



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-395/82-58

Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company
 Columbia, SC 29218

Facility Name: V. C. Summer

Docket No. 50-395

License No. NPF-12

Inspection at V.C. Summer plant site near Jenkinsville, S. C.

Inspector: *P. T. Burnett* 29-12-82
 P. T. Burnett Date Signed

Approved by: *F. Jape* 12/29/82
 F. Jape, Section Chief Date Signed
 Engineering Program Branch
 Division of Engineering and Operational Programs

SUMMARY

Inspection on December 6-10, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved thirty-two inspector-hours on site in the areas of witnessing power operations tests, review of test results, and closeout of outstanding items.

Results

No violations or deviations were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *O. W. Dixon, Vice President-Nuclear Operations
- *O. S. Bradham, Plant Manager
- *J. G. Connelly, Deputy Plant Manager
- *B. G. Croley, Assistant Manager-Technical Support
- *L. F. Storz, Assistant Manager-Plant Operations
- *V. R. Albert, Assistant Manager-Support Services
- *S. F. Fipps, Director of Technical Services
- G. Taylor, Reactor Engineer
- *A. R. Koon, Technical Services Coordinator

Other licensee employees contacted included three shift supervisors, two technicians, six operators, four shift technical advisors and five office personnel.

Other Organizations

L. A. Wooldrige, Westinghouse

NRC Resident Inspector

*J. L. Skolds, Senior Resident Inspector

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 10, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Level IV Violation (395/82-52-01): Procedure STP-114,002 not adequate to perform surveillance of reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage. Revision 1 of the procedure was reviewed. This version of the procedure properly accounts for changes in RCS average temperature and pressurizer level. The revised procedure has been in use since November 13, 1982.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Power Operations Tests (72528, 72576 and 72600)

The inspector witnessed portions of the following initial power operations tests:

- POT-3, Feedwater Pump Speed Control Test,
- POT-4, Automatic Reactor Control Test, and
- POT-6.1, Power Coefficient Determination at 30% Power.

During all periods of observation, coordination of activities between operations and test personnel was satisfactory. Test personnel appeared to be familiar with the test procedures and the acceptance criteria.

The evaluations of data from POT-6.1 were reviewed by the inspector. The acceptance criterion for agreement of predicted and measured ratios of doppler coefficient to isothermal temperature coefficient was satisfied.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Test Results (72596 and 72598)

Review of HST-7 (Revision 3, changes 1-9), Pressurizer Spray and Heater Capability and Continuous Spray Flow Settings, revealed that the Level I acceptance criteria had been met. Two Level II acceptance criteria were not satisfied: the response of the pressurizer to either full spray or full heater actuation was not as rapid as predicted. These issues are being pursued with the reactor vendor.

ZPT-6.0 (Revision 0, changes 1-3), Worth of Shutdown Banks Less Highest Worth Stuck Rod, was reviewed. The Level I acceptance criterion that the worth of all rods less the highest worth rod be greater than 6790 pcm was satisfied. One Level II acceptance criterion was not satisfied: The worth of shutdown bank B, less rod B-8, was less than predicted. This discrepancy was resolved by the vendor, who determined that the licensee's method of predicting worth was not appropriate to the configuration in use. That is, no valid comparison could be made since the vendor had not analyzed the configuration. The criterion in question was a check on design, not safety margin. As part of ZPT-6.0 the licensee performed a least-squares fit of integral reactivity from control rod worth measurements to boron concentration from endpoint measurements and obtained a boron worth co-efficient of 10.7 pcm/ppm. That action resolves inspector followup item 395/82-56-02.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Followup of Outstanding Items (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup item (395/82-56-01): Resolve issue of high worth of control bank A. Review of the file on ZPT-5.4 confirmed that the issue had been brought to the attention of the NSS vendor, who is following it on a generic basis. Because control bank A rods are located near the periphery of the core, the worth of that bank has been more difficult to calculate for all facilities.

(Closed) Inspector Followup item (395/82-56-02): Review boron worth determination. See discussion of ZPT-6.0 in paragraph 6.

(Closed) Inspector Followup item (395/82-56-03): Confirm proper review of ZPT-3.3. Review of the file on ZPT-3.3 confirmed that the completed test has been reviewed by the PSRC and approved by the station manager.

(Closed) Inspector Followup item (395/81-30-05): This item was closed in inspection Report No. 82-47, but improperly reported as item 81-30-03, which was closed in Report No. 82-28.