THE RESTENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

22 NAV 15 A 9 : 290 Chestnut Street Tower II

November 8, 1982

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

ANTALUS

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/82-20 AND 50-328/82-20 - RESPONSE TO VIOLATION

The subject OIE inspection report dated October 7, 1982 from D. M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris cited TVA with one Severity Level V Violation. Enclosed is our response to the subject inspection report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FIS 858-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure) Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/82-20 AND 50-328/82-20 D. M. VERRELLI'S LETTER TO M. G. PARRIS DATED OCTOBER 7, 1982

50-327, 50-328/82-20-01

10 CFR 20.203(d) and the TVA Health Physics Manual as implemented by paragraph III.B.6 of Radiological Control Instruction, RCI-1, requires that each airborne radioactivity area as defined in 10 CFR 20.203(d) be conspicuously posted with a sign or signs.

Contrary to the above, airborne radioactivity areas of the Auxiliary Building were not posted as required in that maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) of Xe-133 were exceeded on April 28, 1982, by the following amounts without posting: Elevation 669-4.52 MPC, Elevation 690-5.61 MPC, Elevation 714-50 MPC, Elevation 734-1.78 MPC.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement IV).

1. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

2. Reasons for the Violation if Admitted

On April 28, 1982, the auxiliary building constant air monitors and radiation monitor RM-14 frisking monitors indicated a slight increase above normal background. Health Physics immediately surveyed and collected air samples throughout the auxiliary building. While the air samples were being analyzed, additional data was collected. The health physics investigation indicated a puff (noncontinual) release of noble gases was emitted from the vent line of the boric acid storage tank. The noble gases were transported through the auxiliary building by the normal ventilation system. This situation caused the airborne activity to be elusive and the data collected from a previous air sample was invalid by the time the sample was analyzed. Therefore, the total auxiliary building was not posted as an airborne radioactivity area.

3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved

The boric acid storage tank ventilation system was temporarily modified to prevent the release of radioactive materials to the auxiliary building atmosphere.

4. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations

The boric acid storage tank ventilation system is currently being reviewed for possible future modifications to prevent inadvertent release of airborne radioactivity to the auxiliary building atmosphere. Health Physics has been instructed to properly zone all affected areas should the situation occur in the future.

5. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

Full compliance of 10 CFR 20.203(d) was achieved on September 1, 1982.