1	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
/0/1/	CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) $/V/A/N/A/S/1/$ (2) $/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/$ (3) $/4/1/1/1/1/$ (4) $////(5)$ LICENSEE CODELICENSE NUMBERLICENSE TYPECAT
/0/1/	$\frac{\text{REPORT}}{\text{SOURCE}} \frac{/L}{/} (6) \frac{/0/5/0/0/3/3/8}{\text{DOCKET NUMBER}} (7) \frac{/1/2/0/5/8/2}{\text{EVENT DATE}} (8) \frac{/1/2/2/1/8/2}{\text{REPORT DATE}} (9)$ $\frac{1/2}{2} \frac{1/2}{2} \frac{1/8}{2} \frac{1}{2} $
/0/2/	/ On December 05, 1982, while in Mode 2, the 3A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was re- /
/0/3/	/ moved from service contrary to T.S. 3.7.1.2. This was done to determine the /
/0/4/	/ cause of the instantaneous overcurrent flag drops on A and C phase. Since the /
/0/5/	/ redundant auxiliary feedwater trains were available and the affected pump was /
/0/6/	/ returned to service within the time frame requirement, the health and safety of /
/0/7/	/ the public were not affected. This event is reportable pursuant to /
/0/8/	/ T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. / SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
<u>/0/9</u> / (17)	$\frac{/W/G}{(11)} \frac{/X}{(12)} \frac{/Z}{(13)} \frac{/C/K/T/B/K/R}{(14)} \frac{/A}{(15)} \frac{/Z}{(16)}$ $\frac{/Z}{(16)}$ $\frac{LER/RO}{REPORT}$ $\frac{EVENT}{VEAR}$ $\frac{REPORT}{REPORT} NO.$ $\frac{CODE}{TYPE}$ $\frac{NUMBER}{8/2/} \frac{/A}{-1} \frac{/O/9/0}{/0/9/0} \frac{/A}{10/3} \frac{/L}{10/3} \frac{/L}{10/3}$
ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
$\frac{/X}{(26)}$ (18)	8) $\underline{/Z}/(19)$ $\underline{/Z}/(20)$ $\underline{/Z}/(21)$ $\underline{/0/0/0/}(22)$ $\underline{/Y}/(23)$ $\underline{/N}/(24)$ $\underline{/A}/(25)$ $\underline{/1/2/0/2}/$
CAU	USE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
/1/0/	/ The cause of the flag drops could not be determined. The flags were reset, the /
/1/1/	/ motor was bridged and meggerred with no discrepancies. The pump was started and /
/1/2/	/ operated with satisfactory results and returned to service. /
/1/3/	1
/1/4/	/

.

/1/4/		1
/1/5/	FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY /C/(28) /0/0/0/(29) / NA / (30) /A/(31) / Operator Observation	(32)
/1/6/	ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) <u>/Z/(33)/Z/(34)/ NA // NA</u>	1
/1/7/	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA PERSONNEL INJURIES / NA	
/1/8/	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) /0/0/0/ (40) / NA	/
/1/9/	Iteration (43) 1/2/ (42) 1/2/ NA	1
/2/0/	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) /N/ (44) / NA ////////////////////////////////////	1
	NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151 B212300315 B21221 PDR ADOCK 05000338 S PDR	_

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-338 Attachment to LER 82-090/03L-0

Description of Event

On December 5, 1982 while in Mode 2, the instantaneous overcurrent trip flags were found to have dropped on the 3A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Power Supply Breaker. The A and C phase flag drops were discovered during a routine surveillance of switchgear by Operations Personnel. There was no breaker trouble indication or trip annunciator on the main control board. The pump was declared inoperable and the T.S. 3.7.1.2 Action Statement was entered to allow investigation into the cause of the flags. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The Auxiliary Feedwater System is designed to enable the removal of decay heat from the reactor core and cool the unit to 350°F following a loss of off-site power. The pump was removed from service only for investigation into the cause of the flags. The pump would still have auto-started if required with the flags dropped. Also, the redundant feedwater trains remained operable. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Cause of Occurrence

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The cause of the dropped flag is unknown. In the past, the drop of the flags has been attributed to vibration. The overcurrent condition can only exist if the supply breaker is closed. In this case, the breaker would have tripped open giving trouble indication in the Control Room. Since this did not occur, an overcurrent condition probably did not occur. In order to further ensure this did not occur, the pump was removed from service to check the motor. There were no problems found.

Immediate Corrective Action

The pump motor was bridged and meggered with satisfactory results. The VEPCO Automation and Control Department was contacted to determine the cause of the flag drops. When it was determined that an overcurrent condition did not occur, the pump was started and operated using the Periodic Test procedure. The pump was returned to service.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further corrective actions are necessary.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

No further corrective actions are necessary.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications from this event.