RECEIVED

TELEPHONE

(714) 492-7700

REGIONVIER

Southern California Edison Company 1382 NOV 29 PM 12: 34 P.O. BOX 128 SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92872

H. B. RAY STATION MANAGER

November 22, 1982

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator Attention:

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-361 30-Day Report Licensee Event Report No. 82-125 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Letter, H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken (NRC), Reference: dated October 29, 1982

This letter provides the follow-up to the referenced interim report which was made in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.13b. The reported condition involved Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's) 3.4.1.4.2 and 3.4.1.4.1 associated with the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS). A final copy of LER 82-125 is enclosed.

As stated in the referenced letter, on October 1, 1982, decreasing water level in Train A Component Cooling Water Surge Tank T-003 indicated a leak in the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS). Additionally, since the CCWS provides for heat removal from the SCS while in Modes 4, 5 and 6. Train A SCS was declared inoperable.

An investigation revealed that the root cause of Train A SCS inoperability was due to a chain of events beginning with failure of CCWS Surge Tank T-003's level control switch 2LSH-6498. This high-level shutoff switch failed to isolate make-up water from the Nuclear Service Water System being provided to the surge tank. The surge tank was filled solid and the resultant pressure increase caused relief valve 2PSV-6403 on Train A CCWS emergency chiller to lift. Additionally, the increase in pressure aggravated a pre-existing tube leak in the Train A CCW heat exchanger. The leak was located and repaired as reported in the referenced letter.

8212070406 821122 PDR ADDCK 05000361 PDR R. H. Engelken

The CCW surge tank level control switch 2LSH-6498 was recalibrated.

The pre-existing tube leak is assumed to be the result of tube degradation caused by excessive impingement of seashells on the Saltwater Cooling System side of the tubes. As a result, an engineering investigation has been initiated to evaluate the feasibility of design modifications to the circulating water screens and rakes to preclude excessive seashell collection in the heat exchanger.

Since the redundant full capacity SCS train remained operable throughout the event, there was no impact on health and safety of plant personnel or the public.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact me.

Sincerely,

ntolary

Enclosure: LER 82-125

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information & Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations