U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/3/2/3/8/3/ (8) /0/4/2/0/8/3/ (9)
DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On March 23, 1983, with Unit 1 at 100% power, it was identified that a stiffener /
/0/3/ / support had not been added to the "J" Bus Service Water Auxiliary Relay Panel as /
/0/4/ / required by Design Change 80-S45I (4kv Switchgear Wiring for the Generator Break-/
/0/5/ / er Addition). Since "J" Bus Panel was not subject to a seismic event and the "H"/
/0/6/ / Bus Auxiliary Relay Panel remained operable, the public health and safety were /
/0/7/ / not affected. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c. /
/0/8/ / /

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/E/B/ (11)	/A/ (12)	/E/ (13)	/R/E/L/A/Y/X/ (14)	/F/ (15)	/Z/ (16)

	LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17)		/8/3/	/-/ /0/1/6/	/ \ / /0/3/	/L/	/-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/X/ (18)	/Z/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/ (23)	/N/ (24)	/A/ (25)	/H/2/1/5/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The cause of this event was personnel error. The stiffener was not installed on /
/1/1/ / "J" Bus Panel although the procedure for completing the installation, including /
/1/2/ / Quality Control verification, was signed off as required. The stiffener/support /
/1/3/ / was added as per the Design Change instructions and pertinent drawings. /
/1/4/ / /

	FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/E/ (28)	/1/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/D/ (31)	/Advisory Engineer Inspection/

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
/1/9/	/Z/ (42)	/ NA /

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER E. WAYNE HARRELL PHONE (703) 894-5151

Description of Event

On March 21, 1983, with Unit 1 at 100% power, an A/E site engineer discovered that a stiffener/support for the "1J" Bus Service Water Auxiliary Relay Panel was not installed as per Design Change 80-S45I. The stiffner for the "1H" Bus Service Water Auxiliary Relay Panel was installed as per the Design Change. The additional stiffner (consisting of unistrut and a thread rod attachment to the panel) was one of several modifications to be completed on both "H & J" Auxiliary Relay Panels.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The Auxiliary Service Water Relay Panel ("1J" Bus) is utilized primarily to provide the relay logic for the testing and operation of the 4160 Volt "1J" Emergency Bus Undervoltage Protection. Since a redundant fully operable relay panel was available to operate the "1H" 4160 Volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage Protection, and the "1J" Relay Panel was not subject to any seismic action since the panel was modified to require an additional stiffner, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

The cause of this event was personnel error on the part of both Construction and Quality Control personnel. The reason for the work not being completed by the Construction personnel is not known since those involved are no longer on site. The Quality Control inpector involved failed to adequately review all of the supporting documentation prior to verification of the activity.

Immediate Corrective Action

After identifying that the stiffener/support was not installed on "1J" Bus Relay Panel the stiffener installed as per Design Change instructions and drawings.

Scheduled Corrective Action

None

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

An investigation into the event was undertaken by both the construction and Quality Control organizations. The Construction investigation identified the individuals involved and the amount of work subject to question. Since the individuals involved are no longer on site no further action was taken. The Quality Control investigation attributed the event to human error and indicated that the error was an isolated event.

The Quality Control individual involved in this event was cautioned to review supporting documentation thoroughly prior to verification of an activity.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications to this event.