



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

February 13, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: John T. Collins, Deputy Director, NRC/TMI Technical Support Staff  
FROM: George Kalman, NRC/TMI Technical Support Staff  
SUBJECT: TELEPHONE NETWORK EVALUATION DURING INCIDENT RESPONSE  
ON FEBRUARY 11, 1980

Sequence of telephone communications:

1. Licensee telephone communicator called NRC trailer at TMI to report a leak in the make-up system. This call was made on a commercial line.
2. The communicator next attempted to notify Region I on the SS4 line. He dialed 93 and received no answer. He dialed 25 and was answered by a half dozen resident inspector sites.
3. The TMI NRC trailer picked up the SS4 line and was told by the licensee communicator that he was unable to reach Region I, he also stated that he had not notified NRC Headquarters (HQ).
- By this time the NRC trailer was in communication with the NRC representative in the control room (CR) on the SS4 line. Due to poor voice transmission on the SS4 line, CR established communications with NRC trailer via commercial line.
4. The NRC trailer notified Region I and NRC HQ on FTS.
5. The NRC trailer was directed by HQ via CR to hang up so that HQ could patch all parties onto one line.
- HQ had established telephone link with CR and Region I on a commercial line.
6. Approximately five minutes after item 5, CR re-established communications with the NRC trailer. The trailer patched in Region I on a FTS conference call.
7. Telephone communications were eventually shifted to the SS4 line. The CR, NRC trailer, Region I, and HQ were on this common line. The quality of telephone reception at the NRC trailer and the CR varied from good to unsatisfactory. Periodically, reception would become weak and unreadable. During one cycle when reception at the NRC trailer was unreadable, a switch was made to the OPX line.

February 13, 1980

8. All parties, CR, NRC trailer, Region I, and HQ, shifted to the OPX line. The quality of communications on the OPX line appeared to be the same as on the SS4 line. Periodically, reception became weak and unreadable.

The above sequence of events is relayed from memory and may not be completely accurate. However, it does establish that the emergency communications system is not totally reliable.

Note: At the time of the incident, the CR did not attempt to notify Region I or HQ on the OPX line. There was some confusion as to which line should be used for initial notification.



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