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December 3, 1982 MP-4446

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes
Regional Administrator, Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference:

Provisional License DPR-21

Docket No. 50-245

Reportable Occurrence RO-82-26/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-82-26/3L required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit l Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.a. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

E/J. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:mo

Attachment:

LER RO-82-26/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30) Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,

Washington, D. C. (3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,

Washington, D. C. 20555

ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-26/3L NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWL: STATION - UNIT 1 PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21 DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Steam tunnel high temperature instrument settings were found to be less conservative than those established by Technical Specification.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to occurrence the unit was shutdown for a refuel outage.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On November 4, 1982, at 1630 hours, while performing Steam Tunnel High Temperature Functional Test, six of the sixteen temperature switches, 261-16A, 16B, 16D, 18B, 18C and 18D tripped at 209°F, 203.9°F, 202°F, 202°F, 205°F and 202°F respectively. Technical Specification, Table 3.2.1, requires a high temperature main steamline tunnel trip level setting less than or equal to 200°F.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

Failure of the switches to trip at their desired setpoint is attributable to setpoint drift.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steamline tunnel to detect leaks in this area. This instrumentation causes a Group 1 isolation when the trip level setting of 200°F is exceeded. This setting of 200°F is low enough to detect leaks in the order of 5 to 10 gpm, thus covering the entire spectrum of breaks.

The sixteen switches are arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice logic system. Failure of the switches in question to trip at the system's ability to perform its intended function. The remaining switches were found to be within their required setpoint range and would have initiated the required action upon receipt of a main steamline high temperature.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The switches in questi and satisfactorily tested.

The switches are a Fenwal, model number 17002-40, with a range of minus 100°F to plus 700°F.

Similar occurrence: 81-05/3L.