NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 LICENSEE CODE: A L B R F 2 ② LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 ③ LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 ④ CAT: ⑤

CON'T 0 1 REPORT SOURCE: L ⑥ DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0 ⑦ EVENT DATE: 1 2 0 4 8 2 ⑧ REPORT DATE: 1 2 1 7 8 2 ⑨

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

0 2 During refuel outage, while performing SI 4.2.B-27 (Suppression Chamber High-Level)
0 3 level switches, LS-73-57A and 57B (HPCI suction valve interlock) were found
0 4 inoperable. Tech. Spec. Table 3.2.B requires a minimum of one operable per trip
0 5 system. There was no effect on public health or safety because control room
0 6 suppression chamber water level instrumentation was available and operable.
0 7
0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE	I B ⑪
CAUSE CODE	X ⑫
CAUSE SUBCODE	Z ⑬
COMPONENT CODE	I N S T R U ⑭
COMP SUBCODE	S ⑮
VALVE SUBCODE	Z ⑯

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER — EVENT YEAR	8 2
	—
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	0 3 9
	/
OCCURRENCE CODE	0 1
REPORT TYPE	X
	—
REVISION NO.	0

ACTION TAKEN	B ⑱
FUTURE ACTION	Z ⑲
EFFECT ON PLANT	Z ⑳
SHUTDOWN METHOD	Z ㉑
HOURS ㉒	0 0 0 0
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	Y ㉓
NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	N ㉔
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	L ㉕
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	R 2 9 0 ㉖

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

1 0 The Robertshaw model 82798-C3 level switch floats were stuck. The floats were
1 1 freed and the level switches were recalibrated, functionally tested and returned
1 2 to service. In the future, the surveillance test will be performed immediately
1 3 before the suppression chamber is drained so that sw[illegible]perability can be
1 4 determined.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS: H ㉘ % POWER: 0 0 0 ㉙ OTHER STATUS ㉚: NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B ㉛ DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ㉜: Surveillance Testing

1 6 ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z ㉝ CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z ㉞ AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉟: NA LOCATION OF RELEASE ㊱: NA

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 ㊲ TYPE: Z ㊳ DESCRIPTION ㊴: NA

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 ㊵ DESCRIPTION ㊶: NA

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸ TYPE: Z ㊷ DESCRIPTION: NA

2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED: N ㊹ DESCRIPTION ㊺:

8212220472 821217
PDR ADOCK 05000260
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Bobby J. Irby PHONE (205) 729-0841

Tennessee Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17
BF 15.2
2/12/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-260 /82039 Technical Specification Involved 3.2.B

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.(1) * Date Due NRC 12/18/82

Event Narrative:

Units 1 and 3 were operating at 99-percent and 78-percent power, respectively. Unit 2 was in a refueling outage. Only unit 2 was affected by this event. The last calibration on these switches was July 9, 1982, 22 days before the start of the outage. While performing SI 4.2.B-27 (Suppression Chamber High Level) level switches LS-73-57A and 57B were found inoperable. Technical Specification Table 3.2.B requires a minimun of one operable per trip system. These switches open HPCI suction valves to the suppression chamber upon detection of high water level in the suppression chamber. The Robertshaw model 82798-C3 level switches floats were stuck due to not being exercised since the unit went into outage. The floats were freed and level switches were recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned to service. It is most probable that the switches did not become inoperable until after the refueling outage began, when switch operability is not required. However, due to the test schedule, this can't be positively determined. There was no effect on public health and safety because suppression chamber water level instrumentation was available and operable. In the future, the surveillance instruction will be performed immediately before the suppression chamber is drained so that switch operability can be determined.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-296/81025

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP