

7590-01

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONPUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANYDOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311CORRECTION

On July 27, 1989, (54 FR 31270) was published in the Federal Register which contained exemptions to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, related to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The following corrections should be incorporated:

1. Page 31271, Column 1, Line 53, change "1 & 2" to "12".
2. Page 31271, Column 2, replace Line 3 through Line 32 with the following:

"The rooms within this area are separated by hollow core metal office partitions except the air conditioning rooms, which are separated by a reinforced concrete wall. The two control rooms are separated by a 10-foot wide corridor. Room partitions between the control rooms and the senior shift and shift supervisor's office contain glass panels. The control rooms are separated from their associated control equipment rooms by built-in steel frame control cabinets. Dropped ceilings are finished with acoustic tile."

3. Page 31272, Column 1, Line 5, change "1006" to "100G".
4. Page 31272, Column 2, Line 35, change "781" to "78I".
5. Page 31272, replace Column 2, Line 37 to Column 3, Line 44, with the following:

"4.1 Exemption Requested

An exemption was requested from Section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires the separation of redundant cables and equipment by hour rated fire barriers plus area-wide suppression and detection. Specifically, these locations are not protected by automatic fire suppression system or area-wide fire detection systems.

4.2 Discussion

This fire area consists of the mechanical penetration areas on elevations 78 feet and 100 feet of the auxiliary building. It is constructed of reinforced concrete with 3-hour fire rated barriers. Doors, dampers, and HVAC duct penetrations are not 3-hour rated; however, these are the subject of a generic exemption previously evaluated to be acceptable.

Elevation 100 ft contains the fuel handling area exhaust ventilation equipment and the containment pressure relief exhaust unit and the steam generator blowdown tanks. The area also contains some safety-related instrument panels. Elevation 78 ft. contains piping for various systems which run between the auxiliary and the containment building. The area also contains service water piping which enters the auxiliary building from the service water intake structure. Partial area fire detection is provided for the protection of the major fire hazards on elevations 78 ft. and 100 ft. Continuous thermal strip detectors are also provided to protect charcoal filters in the ventilation units. Additionally, automatic fire suppression is provided in the ventilation units by a water deluge spray system actuated by the thermal strip detectors. Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations are also provided on elevation 100 ft.

The redundant equipment located in this area includes piping and valves associated with the following systems:

- Auxiliary Feedwater
- Component Cooling
- Charging System
- Containment Ventilation
- Service Water
- Residual Heat Removal
- Main Steam

4.3 Evaluation

The fire protection in this area does not comply with the technical requirements of Section III.G.2.c of Appendix R because the redundant cables are protected by a 1-hour rated barrier but, without automatic suppression and area-wide detection.

There was a concern that a fire in this fire area could cause the loss of normal shutdown capability. The in-site combustibles in the Mechanical Penetration area will result in a total fire load of approximately 28,000 BTU/ft² (21 minutes on the ASTM time-temperature curve). The major combustibles in this area consist

of the charcoal filters and electrical cable insulation. The charcoal filters are protected by automatic deluge suppression systems. The electrical cables are widely dispersed and protected by the partial detection system. There is a reasonable assurance that a fire in this area will be detected by the partial fire detection system in its early stages and extinguished by the fixed fire suppression system or the fire brigade before adjacent safety-related areas are threatened. The 1-hour fire barriers would maintain one division of cables needed for safe shutdown free of fire damage until the fire brigade could extinguish the fire.

4.4 Conclusion

Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the existing fire protection features already in place combined with the 1-hour fire barriers in the above described fire areas provide a level of fire protection equivalent to the technical requirements of Section III.G.2.c of Appendix R. Therefore, the exemption is granted."

6. Page 31275, Column 1, Line 8, change "Panel 35" to "Panel 355".
7. Page 31275, Column 3, Line 67, change "1&2 FA-AB-122A" to "12 FA-AB-122A".
8. Page 31276, Column 1, Line 16, change "781" to "78I".
9. Page 31276, Column 1, replace Lines 18 through 24 with the following:

"7. Lack of complete 1-hour fire rated barriers between redundant shutdown systems in the 460V switchgear room. (Areas 1&2 FA-AB-84A) (Licensee Exemption 6);"
10. Page 31276, Column 1, replace Lines 30 through 33 with the following:

"9. Lack of complete 1-hour fire rated barriers between redundant shutdown system and a manually actuated fire suppression system in lieu of an automatic system in the 4160V switchgear room (Areas 1&2 FA-AB-64A) (Licensee Exemption 9);"

11. Page 31276, Column 1, Line 46, change "45A" to "45A and B".

Dated this day at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of June, 1994.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Charles L. Miller

Charles L. Miller, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ENCLOSURE 3

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