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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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	CONTROL BLOCK:	(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 7 8	A L B R F 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 LICENSE CODE 14	0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 57 CAT 58
CON'T	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10	7 0 13 12 15 1 8 1 3 8 0 1 4 1 2 1 2 1 8 1 3 9 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
0 2	During normal operation on units 1, 2,	and 3, while performing SI 4.2.A-13,
0 3	standby gas (SBGT) train "B" was found	inoperable due to erratic flow switch FS-65-42A
0 4	[(T.S. 3.7.B.3 and T.S. Table 3.2.A). T	he SBGT system is common to all three units.
0 5	There was no effect on public health or	safety. T.S. 3.7.B.3 permits operation
0 6	[for 7-days with one train inoperable.	SBGT train "A" and "C" were available and
0 7	operable. SBGR train "B" was inoperable	e for about 12-hours.
08		80
0978	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE S C 11 E 12 A 13 I I	COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE
	17 REPORT NUMBER 8 3 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. 0 1 8 24 26	CODE TYPE NO. 0 3 29 30 31 32
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)	0 1 10 1 10 1 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10	L"B" SBGT train was inoperable due to er	ratic McDonnel and Miller flow switch.
111	[Model AF-1. The flow switch was replace	
112		e flow switches presently being used are
13	expected to be replaced with differenti	al pressure switches by February 15, 1984.
14		
7 8	E 28 0 8 7 29 NA DI	B 31 Surveillance tests
	ACTIVITY CONTENT LELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LZ (33) LZ (34) NA	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA 80
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 NA	J
1 8	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41 O 0 0 0 40 NA	8304280230 830422 PDR ADOCK 05000259 S PDR 80
1 9	Z 42 NA	80
20	IN (44) NA	NRC USE ONLY
, .	9 19	68 69 80
	NAME OF PREPARER Stan Carter	PHONE (205) 729-0889

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-	259	83018	Technical	Specification	Involved	3.7.B.3	
Reported				on 6.7.2.b.(

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 87-percent power, unit 2 was operating at 68-percent power, and unit 3 was operating at 100-percent power. All three units were affected by this event. The standby gas treatment system is common to units 1, 2, and 3. While performing Surveillance Instruction 4.2.A-13, Calibration of Flow Switches for Standby Gas Treatment System Train A, B, and C Heaters, standby gas treatment train "B" was found inoperable due to erratic flow switch FS-65-42A (Technical Specification 3.7.B.3 and Technical Specification Table 3.2.A). There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical Specification 3.7.B.3 allows operation for 7-days with one train inoperable. Standby gas treatment trains "A" and "C" were available and operable. "B" train was inoperable for about 12-hours. The flow switch was replaced and SI 4.7.B-1, Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test, and SI 4.2.A-13 were successfully completed.

The cause for the erratic operation of the flow switch could not be determined; however, the most probable cause for failure was a weak tension spring.

The paddle type flow switches on trains "A" and "B" are expected to be replaced with differential pressure switches similar to those installed on "C" train by February 15, 1984.

* Previous Similar Events:

None

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: