

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | S | C | H | B | R | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T
0 1 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On April 10, 1983, at 1445 hours with the unit at 80% power, a service water leak
0 3 | was discovered on Containment Fan Cooler HVH-3. The service water to the unit was
0 4 | immediately isolated, and the unit was declared inoperable. This event is considered
0 5 | a degradation of containment boundary pursuant to IE Bulletin 80-24 and is reported
0 6 | in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.3. There was no activity released
0 7 | and no threat to the public health and safety.
0 8 | _____
7 8 9 80

0 9 | S | B | _____ | E | _____ | F | _____ | H | T | E | X | C | H | _____ | G | _____ | Z | _____ |
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
17 | LER/RO | EVENT YEAR | _____ | _____ | SEQUENTIAL | OCCURRENCE | REPORT | REVISION
REPORT | NUMBER | 8 | 3 | 22 | REPORT | NO. | 0 | 0 | 3 | 26 | 27 | CODE | 0 | 1 | 29 | TYPE | T | 31 | NO. | 0 | 32
83 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD (22) SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
B | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | N | 25 | W | 1 | 2 | 0 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | In accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.a, containment spray pump oper-
1 1 | ability test was satisfactorily completed at 1630 hours on April 10, 1983. The
1 2 | cooler leak was repaired, and HVH-3 was declared operable at 1525 hours on April 11,
1 3 | 1983. The leak is attributed to corrosion/erosion of the cooler tubing.
1 4 | _____
7 8 9 80

1 5 | E | 28 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 29 | _____ | N/A | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | Operator Observation | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | _____ | N/A | 35 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | _____ | LOCATION OF RELEASE | N/A | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) (34) (35) (36)

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | _____ | N/A | 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | _____ | 41
7 8 9 10 11 12
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

8304280135 830422
PDR ADOCK 05000261
S PDR

1 9 | Z | 42 | _____ | N/A | 43
7 8 9 10
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)

2 0 | N | 44 | _____ | N/A | 45
7 8 9 10
PUBLCITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

NRC USE ONLY

I. Cause Description and Analysis

On April 10, 1983, at 1445 hours with the unit at 80% power, a service water leak was discovered on Containment Fan Cooler HVH-3. The service water to the cooler was immediately isolated, and HVH-3 was declared inoperable. Further investigation revealed that the leak was confined to one of the six tube bundles. The leak is attributed to corrosion/erosion of the cooler tubing.

This event is considered a degradation of a containment boundary pursuant to IE Bulletin 80-24 and is reported in accordance with Plant Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.3. There was no activity released as a result of this event. Thus, there was no threat to the public health and safety.

II. Corrective Action

As stated above, service water to HVH-3 was immediately isolated. Also, in accordance with Plant Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.a, operability testing of the Containment Spray pumps was completed at 1630 hours on April 10, 1983. The leaking tube bundle was repaired, and HVH-3 was declared operable at 1525 hours on April 11, 1983. Although the total time HVH-3 was inoperable exceeded the 24 hour limiting condition for operation as defined by Technical Specification 3.3.2.2.a, the unit was returned to service within the 8 hour period allowed for the Plant to achieve Hot Shutdown conditions by Technical Specification 3.0.

III. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence

As a result of a previous inspection of the HVH units and an assessment of the Service Water (SW) system by the Corporate Nuclear Safety Section, a complete review of the SW system was initiated by Plant personnel. This review includes the investigation of potential cooler degradation throughout the SW system. The output of this review will be the development of recommendations and/or design changes to improve the reliability of the SW system. This action is considered sufficient to preclude recurrence of this or similar events.