in room 2168. However, this pump exists on Unit 1 only.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-4922, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/17/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings for the Auxiliary Building to identify room number 2324 as the "Primary Chemistry Lab". The associated FSAR figures were revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-4996, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205019 and D-205161 to reflect the addition of a new line number, HCB-102, in the post-accident containment venting system. Line number HCB-102 was created in order to describe actual service conditions downstream of throttling valve PCV-3532 and up to the filtration unit. FSAR Figure 6.2-104 was revised to reflect this drawing change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5063, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/20/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the radiation zone maps and post-LOCA radiation zone maps to reflect current expected dose rates and radiation zone classifications. FSAR Figures 12.1-12 through 12.1-20 and 12.1-27 through 12.1-31 were revised to reflect the new dose rates and radiation zones.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5238, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the Auxiliary Building fire barrier delineation drawings and fire zone data sheets to depict rooms 2404, 2403, 2420/2421, 2447, 2150, 2167, 2179, 2601, 2602 and 2603 as "Combustible Storage Rooms". The following FSAR figures were revised to depict the preceding changes: 9B-49, 9B-54, 9B-58, 9B-59, 9B-45, 9B-44, 9B-60. FAHAs for fire areas 2-4 and Tables 9B.C-5 and 9B.C-6 were also revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5243, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/20/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Section 9B.4.1.9 and several plant drawings to reflect that Auxiliary Building fire hose cabinets D-108 and D-119 have 100 foot fire hoses installed instead of the original 75 foot hoses. The replacement hoses were installed per Minor Departure 88-1917 because of the requirement that all interior areas of the Auxiliary Building must be within reach of a hose stream from at least one permanently installed fire hose.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5333, Rev. 2

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2117, 01/19/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-200019, Sheet 1, to depict the installation of Pacific model 6-180-U-WE(40) check valves as replacements for Walworth model 5341 check valves. These 5 inch check valves are used in several non-safety related applications. The Walworth valves are no longer available and will be replaced as needed. FSAR Figure 9.3-1, Sheet 4, was revised to reflect this change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5344, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-205034, Sheet 4, to depict as-built conditions. The revised drawing shows an instrument air isolation valve for instrument air pressure indicator PI-2228 and an instrument air drain valve for the line that supplies backup air to the PORVs. Also, this PCN assigned TPNS numbers to the valves. FSAR Figure 9.3-1, Sheet 8, was revised to depict these changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5351, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/20/90

DESCRIPTION: Installed a 4" sample connection with threaded cap on the manway of the 2B D/G fuel oil storage tank, Q2Y52T503. This connection provides a method to perform routine bottom sampling of the tank without removing the manway.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Addition of the 4" threaded sample connection has been evaluated and meets the requirements of the applicable codes. Therefore, this modification will not invalidate the existing seismic qualification of the tank nor adversely affect its safety related function.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5387, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205012, HVAC in the control room and computer room, to depict the input from radiation monitors RE-35A and RE-35B to the TSC HVAC system. This PCN revised FSAR Figure 9.4-1, Sheet 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5474, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Created P&ID D-205042, Sheet 6, for the hydrogen recombiner skid package and assigned TPNS numbers to the skid valves. FSAR Figure 11.3-3 was revised to reflect this change. Also, existing documentation will be revised to reflect the as-built location of PI-1107A.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S88-2-5557, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2169, 06/07/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate drawings to show a small non-designated room above the No. 2 stairwell and to clarify the wall rating of the west wall of room 2192 (auxiliary feedwater pump room). The room has been designated Room No. 2431 and has been incorporated into Fire Area 2-4. FSAR Appendix 9B, Figure 9B-60, was revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems. Also, this design change reflects analyses required to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R. The effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program is not decreased.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-0-5620, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2170, 06/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised seventeen FSAR Fire Zone Data Sheets and their associated plant drawings to reflect as-built conditions and to enhance their usability by operations and fire brigade personnel. The drawings contained errors in room and door identification, lacked some as-built architectural details and needed some clarifying notes on various room configurations. Additionally, two architectural drawings, D-176060 and D-206060, were revised to provide fire area designation to a duct chase.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-0-5814, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Figure 9B-29 (D-508500), Fire Zone Data Sheet for the Service Water Intake Structure, to identify clearly the train A and B disconnect switches and to show all of the existing bottle racks for the high pressure carbon dioxide systems which provide fire protection to various switchgear.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-0-5916, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2163, 05/18/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the well water system P&ID D-170110 to show a sample valve and pressure switch needle valve installed on the discharge of each well water pump as indicated on the instrument detail sheets A-170254, Sheets 68, 92 and 93. FSAR Figure 9.2-25 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-0-6029, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2169, 06/07/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the fire protection annunciator list, drawing D-170353 and FSAR Figure 9B-37, to reflect as-built conditions. Previously, the list had indicated that high pressure CO₂ system 1-SW-99 provided coverage to "500 V" switchgear Bus 1-2K and 5KV disconnect switches "No. 1 & No. 2". In fact, coverage is to "600 V" switchgear Bus 1-2K and 5KV disconnect switches "1A" and "1B".

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-0-6065, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2151, 04/20/90

DESCRIPTION: Updated D-173490, D-173491, and FSAR Section 9.2.9.3 to show the installation of a 10 second Agastat time delay relay for the #1 well water pump. Minor Departure 89-2095 made this change to prevent the pump from tripping due to periodic system pressure spikes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-0-6273, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2172, 06/21/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings and FSAR Figures 9B-40 and 9B-42 to show clearly that a portion of the south wall of the Unit 1 Turbine Building is shared with the Service Building and that this common wall has a three hour fire rating.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5608, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2145, 04/10/90

DESCRIPTION: Powered the main generator hydrogen instrumentation from a different 600V bus to prevent nuisance alarms caused by voltage transients. This was achieved by swapping the normal and standby feeds to 208V switchgear 2A, which feeds the instrumentation. Following the change, the normal feed to this switchgear is from 600V load center 2P and the standby feed is from 600V load center 2G. FSAR Section 8.3.1 and FSAR Figures 8.3-49 and 8.3-50 were revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This configuration will provide more reliable power to 208V switchgear 2A loads and will also align the 208V 2A switchgear in a manner similar to Unit 1 208V 1A switchgear. Both 600V buses 2P and 2G are non-safety related and are isolated from safety related buses so that equipment failures will not affect safety related equipment. The 208V switchgear 2A load will be added to 600V bus 2P and 4KV bus 2D which are non-safety related. Since load center 2G is fed from a safety-related bus, this will result in a decrease in load on the safety related buses.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5633, Rev. 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2170, 06/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Figure 9B-59 (drawing D-508946) and the FAHA for fire area 2-4 to reflect the correct room numbers assigned to the demineralizer compartments. The numbers were inconsistent with the architectural floor plan drawings which are the controlling documents. The revision will result in uniformity between Auxiliary Building drawings.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5634, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-200189, Unit 2 fire suppression and detection annunciator list, to depict FPS 2A-101 as an automatic preaction sprinkler system as well as a fire hose station. This brings the documents associated with FPS 2A-101 in agreement with each other. FSAR Figures 9B-38 and 9B-45 were revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5697, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2170, 06/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the instruction manual for the motor driven AFW pumps (U-214855) to replace a superseded vendor drawing. Also, FSAR Table 6.5-1 was revised to correct the material shown for the motor driven AFW pump impeller and shaft.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5802, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-508945, Fire Zone Data Sheets, to depict the existence of door 2463 between rooms 2445 and 2450 in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building. This configuration is consistent with the architectural and Auxiliary Building door schedule drawings. FSAR Figure 9B-58 was revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5818, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-508955 to depict the coverage area of fire protection sprinkler system 2T-121 and the location of the control station for 2T-121. Sprinkler system 2T-121 provides fire suppression coverage for the Unit 2 Turbine Building system operator work station.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5855, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate FSAR figures and FAHA 2-6 to show that the phosphate tank and pump area is assigned room number 2199. Also, the MCC 2C room number was corrected to be 2448 rather than 2447 as previously shown.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-5963, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2170, 06/15/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205000, Sheet 2, and FSAR Figure 10.3-5, which show the chemical injection system, to incorporate the changes made by Minor Departure 89-2078. A drain valve was added to each of the five chemical injection strainers and five additional drain valves were noted as normally closed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-6080, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2172, 06/21/90

DESCRIPTION: Corrected several discrepancies and omissions on the hydrogen recombiner P&IDs, D-205042, Sheets 9 & 10. FSAR Figures 11.3-2, Sheet 2, and 11.3-3, Sheet 2, were revised accordingly. Some connections, labels and other information were inadvertently missed or not shown properly when these P&IDs were developed from the vendor's drawings.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S89-2-6201, Rev. 1

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90

DESCRIPTION: Relocated the three existing smoke detectors and installed two new smoke detectors for FPS 2A-39 in room 2346, motor-generator set room, in order to meet the requirements of NFPA 72E.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Implementation of these modifications will bring the system into compliance with applicable codes, regulatory requirements and licensing commitments.

SUBJECT: PCN S90-0-6447, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2175, 07/03/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised the diesel generator compressed air start system documentation to delineate the break between safety-related and non safety-related piping and components. FSAR Figures 9.5-19 and 9.5-20 were revised accordingly. Also, FSAR Section 9.5.6 was revised to clarify the air start system design basis.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes are editorial in nature and serve only to clarify the FSAR sections. These changes do not result in a physical change to the plant or functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: PCN S90-0-6654, Rev. 0

PORC REVIEW: PORC Meeting 2194, 08/21/90

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings A-170750, B-175968 and D-170110 to clarify the low level alarm setpoints for the fire protection water storage tanks. Additionally, drawing B-170249, Sheet 67C, was revised to show the start-stop setpoints for the primary well water pump which supplies the fire protection water tanks. FSAR Figure 9.2-25 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT: GO-NG-9, "Administrative Control of Plant Services Approved Suppliers List," Revision 7

NORS REVIEW: NORB Meeting 90-1, 03/09/90

DESCRIPTION: Revision 7 presents the changes involved during the formation of SNC. This includes an SNC Procurement Department totally dedicated to supporting purchasing for Southern Company's nuclear units, and the establishment of the Corporate Quality Services section for quality evaluations of suppliers for the system's nuclear units.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision provides changes in organizational responsibilities as discussed above. There are no changes in the performance of quality-related purchasing or evaluations of suppliers for the system's nuclear units.

SUBJECT: GO-NG-12, "Procurement and Procurement Document Control," Revision 11

NORB REVIEW: NORB Meeting 90-1, 03/09/90

DESCRIPTION: Revision 11 presents the changes involved during the formation of SNC. This includes an SNC Procurement Department totally dedicated to supporting purchasing for Southern Company's nuclear units, and the establishment of the Corporate Quality Services section for quality evaluations of suppliers for the system's nuclear units.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision provides changes in organizational responsibilities as discussed above. There are no changes in the performance of quality-related purchasing or evaluations of suppliers for the system's nuclear units.

SUBJECT: GO-NG-33, "Operational Procurement Interface for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant," Revision 8

NORB REVIEW: NORB Meeting 90-3, 09/19/90

DESCRIPTION: This procedure provided guidance for operational procurement interfaces with FNP. Revision 8 deleted GO-NG-33 because the basic responsibilities for the Procurement Department which had been covered by this procedure are now addressed by the SNC Procurement Department QA Program. Responsibilities of other organizations involved in operational procurement for FNP are described in administrative procedures listed on the Operations Quality Assurance Policy Implementation List (OQAPIL).

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision deletes GO-NG-33 because its activities are addressed by other approved procedures and/or manuals.

SUBJECT: "Operations Quality Assurance Policy Implementation List," Revision 17

NORB REVIEW: NORB Meeting 90-2, 06/22/90

DESCRIPTION: Revision 17 provides the changes in the corporate organization and transfer of responsibilities resulting from the formation of SNC. The changes include a transfer of responsibilities for certain aspects of the Quality Assurance Program. Since SNC Corporate Quality Services is committed to maintain a program for review and audit of vendor quality assurance programs in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, this does not reduce the scope of audit coverage described in the FSAR. Also, the responsibility for performing specification reviews has been transferred from Nuclear Administration to Nuclear Engineering. This transfer of responsibility does not change the quality assurance program commitments for specification reviews described in the FSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision transfers the responsibility for reviewing the auditing of quality assurance programs of suppliers of material and services for FNP from APC's Manager of Safety Audit and Engineering Review to SNC Corporate Quality Services, and transfers specification reviews from Nuclear Administration to Nuclear Engineering.

SUBJECT: "Safety Audit and Engineering Review Administrative Procedures Manual," Revision 18

NORB REVIEW: NORB Meeting 90-2, 06/22/90

DESCRIPTION: Revision 18 provides the changes in the corporate organization and transfer of responsibilities resulting from the formation of SNC. The changes include a transfer of responsibilities for certain aspects of the Quality Assurance Program. Since SNC Corporate Quality Services is committed to maintain a program for review and audit of vendor quality assurance programs in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, this does not reduce the scope of audit coverage described in the PSAR. Also, the responsibility for processing FNP purchase orders has been transferred from APC's Purchasing Department to the SNC Procurement Department. This transfer of responsibility does not change the quality assurance program commitments for procurement document control as described in the PSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision transfers the responsibility for reviewing the auditing of quality assurance programs of suppliers of material and services for FNP from APC's Manager of Safety Audit and Engineering Review to SNC Corporate Quality Services, and transfers the responsibility for processing FNP purchase orders from the APC Purchasing Department to the SNC Procurement Department.
