



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Hope Creek Generating Station

June 15, 1994

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT
HOPE CREEK GENERATION STATION UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-354

In compliance with Section 6.9, Reporting Requirements for the Hope Creek Technical Specifications, the operating statistics for May 1994 are being forwarded to you with the summary of changes, tests, and experiments that were implemented during May 1994 pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.59(b).

Sincerely yours,

R. J. Hovey
General Manager -
Hope Creek Operations

DR:WS:JC
DR:WS:JC
Attachments

C Distribution

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PDR ADDCK 05000354
R PDR

The Energy People

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OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-354
 UNIT Hope Creek
 DATE 6/10/94
 COMPLETED BY V. Zabielski *VZ*
 TELEPHONE (609) 339-3506

OPERATING STATUS

1. Reporting Period May, 1994 Gross Hours in Report Period 744
2. Currently Authorized Power Level (Mwt) 3293
 Max. Depend. Capacity (MWe-Net) 1031
 Design Electrical Rating (MWe-Net) 1067
3. Power Level to which restricted (if any) (MWe-Net) None
4. Reasons for restriction (if any)
5. No. of hours reactor was critical

	<u>This Month</u>	<u>Yr To Date</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
6. Reactor reserve shutdown hours	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
7. Hours generator on line	<u>591.1</u>	<u>2195.5</u>	<u>54228.0</u>
8. Unit reserve shutdown hours	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
9. Gross thermal energy generated (MWH)	<u>1840060</u>	<u>6946956</u>	<u>172910326</u>
10. Gross electrical energy generated (MWH)	<u>610520</u>	<u>2314710</u>	<u>57278664</u>
11. Net electrical energy generated (MWH)	<u>582046</u>	<u>2203407</u>	<u>54731091</u>
12. Reactor service factor	<u>83.5</u>	<u>62.7</u>	<u>84.4</u>
13. Reactor availability factor	<u>83.5</u>	<u>62.7</u>	<u>84.4</u>
14. Unit service factor	<u>79.4</u>	<u>60.6</u>	<u>83.1</u>
15. Unit availability factor	<u>79.4</u>	<u>60.6</u>	<u>83.1</u>
16. Unit capacity factor (using MDC)	<u>75.9</u>	<u>59.0</u>	<u>81.3</u>
17. Unit capacity factor (Using Design MWe)	<u>73.3</u>	<u>57.0</u>	<u>78.6</u>
18. Unit forced outage rate	<u>20.6</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>4.5</u>
19. Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date, & duration):
 None
20. If shutdown at end of report period, estimated date of start-up:
 N/A

OPERATING DATA REPORT
UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

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 DATE 6/10/94
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 TELEPHONE (609) 339-3506

MONTH May 1994

NO.	DATE	TYPE F=FORCED S=SCHEDULED	DURATION (HOURS)	REASON (1)	METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR OR REDUCING POWER (2)	CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENTS
1	5/1	S	0.0	C	5	Start-up following refueling outage.
2	5/14	S	0.0	B	5	Power reduction to support testing of digital feedwater system.
3	5/15	F	152.9	B	3	Automatic SCRAM during digital feedwater testing.

AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

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TELEPHONE (609) 339-3506

VZ

MONTH May 1994

DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL
(MWe-Net)

DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL
(MWe-Net)

1. 645
2. 912
3. 1078
4. 1062
5. 1057
6. 1057
7. 1060
8. 1000
9. 1056
10. 1056
11. 1057
12. 1039
13. 1067
14. 793
15. 564
16. 0

17. 0
18. 0
19. 0
20. 0
21. 0
22. 523
23. 971
24. 1044
25. 1042
26. 1044
27. 1059
28. 1058
29. 1041
30. 1044
31. 1048

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

MONTHLY OPERATING SUMMARY

May 1994

Hope Creek entered the month of May at approximately 100% power. The unit operated at full power through May 15 when the plant automatically shut down due to a problem with Feedwater Level Control. The Plant was back on line on May 21. As of May 31 the unit has been on line for 11 consecutive days.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
FOR THE HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

May 1994

The following items have been evaluated to determine:

1. If the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or
2. If a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or
3. If the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations showed that these items did not create a new safety hazard to the plant nor did they affect the safe shutdown of the reactor. These items did not change the plant effluent releases and did not alter the existing environmental impact. The 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations determined that no unreviewed safety or environmental questions are involved.

Design Change Package

Summary of Safety Evaluation

4EC-0070: This Design Change provides a demineralized water backflush system for the back flush and air elimination of the reactor instrument lines. The installation of the demineralized water lines and storage carts is in the reactor building. All installations and stored items in the reactor building are subject to the II/I criteria.

The demineralized water station that is added is not safety related and is not interconnected with any safety related systems or any system that is important to safety as described in the accident analysis. The portable demineralized water tank and hydric pump are tools to aid in the back flush of instrument tubing. A revision to P&ID M-18-0 and HCGS UFSAR figure 9.2.7 is required.

Therefore, this DCP does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve any Unreviewed Safety Question.

Temporary Modifications

Summary of Safety Evaluation

T-Mod 94-012: This Temporary Modification installed an electrical jumper across the #2 Feedwater Heater Hi-Hi Level trip switches and installed a temporary keep fill line to the low side of the level transmitters. This modification is performed due to spurious indications during power ascension and is removed at approximately 40 % Reactor Power. This T-Mod does not increase the probability or the consequences of an accident listed in Table 15.0-2 of the UFSAR since the worst case would be for water induction into the turbine resulting in a turbine trip.

Therefore, this Temporary Modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

T-Mod 94-013: This temporary modification installs temporary mechanical jumpers to maintain instrument air to air actuated components in various systems supplied by the riser being repaired. Instrument air is jumpered to itself therefore there is no new affect to other systems except for the routing of the air supply lines.

The worst case failure mode is loss of instrument air as described in the UFSAR Chapter 15. The loss of the jumpers would be identical to a breach in the instrument air system. Therefore the failure of the T-Mod would result in a loss of instrument air as analyzed. The temporary hose and fittings are rated above the normal operating pressure of the system and are controlled in accordance with plant procedures. Therefore the loss of air event is not increased.

Therefore, this Temporary Modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Procedure Changes: Summary of Safety Evaluations

HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0255(Q): "Degraded ECCS Performance/Loss of NPSH" This new procedure was created to implement the concerns documented in NRC Bulletin 93-03 pertaining to Post LOCA ECCS suction strainer blockage. This abnormal response procedure is intended to be used after the occurrence of a large break LOCA which has caused debris in the drywell to be blown into the torus. The debris could subsequently be collected on the ECCS suction strainers causing decreased suction flow to the respective pumps. The procedure would be used in conjunction with the EOP's and in no way conflicts with or negates direction provided in those procedures.

Therefore, this Procedure revision does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

Other Summary of Safety Evaluation

SAR Change Notice HCP.8-003, HCP.6-041: This proposal changes the Hope Creek UFSAR sections 9.1.2.3.3.2.2, 9.1.2.3.3.4.2 and 9.1.2.3.3.7.2 and adds section 9.1.2.3.3.3.6. These changes will allow the minimum temperature in the spent fuel pool to be 40°f. The current criticality analysis for the PAR racks (PAR Systems Corp. fuel racks) is applicable for the spent fuel pool temperatures of 68°f and above. The current criticality analysis for the Holtec racks is applicable for spent fuel pool temperatures of 40°f and above.

This proposal will change the description of the dropped assembly analysis of the UFSAR and this is a change to the facility. In order to account for the increase in reactivity due to decrease of the water temperature from 68°f to 40°f, the conclusion reached for the dropped assembly analysis has been changed. Section 9.1.2.3.3.4.2. has been changed to address the fact that the results of (K_{eff}) for the dropped assembly analysis is less than the results for the "KENO" reference case (industrial standard computer code used for criticality analysis). The original PAR calculations were used to support this conclusion. Since the resulting K_{eff} for the dropped assembly is less than the K_{eff} for the KENO reference case, the dropped assembly causes no adverse reactivity effects.

Therefore, this SAR Change Notice does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

SAR Change Notice 94-18: Hope Creek UFSAR section 9.5.1.2.3.2, identifies a surveillance procedure be performed every 7 days by site protection to verify the Diesel Driven Fire Pump Operability. A review of this statement indicated :

- > This referenced testing is considered to be in conflict with licensing commitments to NUREG 1186.
- > Section 9.5.1.4.2 discusses testing requirements for fire protection making this statement repetitive.

This Change Notice is to remove the misleading and repetitive statements regarding fire pump testing from section 9.5.1.2.3.2. This revision will not impact the basic design of the Fire Protection Systems nor modify any provisions of the Fire Protection Systems. As a result of the evaluation of this change, the SAR requirements of the Fire Protection Program such as fire prevention, detection, and control of fire hazards, the safeguarding of life, prevention of property damage or loss due to fire at Hope Creek remain satisfied.

Therefore, this SAR Change Notice does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously described in the SAR and does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.