DEC 04 1986

Docket No.: 50-373

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Elinor G. Adensam, Director
BWR Project Directorate No.3
Division of BWR Licensing

FROM: Gus Lainas, Assistant Director
Division of BWR Licensing

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF APPENDIX-J TYPE-A TEST VALUE LINEUP - LASALLE 1 (TAC NO. 62136, AITS #8603318R6)

The Plant Systems Branch has completed the review of the subject issue requested by Region III (Reference: Memorandum From Carl J. Paperiello of Region III to Gary Holahan of NRR, August 5, 1986).

We have concluded that the gate valves for the feedline and RCIC system should be left open for the Type-A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test at LaSalle plant. The basis for this conclusion is discussed in the enclosed safety evaluation.

The review was requested by Region III and no licensee's information was needed for the review. Therefore, we have no input to the SALP.

Gus Lainas, Assistant Director
Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosure: As Stated

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*See Previous Sheet for Concurrence
(5520 DOCUMENT NAME: TYPE-A TEST VALVE LINEUP SER)

	:PSB:DRL*	:PSB:DRL*	:PSB:DRL	:ADBL	:
NAME	:SKIM/vs	:JKUDRICK	:LSHOLMAN	:GLAINAS	:
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON D C 20555

EVALUATION OF VALVE LINEUP FOR TYPE-A LEAK TEST

LASALLE COUNTRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-373

REFERENCE: MEMORANDUM FROM [illegible] PAPERIELLO OF REGION III TO GARY HOLAHAN OF NRR, "REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE-REVIEW LASALLE 1 TYPE-A TEST VALVE LINEUP", AUGUST 6, 1986.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It was requested that the NRR provide Region III with an evaluation of the licensee's position regarding valve lineup for the Type-A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) at the LaSalle plant. The valves in question are 1&2B21F065A,B on feedline and 1E51-F068 on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine exhaust line.

2.0 EVALUATION

The valves in question are remote manual motor-operated gate valves and they are normally open in the operating mode. The regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J) require the containment to be leak tested as close to the "as is" condition as practical. For sometime now, it has been the staff's interpretation that "as is" means that the value position for CILRT should be consistant with the one in a normal operating mode when those valves are remote manual motor-operated.

The feedwater lines (there are two lines altogether) penetrate the drywell to connect with the reactor pressure vessel. There are three isolation valves per line. The isolation valve inside the drywell is a check valve. Outside the primary containment, there is another check valve. Farther away from the containment is a remote manual motor-operated gate valve 1&2B21F065A,B. Shoul. a break occur in the feedwater line, the check valves would prevent a significant loss of reactor coolant inventory, and would provide prompt primary containment isolation. During the postulated loss-of-coolant accident it is desirable to maintain reactor makeup water from all sources of supply. For this reason, the outermost gate valve does not automatically isolate upon a signal from the protection system. Therefore, the gate valves should be left open for CILRT.

As noted previously, two check valves offer immediate isolation should a break occur in the feedwater line. Subsequently, the gate valve is to be remote manually closed from the main control room to provide long-term leakage protection. For other accidents, the gate valve can be closed once the operator determines that feedwater makeup is unavailable or unnecessary, thus providing long-term leak tightness as stated in the FSAR.

The gate valve 1E51F068 is on the RCIC turbine exhaust line approximately three feet outside of the containment. The turbine is steam driven and exhaust steam enters the suppression pool. As in the case of the feedline, there is a check valve upstream in relation to the gate valve, and it is used for an immediate isolation of the containment in case of a break in the line. The gate valve is motor operated and remote manually actuated. It is normally open during plant operation. The FSAR states that "the gate valve in the RCIC turbine exhaust is designed to be locked open from the control room, and interlocked to preclude opening of the in let steam valve to the turbine while the turbine exhaust valve is not in full open position". The table 6.2-21 of the FSAR also calls for an open gate valve position for a post accident as well as plant normal operation. Therefore, the gate valve in question should be left open for the CILRT.

3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on the design, functions, and intended operation, we conclude that the gate valves in question should be left open for the duration of the CILRT. It should be noted that the majority of licensees have conducted their CILRT in the past with these valves in the open position. Therefore, LaSalle would become consistent with past industry practice in this regard.