

L52 830-26 865

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TELECOPY TO NRC
Apr. 25, 1983

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

BFR0-50-259/83021

Reported under Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.(2)

Telecopy : Date 4/25/83 Time: 1315

Telephone : Date 4/25/83 Time: 1230

Person Contacted: Floyd Cantrell

Date of Occurrence: 4/24/83 Time of Occurrence: 1355 Unit 1

Technical Specification Involved: 5.5.B

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit 1 - Refueling outage
Unit 2 - 79% power
Unit 3 - 92% power
Units 2 and 3 were not affected by this event.

Identification and Description of Occurrence

One-hundred thirty (130) fuel bundles were unloaded from the core and placed in a high-density fuel storage rack in the spent fuel storage pool, that had not been tested for proper boron concentration.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The qualification of the high-density fuel storage racks had not been thoroughly verified prior to preparation of fuel assembly transfer forms. This was aggravated by a failure to have properly qualified fuel racks documented in a plant instruction which would normally be consulted and readily available during preparation of fuel assembly transfer forms.

Other Related Events

None

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Corrective Action Taken or Planned

- (1) Fuel handling operations were stopped at 1355 hours to investigate the problem. Concurrently, a field change to the fuel assembly transfer forms was made to move affected bundles from an unqualified to a qualified fuel storage rack. Movement of fuel from the unqualified to a qualified rack was allowed to proceed, and was subsequently suspended at 2150 hours, for a safety analysis to address unloading of fuel in the untested rack.
- (2) Tag boards on the refuel floor and in the control room will be marked to clearly identify any untested fuel storage racks.
- (3) Plant procedures will be modified to document which fuel storage racks have been fully tested and a control form will be included in work plans related to installation of fuel racks to provide positive control for updating the affected plant procedures.
- (4) Second person verification by a nuclear engineer will be added to fuel assembly transfer forms.

J. A. Coffey
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Acting Power Plant Superintendent
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant