



LOUISIANA
POWER & LIGHT


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April 25, 1983

L. V. MAURIN
Vice President Nuclear Operations

W3I83-0119
Q-3-A35.07.76

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012



SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3
Docket No. 50-382
Significant Construction Deficiency Report No. 76
"Damage to Pressurizer Heaters During Hot Functional Testing"
First Interim Report

Reference: Telecon from W. A. Cross to J. Boardman dated March 11, 1983

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 76, "Damage to Pressurizer Heaters During Hot Functional Testing". This condition was originally identified as PRD 108.

Very truly yours,

L. V. Maurin

LVM/MAL/grf

- cc: 1) Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555
- 2) Director
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- 3) Mr. E. L. Blake
- 4) Mr. W. M. Stevenson

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Interim Report of
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 76
"Damage to Pressurizer Heaters During
Hot Functional Testing"

Introduction

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes damage which occurred to the pressurizer heaters during pre-core hot functional testing. At present, this problem is considered to be reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e)(1)(iii).

Description of Problem

On March 10, 1983, Pre-core Hot Functional Testing was in progress with the plant conditions stable at a primary system test plateau of 460°F and 1100 psi for testing and equipment surveillance. Channel "X" was selected for pressurizer Level Control while leaking instrument tubing connections on the Channel "Y" system were being repaired by I&C technicians. Throughout the afternoon, unrecognized by control room personnel, the Channel "X" level control system erroneously indicated a pressurizer level of approximately 40% while Channel "Y" ranged from 31% down to 2.8%. Channel "Y" repairs had been completed by I&C Technicians but this information was unknown to Control Room personnel.

A low-low pressurizer level signal deenergizes all heaters to protect the heaters should they become uncovered. Channel "X" was selected for this function and due to the anomolous Channel "X" level indication, the pressurizer heaters were maintained energized while uncovered resulting in known damage to 21 heaters and suspected damage to the remaining 9 heaters.

Subsequent to the pressurizer heater damage, it was determined that the Channel "X" pressurizer level measurement and control system was inoperable due to leaks at instrument tubing connections and that Channel "Y" was providing valid level indication.

Safety Implications

At this time the full extent of the Pressurizer Heater damage has not been determined and the safety significance of this event is still under evaluation.

Corrective Action

Hot Functional Test Coordinators, Test Directors, and Plant Staff Maintenance personnel were instructed in the use of Startup Administrative Procedure (SAP-08), "Condition Identification and Corrective Action." Also emphasized was the need for proper approvals and communications with the Nuclear Operations Supervisor prior to and at the completion of maintenance activities.

Additionally, the full extent of the pressurizer heater damage will be determined and unacceptable heaters will be replaced or reworked.

Further information on this matter will be submitted to the USNRC on or before July 15, 1983.