



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

December 30, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-146/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station
Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,
we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable
Occurrence 82-146/03L. This report is required within
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H. J. Midura", is written above the typed name.

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks

CC: Distribution

8301250424 821230
PDR ADOCK 05000311
S PDR

The Energy People

Handwritten initials "IEU" in dark ink, slanted upwards to the right.

Report Number: 82-146/03L
Report Date: 12-29-82
Occurrence Date: 11-30-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Sump Monitoring System - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-498.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 82 % - Unit Load 910 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1030 hours, November 30, 1982, Containment Sump Discharge Valve 2WL16 was deactivated in the closed position to comply with Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.3b. The closing of the valve rendered the Containment Sump Monitoring System inoperable. Therefore Action Statement 3.4.7.1 was entered.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Due to a loss of valve position indication at the control board, Valve 2WL16 was intentionally failed closed, resulting in isolation of the containment sump pump discharge flowpath.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Containment Sump Monitoring System is utilized as a Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection System to monitor and detect leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. Since the redundant detection systems were operable, the incident involved no risk to the health and safety of the public.

Technical Specification 3.4.7.1 requires:

With only two of the above required leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours when the required gaseous and/or particulate radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The valve position limit switch was adjusted, and valve position indication was regained. Valve 2WL16 was reopened at 1138 hours, November 30, 1982, rendering the Containment Sump Monitoring System operable, and terminating Action Statement 3.4.7.1.

FAILURE DATA:

Masoneilan International, Inc.
3-inch Control Valve
Model 38-20561

Prepared By F. Dickey



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-114