Maine Yankee
RELIABLE ELECTRICITY SINCE 1972

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June 16, 1994
MN-94-59 JRH-94-142

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: (a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)

Subject: Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 94-007-00, Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) Subsystem Valve Not Locked

Gentlemen:

Please find enclosed Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 94-007-00. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Please contact us should you have questions regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,

James R. Hebert

James R. Hebert, Manager
Licensing & Engineering Support Department

JRH/jag

Enclosure

c: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Mr. J. T. Yerokun
Mr. E. H. Trottier
Mr. Patrick J. Dostie

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NRC FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	50-309	1 OF 2

TITLE (4)
Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) Subsystem Valve Not Locked

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
5	17	94	94	-- 007 --	N/A	06	16	94	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	7
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Jerry Maben--Shift Technical Advisor	(207) 882-6321

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

The Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSARC) and the Operations Department Manager requested Maine Yankee Quality Programs Department (MYQPD) to perform an audit of the completed Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) locked valve program. During the assessment MYQPD discovered that a one inch globe valve of an ECCS subsystem was not locked.

The valve (SCC-18) was not in its proper ECCS position. An inline valve (SCC-19) serving the same function and administratively controlled by a class "A" procedure was shut but not locked. Subsequently, SCC-19 was locked in lieu of SCC-18.

The function of the valves were to isolate Secondary Component Cooling (SCC) water to the chemical addition tank in the SCC system.

Maine Yankee Technical Specifications (Tech. Specs.) requires manual ECCS valves (and subsystem valves) to be aligned and locked in the position required for safeguards operation. SCC-19 was immediately locked.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	50-309	94	-- 007 --	0	2 OF 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSARC) and the Operations Department Manager requested Maine Yankee Quality Programs Department (MYQPD) to perform an audit of the completed Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) [JE] locked valve program. During the assessment MYQPD discovered a one inch globe valve of an ECCS subsystem which was not locked. The valve (SCC-18) was not in its proper ECCS position. A downstream valve (SCC-19) that served the same function and was more accessible was shut but not locked. SCC-19 was controlled shut by a class "A" procedure. Operations was informed about the situation and SCC-19 was locked. A Safety Issue Concern (SIC) was generated in order to track closure of this issue. Changes to plant operating procedures were immediately implemented.

The function of the valves are to isolate Secondary Component Cooling (SCC) [CC] water to the chemical addition tank in the SCC system. The valves could, if opened, divert a minor amount of flow (approximately 50 gpm) around the SCC heat exchanger and cause a decrease in available cooling to other ECCS components.

Maine Yankee Technical Specifications (Tech. Specs.) requires manual ECCS valves (and subsystem valves) to be aligned and locked in their safeguards position.

The SIC process required an evaluation to identify similar situations. Another SCC valve (SCC-397), which was also administratively controlled by a class "A" procedure, was subsequently locked to isolate a section of piping subject to a "block wall seismic failure concern" issue. A Primary Component Cooling (PCC) [CC] system inlet valve to the chemical addition tank, was not properly controlled by procedure and locked, but was previously tagged closed. This valve (PCC-16) also was subsequently locked. Changes to plant operating procedures were also immediately implemented.

Since the systems were aligned to prevent Component Cooling flow through the chemical addition tanks there were no safety consequences from this event.

Corrective Action is ongoing as a result of the SIC and a closeout plan has been implemented. A review of all ECCS valves will be performed to assure proper locking.

The cause of this event is human error through oversight of not listing the valves on the ECCS locked valves list.

Previous occurrences of ECCS valves being procedurally controlled but not locked are documented in LER's 88-002, 91-007, 93-008, and 93-015.