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June 13, 1994
C321-94-2050

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report 92-008, Revision 1

Enclosed is the Licensee Event Report 92-008, Revision 1. The revised portions have been identified by a bar in the right hand margin.

If there are any questions please contact Mr. Terry Sensus at 609.971.4680.

John J. Barton
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

JJB/TS/jjr
Attachment

cc: Administrator, Region I
Senior Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Oyster Creek, Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000219 PAGE (3) 1 of 4

TITLE (4) Technical Specification Shutdown due to Isolation Condenser Valve Inoperability

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
06	08	92	92	-- 008 --	01				FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>			
<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/>				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME Chris Lefler, Technical Functions Site Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 609.971.4411

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (16) (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced lines)

During a plant startup on June 8, 1992, one Isolation Condenser became inoperable. Technical Specifications required a shutdown. This shutdown is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

The cause of the shutdown was a packing leak on valve V-14-33 which was attributed to a scored stem. During the last refueling outage (14R), an inspection of the valve revealed that the stem scoring was caused by the stem being bent and contacting the bonnet backseat bore. During cycle 14, a review of the valve design was performed and the root cause of the scored stem was determined to be deficiencies in the valve design. The manufacturer's corrective actions to modify all six Isolation Condenser valves will be completed in the upcoming 15R refueling outage.

The safety significance of this event is considered minimal as the redundant Isolation Condenser was available for operation throughout the entire period of the valve inoperability.

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DATE OF OCCURRENCE

The event described within this report occurred on June 8, 1992.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

During a plant startup, one of the Isolation Condensers become inoperable. Technical Specifications required a shutdown. This condition is considered to be reportable as defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On June 8, 1992, at approximately 0535 hours, the control room received a report of a packing leak in the vicinity of the Isolation Condenser (EIS-BL) valves (CFI-ISV). At 0635 hours, it was determined that the packing leak was associated with the "B" Isolation Condenser steam inlet valve V-14-33. At 1400 hours, valve V-14-33 and the associated "B" Isolation Condenser were declared inoperable while evolutions were in progress to adjust the packing and prepare for the necessary post maintenance testing. This condition required the plant to enter a 30 hour technical specification required shutdown. The adjustment to the packing was unsuccessful in stopping the leak, therefore, valve V-14-33 was manually backseated to stop the leakage. The plant shutdown continued and at 2259 hours, all control rods were fully inserted. Cold Shutdown conditions were reached at 0410 hours on June 9, 1992.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of the shutdown was a packing leak on V-14-33 which has been attributed to a scored stem. This valve is relatively new and was installed during the 13R refueling outage.

During the 14R refueling outage, valve V-14-33 was disassembled and inspected to determine the cause of the packing leak. The inspection revealed that the stem scoring was caused by the valve stem being bent and contacting the packing gland as the valve was stroked.

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APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (cont)

During cycle 14, stem scoring continued. A review of the valve design was performed and the root cause of the scored stem was determined to be deficiencies in the valve's design. The installed disk does not contact the guides until the valve is almost fully closed. This contact is important for maintaining stem alignment in a valve which is horizontally mounted. Also, the valve stem packing does not provide adequate support to keep the stem from contacting the valve bonnet backseat bore.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The purpose of the Isolation Condensers is to depressurize the reactor and remove decay heat without reducing coolant inventory in the event that the main condenser is unavailable as a heat sink.

Technical Specifications require two Isolation Condenser loops to be operable during power operation and any time reactor temperature is above 212°F (except during pressure vessel testing). If one Isolation Condenser is found to be inoperable during the run mode, the reactor may remain in operation not to exceed seven days provided the motor operated valves in the operable Isolation Condenser loop are verified daily to be operable. As the reactor mode selector switch was still in the startup position and temperature was above 212°F, a reactor shutdown was required within 30 hours.

The safety significance is considered minimal as during this period the "A" Isolation Condenser was available for operation.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action was taken to stone the stem and repack the valve. Subsequently, the valve was backseated to minimize stem leakage.

During the 14R refueling outage, the valve was repaired by installing a new stem and a split packing gland with larger internal diameter clearances to ensure stem clearances.

The valve manufacturer will provide the corrective actions to modify all six valves of this design in the next (15R) refueling outage. These actions include deepening the stuffing boxes, installing larger disks, and installing new stems.

SIMILAR EVENTS

None.