NRC FORM 366 (12-81) 10 CFR 50

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

APPROVED BY OMB 3150-0011

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	A L B R F 2 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)
	LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	CAT

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE	L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0 (7)	0 3 2 2 8 3 (8)	0 4 2 0 8 3 (9)
			DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With unit 2 at 38.5-percent power for refueling tests, CRD 10-39 failed to scram

0 3 while performing SI 4.3.C as required by T.S. 3.3.C. The scram signal was

0 4 initiated from the auxiliary instrument room per SI 4.3.C/RTI-5. All other CRD's

0 5 were operable. There was no effect on the public health and safety. Redundant

0 6 systems were available and operable (SLC). T.S. 3.3.A.2.f allows plant operation

0 7 with an inoperable control rod.

0 8

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	R B (11)	E (12)	B (13)	V A L V E X (14)	E (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 3	—	0 1 0	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
B (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	L (25)	H 0 3 7

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Valve 85-617 (Hancock 950W) was found to have the valve stem separated from the

1 1 valve seat, blocking the scram discharge water path and causing failure to scram.

1 2 The CRD was inserted to "00" with drive pressure and tagged. The valve was

1 3 repaired and successfully tested per SI 4.3.C/RTI-5. This is a random event and

1 4 no recurrence control is required.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	C (28)	0 3 8 (29)	NA	B (31)	Surveillance Testing

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	(38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	NA

8304280260 830420
PDR ADOCK 05000260
S PDR

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER M. D. Wingo PHONE (205)729-0845

Tennessee Valley Authority
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17
BF 15.2
2/19/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 83010 Technical Specification Involved 3.3.C

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.2 * Date Due NRC 4-21-83

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was at 91-percent power and steady state. Unit 3 was at 99-percent power and steady state. These units were unaffected by this event. Unit 2 was at 38.5-percent power and holding for testing per Surveillance Instruction 4.3.C/RTI-5.

Upon attempting to scram CRD 10-39 from the auxiliary instrument room during the performance of 4.3.C/RTI-5, the CRD failed to scram and therefore could not satisfy Technical Specification 3.3.C requirements. Investigation revealed valve 85-617 was closed as a result of the stem being separated from the valve seat. The valve had appeared to be open. This valve is the manual isolation valve between the scram discharge header and the scram outlet valve. It is suspected that this condition had existed only since startup from the refueling outage since the rod was scrammed satisfactorily on July 3, 1982, to enter the refueling outage. The CRD was operable with drive pressure. All other 184 CRDs were operable and

* Previous Similar Events: (Continued)

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP

LER Supplemental Information

Event Narrative:

SLC was operable. The CRD was inserted to "00" and tagged out; the three (3) other symmetric CRDs were inserted to "00". Upon the unit shutdown for maintenance, the 85-617 valve was repaired. The CRD was successfully tested per Surveillance Instruction 4.3.C/RTI-5 when the unit returned to service. This valve problem is of a random nature requiring no recurrence control.

Technical Specification 3.3.A.2.f allows plant operation with an inoperable control rod. There was no effect on the health or safety of the public.