NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: S C H B R 2 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 1 (7) | EVENT DATE: 1 1 0 3 8 2 (8) | REPORT DATE: 1 1 3 0 8 2 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On November 3, 1982, at 1155 hours, with the unit at 80% power, Containment Fan Cooler,
0 3 HVH-3 failed to restart during the performance of a periodic test. The cause of
0 4 failure was determined to be a defective time delay relay in the motor breaker con-
0 5 trol circuit. This event resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by a
0 6 Limiting Condition for Operation as defined by Tech. Spec. 3.3.2.2.a which is report-
0 7 able pursuant to 6.9.2.b.2. The Containment Spray Pumps were verified operable in addition to the other three Containment Fan Coolers, so there was no threat to the
0 8 public health and safety.

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S B (11)	E (12)	A (13)	R E L A X (14)	H (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 2	—	0 1 6	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	A 1 0 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The defective time delay relay was replaced with a new unit. HVH-3 was tested and
1 1 declared operable at 1550 hours on November 3, 1982. This event is the result of
1 2 component failure caused by natural end of life. No further corrective action is
1 3 considered necessary.
1 4

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	0 8 0 (29)	N/A	B (31)	Routine Test

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	N/A

8212090128 821130
PDR ADOCK 05000261
S PDR

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0	N (44)	N/A

NRC USE ONLY

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GPO 917-926

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FOR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 82-016

I. Cause Description and Analysis

On November 3, 1982, at 1155 hours, with the unit at 80% power, Containment Fan Cooler, HVH-3 failed to start. This failure occurred during the performance of Periodic Test (PT) 10.1B. HVH-3 had been stopped during the test and could not be restarted. Investigation revealed that a time delay relay in the motor control circuit had failed which prevented the motor breaker from closing on receipt of a start signal. Further investigation determined that the time delay relay failure was caused by contact arcing which resulted in the contacts welding together. This failure is attributed to normal end of life of the relay.

This event resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting Condition for Operation as defined by Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.a which is reportable pursuant to 6.9.2.b.2. The remaining HVH units were operable, and the Containment Spray Pumps were verified operable, so there was no threat to the public health and safety.

II. Corrective Action

In accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.a, the Containment Spray Pumps were immediately verified operable. The defective time delay relay (63X) for HVH-3 motor breaker was replaced with a new unit, and HVH-3 was tested satisfactorily. HVH-3 was declared operable at 1550 hours on November 3, 1982.

III. Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence

This event is the result of component failure caused by natural end of life. Current periodic testing is considered sufficient to detect such failures; therefore, no further corrective action is necessary.