



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-395/82-49

Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company
Columbia, SC 29218

Facility Name: V. C. Summer

Docket No. 50-395

License No. NPF-12

Inspection at V. C. Summer Nuclear Station near Jenkinsville, S. C.

Inspector: Vergil L. Brownlee for 10/19/82
J. L. Skolds Date Signed

Approved by: Vergil L. Brownlee 10/19/82
V. L. Brownlee, Section Chief, Division of Date Signed
Project and Resident Programs

SUMMARY

Inspection on September 1-30, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine unannounced inspection involved 190 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant tours, plant operations, technical specification compliance, physical security, maintenance and surveillance, inspector followup item review and 50.55(e)/Part 21 followup.

Results

Of the seven areas inspected, two apparent items of noncompliance were found in two areas (Failure to follow procedure; danger tags - paragraph 6. Failure to perform required surveillance; Service Water Pond level Verification - paragraph 7).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *O. W. Dixon, Jr., Vice President Nuclear Operations
- *W. A. Williams, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Operations
- *O. S. Bradham, Station Manager
- *J. G. Connelly, Deputy Plant Manager
- *B. G. Croley, Assistant Manager, Technical Support
- *L. F. Storz, Assistant Manager, Operations
- *A. R. Koor, Technical Services Coordinator
- *D. A. Lavigne, Director, Surveillance Systems
- *M. N. Browne, Director, ISEG
- *M. D. Quinton, Assistant Manager, Maintenance
- *V. R. Albert, Assistant Manager Support Services

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 10 and October 4, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. During these meetings the violation and inspector followup items were discussed.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Plant Tour

The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to make independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions radiological controls, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements. The inspector also verified that monitoring equipment was operating properly, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. During tours the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, adequacy of firefighting equipment and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts.

During a tour the inspector noted that a few snubbers on safety related systems had broken lockwire. This was immediately corrected by the licensee.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

6. Plant Operations Review

The inspector periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records including surveillance test procedure data sheets, instrument traces and records of equipment malfunctions. The review also included the control room logs, tagout log and the removal and restoration log. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness during plant tours. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures. Section 6.8.1 of the Technical Specification requires written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended in Appendix "A" to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Station Administrative Procedure (SAP)-201 "Danger Tagging, Section 6.5, requires that the Shift Supervisor authorize the hanging of danger tags. Contrary to SAP-201, danger tags on tagout 2813 were hung without the Shift Supervisor's authorization. This item has been identified as a violation (50-395/82-49-01).

7. Technical Specification Compliance

During the reporting interval the inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions and review of completed logs, records and chemistry results. The licensee's compliance with LCO action statement were reviewed as they happened.

Section 4.04 of the Technical Specifications states that entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement associated with Limiting Condition for Operation has been performed within the state surveillance interval. Section 3.7.5 of the Technical Specifications states that the Service Water Pond (ultimate heat sink) shall be OPERABLE with a minimum water level at or above 415 feet during Mode 4. Section 4.7.5 of the Technical Specifications requires that the Service Water Pond be determined OPERABLE by verifying that the water level is within its limit. Contrary to Section 4.04 of the Technical Specifications, Section 4.7.5 was not performed prior to entering Mode 4. The licensee was able to verify through log taken at the Fairfield Pump Storage Facility, that the water level did remain greater than 415 feet at all times since entry into Mode 4. Therefore, the LCO was not violated but rather the surveillance test was not performed to verify compliance with the LCO. This has been identified as a violation (50-395/82-49-02)

The inspector noted that the Sodium Hydroxide Storage Tank Hi/Lo Level Alarm was in an alarmed condition. The high alarm is set at 99 percent plus or minus 2 percent. The low level alarm is set at 96 percent plus or minus 2

percent. The actual level was 98 percent. At this level the operators do not know whether a high or a low alarm is present yet this level is normal.

The licensee is reviewing this matter. This item will be identified as an inspector followup item (50-395/82-49-03)

8. Physical Protection

The inspector verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followed.

An apparent violation of the Physical Security Plan was identified and is reported in Inspection Report 50-395/82-53

9. Maintenance and Surveillance Review

The inspector witnessed and reviewed the results of selected maintenance and surveillance activities during this inspection interval. The activities were reviewed to ensure that test instrumentation was calibrated, results of surveillance met the acceptance criteria, the test of maintenance was conducted by qualified personnel, and approved procedures were being used. LCO's were met during the activities and the system were restored to normal at the completion of the activity.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Inspector Followup Item Review

(Closed) (82-04-12) Iron-55 Analysis Results. The licensee reported the results of analysis for Iron-55 on a spiked sample provided by NRC. The results of 4.23×10 Mc/cc compared favorably with the 4.10×10 Mc/cc in the sample. This results in a 3 percent difference, which is acceptable.

(Closed) (80-06-07) High Hydrogen Alarm. This item dealt with the inability of the operators to determine whether the plant in an ACTION Statement of Technical Specifications concerning the concentration of hydrogen and/or oxygen in the waste holdup tanks. A log change was initiated to enable the operator to determine the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen in the waste holdup tanks. This will give the operator the necessary information to determine whether an ACTION statement has been entered.

11. 50.55(e)/Part 21 Report Followup

(Open) (82-49-04) Computer Analyzed Gap Requirements. In a letter dated September 15, 1982, the licensee informed the NRC of a significant deficiency involving the clearance requirements between safety related piping and its supports when the supports are box type guides. As part of

the Independent Design Verification Walkdown, three supports were found to have clearances in excess of the criteria. SCE&G performed A 100% review was made of computer analyzed box type guide and necessary modifications were made on several supports. This issue will be further reviewed at a later date.

(Open) (82-49-05) Piping Penetration Gap Requirements. In letters dated August 25 and September 22, 1982, the licensee reported a significant deficiency involving penetration gap requirements of safety-related piping. Some safety-related piping was found to exceed the gap requirements after a QC inspection due to the installation and seals. This will be reviewed at a later date.

(Open) (82-49-06) Incomplete Engineering Change Notice (ECN) concerning valves 9311 A&B and 9312 A&B. In a letter dated August 31, 1982, the licensee reported that valves 9311 A&B and 9312 A&B failed to be included in a required ECN concerning viton seals. This item will be reviewed at a future date.

(Open) (82-49-07) "B" Diesel Generator. In a letter dated August 20, 1982, the licensee reported a significant deficiency concerning "B" Diesel Generator. The diesel generator experienced a piston seizure during a test run. The seizure is believed to be due to excessive engine overload. This item will be reviewed at a later date.

(Open) (82-49-08) Pressurizer Relief Piping Analysis. In letters dated August 17 and September 8, 1982, the licensee reported that the wrong Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) cycles response time and stroking characteristic was used in the design basis analysis for the Pressurizer Relief System. This item will be reviewed at a later date.

(Closed) (82-49-09) Torquing Square D Breaker Lugs. In a letter dated September 13, 1982, the licensee reported that breaker lugs in 480 volt motor control centers and panels were not torqued as specified in the technical manual. A Nonconformance Notice (NCN) was generated to retorque the panels and a 100% inspection was performed. The inspector witnessed a portion of the retorquing. This item is considered closed.

(Open) (82-49-10) Misapplication of Cold Space Criteria. In letters dated August 27 and September 21, 1982, the licensee reported a significant deficiency involving the application of Cold Space chart analysis to small bore piping. A final report is due in mid-October.

(Open) (82-49-11) Misapplication of Jet Impingement Criteria. In a letter dated September 15, 1982, the licensee report substantial safety hazard concerning Jet Impingement Criteria under the provisions of 10CFR21. A final report is due October 29, 1982.

(Open) (82-49-12) Solid State Protection System On Line Test Circuit. In a letter, dated September 3, 1982, the licensee reported a substantial safety

hazard concerning the on line test circuits of the Solid State Protection System. This item will be reviewed at a later date.

(Closed) (82-49-13) Limitorque Motor Operators. In a letter dated September 15, 1982, the licensee reported a potential substantial safety hazard concerning Limitorque Motor Operators. The affected Model, SB-0-25 operator, was reported by the licensee not to be installed at the facility. This item is closed.