



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Hope Creek Operations

March 26, 1991

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT NO. 1
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 90-029-01

A revised abstract is being submitted for the subject LER. When the original LER was submitted, coded fields 14 and 15 (Supplemental Report Expected?) indicated that a revised LER would be submitted. The fields were coded in error on an early draft of the document, prior to approval. Subsequent to completion of the draft, sufficient information regarding the event became known such that a supplement is/was not required. When the completed LER was submitted, the coding on fields 14 and 15 was not removed. The purpose of this letter is to resubmit the original abstract with the corrected supplemental report fields.

Sincerely,

J.J. Hagan
General Manager -
Hope Creek Operations

RBC/

Attachment

C Distribution

The Energy People

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FDR ADOCK 05000354
S FDR

IE22
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95-2170 (RSM) 46

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

FACILITY NAME (1) HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 5 4				PAGE (3) 1 OF 11	
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TITLE (4): EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION - ELECTRICAL SPIKE ON CHANNEL "A" LOGIC RESULTS IN AUTO START OF CHANNEL "A" COMPONENTS - MULTIPLE CAUSES

EVENT DATE (5) MONTH DAY YEAR			LER NUMBER (6) YEAR ** NUMBER ** REV				REPORT DATE (7) MONTH DAY YEAR			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) FACILITY NAME(S) DOCKET NUMBER(S)									
1	1	2690	9	0	-	0	2	9	-	0	1	0	3	2	6	9	1		

OPERATING MODE (9)		1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR: (CHECK ONE OR MORE BELOW) (11)													
POWER LEVEL	1 0 0	20.402(b)				20.405(c)				XX 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)	
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)	
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				XX 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				Abstract below	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				and in Text)	
////////////////////		20.405(a)(2)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Richard Cowles, Senior Staff Engineer - Technical										TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 0 9 3 3 9 3 4 3 1			
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC?	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC?
B	EJ	BYC	C173	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED? (14)		YES	NO	XX	DATE EXPECTED (15)			MONTH	DAY	YEAR	////////////////////
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ABSTRACT (16)

On 11/26/90 at 1119, while energizing the Channel "A" 125VDC Battery Charger during the performance of an 18 month capacity test, the charger output voltage spiked high and initiated an electrical system response that resulted in actuation of the Channel "A" Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) logic. Actuation of the ECCS logic caused the following ECCS responses: initiation of the Core Spray (CS) system, Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), and Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) load shedding of the "A" vital electrical bus. During the course of the above ECCS actuations, HPCI injected to the reactor vessel for approximately 4 seconds prior to being secured. An unusual event (UE) was declared at 1143 due to the ECCS injection to the vessel, and was immediately terminated due to the short duration of the injection. All affected systems were returned to a normal, standby status, and the plant returned to a normal operating configuration. Subsequent investigation determined that multiple causes contributed to this event, including failure of a battery charger control logic card, and a less than optimum design of the ECCS actuation instrumentation power distribution scheme. Corrective actions included, scheduling implementation of a previously identified design change on the ECCS instrument power distribution scheme, replacing control logic cards on the Channel "A" Battery Charger, forwarding the failed logic card to the vendor for evaluation, and reviewing the integrated response of plant systems to the event.