

APPENDIX

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Report: 50-267/83-07

License: DPR-34

Docket: 50-267

Category: 5

Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado
P. O. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201

Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection at: Fort St. Vrain Site, Platteville, Colorado

Inspection Conducted: March 1-31, 1983

Inspectors: T. F. Westerman for 4-11-83
M. W. Dickerson, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector Date

T. F. Westerman for 4-11-83
G. L. Plumlee III, Resident Reactor Inspector Date

Approved: T. F. Westerman 4-11-83
T. F. Westerman, Chief
Reactor Project Section A

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted March 1-31, 1983 (Report: 50-267/83-07)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of Operational Safety Verification; Surveillance; Maintenance; Review of Plant Operations; IE Bulletins Follow Up; Follow Up of Previous Inspection Findings; and Review of Periodic and Special Reports. The inspection involved 261 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

T. Borst, Radiation Protection Manager
R. Burchfield, Results Engineering Supervisor
W. Craine, Superintendent of Maintenance
R. Craun, Site Engineering Supervisor
M. Denniston, Shift Supervisor
D. Evans, Shift Supervisor
W. Franek, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager
W. Franklin, Shift Supervisor
C. Fuller, Technical Services Engineering Supervisor
J. Gahm, QA Manager
E. Hill, Operations Manager
J. Jackson, QA/QC Supervisor
J. Liebelt, Senior Maintenance Supervisor
M. McBride, Technical/Administrative Services Manager
T. Orlin, Superintendent QA Services
G. Redmond, Maintenance QC Supervisor
G. Reigel, Shift Supervisor
T. Schleiger, Health Physics Supervisor
L. Singleton, Superintendent Operations QA
J. Van Dyke, Shift Supervisor
D. Warembourg, Manager Nuclear Production
R. Webb, Maintenance Supervisor
W. Woodard, Health Physicist

The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel including reactor operators, maintenance men, electricians, technicians, and administrative personnel.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Violation (50-267/8218-01): Required Data Not Taken. Surveillance SR 5.2.3-X, Tendon Load Cell Check, Issue 12 dated February 17, 1983, now appears adequate to prevent further violations during performance of the surveillance.

(Closed) Violation (50-267/8224-01): Standard Clearance Point Form. Maintenance Procedures MP12-1, Control Rod Driver Assembly Movement/Replacement, Issue 6, dated December 15, 1982, and MP12-6, Maintenance and Repair of Control Rod Drive and Orifice Assemblies, Issue 11, dated January 28, 1983, now agree. Specifically, they agree with regard to steps for preparing for control rod drive assembly removal and also appear to establish control over CRD breaker movement.

(Open) Unresolved Item (8124-06): Review and Rewrite of Surveillance Tests (CAAR-417). The NRC inspector verified from discussions with the licensee that the following surveillances have never been entered in the new format.

<u>Results</u>	<u>Tech SVCS</u>	<u>Health Physics</u>
5.2.16a-M	5.1.3-RX	5.5.3a-SA
5.4.1.1.6.c-R	5.1.5-RX	5.5.3bc-A
5.4.9-A2		

Maintenance

5.2.6-X
5.7.1b-X

(Open) Open Item (8208-06): SOP 21-02 Revisions (CAAR-499). The NRC inspector verified that the System 46 Valves V-461667, V-461668, V-461669, and V-461670 have been included in Drawing PI 46-10 but not SOP 21-02.

(Closed) Open Item (8218-02): Surveillance SR 5.2.3-X Revision (CAAR-532). The licensee's Issue 12 of SR 5.2.3-X dated February 17, 1983, contained the needed corrections and revisions.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The NRC inspector reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and the licensee's management control system is effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation. The review was conducted by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operations, and review of facility records.

Logs and records reviewed included:

- . Shift Supervisor Logs
- . Reactor Operator Logs
- . Equipment Operator Logs
- . Auxiliary Operator Logs
- . Technical Specification Compliance Logs

- . Operations Order Book
- . Operations Deviations Reports
- . Clearance Log
- . Temporary Configuration Reports
- . Plant Trouble Reports

During tours of accessible areas, particular attention was directed to the following:

- . Monitoring Instrumentation
- . Radiation Controls
- . Housekeeping
- . Fluid Leaks
- . Piping Vibrations
- . Hanger/Seismic Restraints
- . Clearance Tags
- . Fire Hazards
- . Control Room Manning
- . Annunciators

Procedures were reviewed and implementation observed for Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Release 837 and Radioactive Liquid Effluent Releases 659 and 663. The releases appeared to have been made in a satisfactory manner.

Clearance 5431 for P-2104S Bearing Water Removal Pump 1B was reviewed for proper preparation and verification of breaker, valves, and handswitch position and tagging as required.

During the followup of an event that occurred on March 17, 1983, at 9:18 a.m. MST, resulting in a reactor scram and delay in the fast transfer of the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT), to the reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT), the NRC inspector determined a potential problem with Operations Procedure SOP 92-02. SOP 92-02, Revision 6, dated May 23, 1979, Step 2.2.1 for placing the UAT in service did not contain provisions in order to establish fast transfer sequencing by requiring lockout relays to be reset in a particular sequence.

This was discussed with the licensee. The NRC inspector informed the licensee that this is considered an open item (8307-01) pending revision to SOP 92-02 incorporating instructions that ensure lockout relays are reset.

During a plant tour, the NRC inspector questioned the traceability of some reserve shutdown (RSD) material that was stored on Level 11 of the turbine building. Apparently this material had just previously been moved to the turbine building after being stored on the refueling deck of the reactor building inside a radiation control area for approximately 10 years. The NRC inspector determined that some of the RSD material was stored in an unmarked Rubbermaid container and some in a barrel marked with a lot number but no purchase order number.

The licensee was informed of the NRC inspector's concern as to whether or not this RSD material was acceptable for quality related applications. The licensee informed the NRC inspector that this material was disposed of upon their determination that the material was not traceable as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

The NRC inspector performed a walkdown of the Electrical System 92 to verify system operability by performing the following:

- . Confirm that the system lineup matched plant drawing and current plant conditions.
- . Identify equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance.
- . Inspect interior of breaker and electrical cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, etc.
- . Verify breakers properly positioned.

The NRC inspector identified the following problems:

- . Numerous 4kV switchgear breaker position and relay reset lights were not operable.
- . The breaker for the backup power to the technical support building was not on the Plant Drawing E-1008.
- . Numerous breakers are physically located within a switchgear contrary to the position indicated in the Plant E drawings.

The above problems were discussed with the licensee. The licensee has initiated corrective action by including 4kV indicating lamps on a weekly electrician inspection program and initiating action requests to have the Plant E drawings corrected.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Surveillance (Monthly)

The NRC inspector reviewed aspects of surveillance testing involving safety-related systems. The review included observation and review relative to Technical Specification requirements. The surveillance tests reviewed and observed were:

SR 5.8.1abc-M Radioactive Gaseous Effluent System Test (Release 837)

SR 5.8.2bc-M Radioactive Liquid Effluent System Instrumentation Functional Test (Releases 659 and 663)

SR 5.4.1.2.5.a-M/5.4.1.2.5.c-R Steam Generator Penetration Pressure Test/Calibration

SR 5.2.9-M Helium Circulator Bearing Water Accumulator Functional Test

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance (Monthly)

The NRC inspector reviewed records and observed work in progress to ascertain that the following maintenance activities were being conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate Codes and Standards. The following maintenance activities were reviewed and observed:

- CN 1480/CWP 82-108 Installation of Buffer Helium Vent Line
- CN 1633/CWP 83-25 Relocate Valve PV-21243-1
- PTR 3-516 Repair C2104 "D" Circulator Steam Outlet to Steam Inlet Pipe Flange Leak in Accordance With MP 21-15 "Helium Circulator Change Out Procedure" as Modified by Procedure Deviation Report 83-102 and MP 100 "General Welding Procedure"
- CN 1536/Cwp 82-201 Assign Conduit Designation, Reroute Existing Cables
- CN 1280A/CWP 83-10 Install Bar Straps on Four Masonary Block Walls
- CN 1169/CWP 82-253 Move ACM Batteries Indoors
- CN 1169 Reissue A
- CWP 82-232 Install Conduit From ACM Diesel to Evaporative Cooler Building

Two items regarding CN 1169 movement of the ACM batteries to the evaporative cooler building were discussed with the licensee. These were:

- 1) Corrective actions or instructions to the operators for auxiliary ventilation if normal ventilation is not available in the building for an extended period of time during which significant hydrogen generation is occurring, and
- 2) The present commitment to the NRC to keep the doors to the ACM diesel generator room locked. The latter question is now pertinent since the batteries were moved from the ACM compartments to the evaporative cooler building. These two matters will remain as an open item (8307-02).

During a review of CN 1480/CWP 82-108, the NRC inspector identified the following problems:

- . Sketch on page B-48 referred to "Buffer Helium Vent Loop 2," however, the sketch was of the Loop 1 vent control valve.
- . Page B-6, Section XIII, Accident Analysis, was not clear as to its meaning as worded.

- . Page B-6 under Section XII, Electrical Analysis, contained an incomplete page reference.
- . CWP 82-108 did not contain a provision that would ensure that Surveillance SR 5.10.4b-X, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Post Maintenance Inspection, was performed immediately following any maintenance which disturbs the retardant material to verify that the seal was returned to its previous condition.
- . The seismic analysis was not signed/dated by the Seismic Piping Program Project Coordinator (SPRP) as required by Procedure ENG-9.

These problems were discussed with the licensee. The licensee informed the NRC inspector that a reissue of CN 1480 would be forthcoming to correct the problems identified. The licensee verified that the SPRP's failure to sign/date the seismic analysis was an isolated case after reviewing all change notices requiring seismic document coordination review by the SPRP. The NRC inspector informed the licensee that this is considered an open item (8307-03) pending the NRC inspector's review of the CN reissue.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Plant Operations

The NRC inspector reviewed the following aspects of facility operations to determine if they were being accomplished in accordance with regulatory requirements.

a. Review and Audit

The NRC inspector witnessed and reviewed portions of QA Audit QAA-1001-82-01, "Quality Assurance Audit of Procurement, Receiving, Storage, Handling, and Disbursement of Quality Related Materials and Services," to verify the following:

- . An audit report, Memo QAC-83-0149, dated March 3, 1983, was made to management.
- . Corrective action was scheduled for selected audit findings.

Eighteen Corrective Action Action Requests (CAAR's) resulted from this audit.

b. Training

The NRC inspector attended a requalification training lecture on the steam driven feedpumps controls to verify:

- . Lesson plan objectives were met.
- . Training was in accordance with the approved operator requalification program schedule and objectives.

c. Emergency Preparedness (Facilities and Equipment)

The NRC inspector verified by witnessing a sampling of the emergency kit audit that emergency equipment is provided and operational as described in the licensee's emergency plan in accordance with health physics Procedure HPP-37.

The NRC inspector witnessed auditing of the contents of the personnel control center, EAB and EPZ kits located in the Engineering/QA building, the portable generators Air-Pak's located in the search area located in the central alarm station.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. IE Bulletins

The NRC inspector verified by record review, observation and discussion with the licensee, the action taken in response IE Bulletins.

The following bulletins were reviewed:

- 83-01 Failure of Reactor Trip Breakers (Westinghouse DB-50) to Open on Automatic Trip Signal. The licensee stated that no Westinghouse DB-50 trip breakers are used at Ft. St. Vrain.
- 83-02 Stress Corrosion Cracking in Large-Diameter Stainless Steel Recirculation System Piping at BWR Plants. Not applicable to Fort St. Vrain.

8. Report Reviews

The NRC inspector reviewed the following reports for content, reporting requirements, and adequacy:

- Monthly Operating Information Report, February 1983
- Monthly Operations Report, February 1983

Summary of Radiation Exposures for the Year 1982
Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments, January 1, 1982 through
December 31, 1982
Environmental Radiation Surveillance Program Summary Report, July 1,
through December 31, 1982.

9. Exit Interview

Exit interviews were conducted at the end of various segments of this inspection with Mr. D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Production, and/or other members of the Public Service Company staff. At the interviews, the NRC inspectors discussed the findings indicated in the previous paragraphs. The licensee acknowledged these findings.