
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April 22, 1983 MP-4988

Mr. James M. Allan Acting Regional Administrator, Region 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA. 19406

Reference:

Provisional License DPR-21

Docket No. 50-245

Reportable Occurrence RO 83-13/3L

Dear Mr. Allan:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO 83-13/3L required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

F. J. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:mo

Attachment: LER RO 83-13/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30) Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,

Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,

Washington, D. C. 20555

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# ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-13/3L NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 PROVISIONAL LICENSE NO. DPR-21 DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

# IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation occurred when the FWCI (feed water coolant injection) subsystem was inoperable.

# CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to occurrence the unit was decreasing power from 2 percent of rated with reactor pressure and temperature at 560 psig and 480°F respectively.

## DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On March 24, 1983, at 2205 hours, while controlling reactor vessel level on the 10 percent bypass valve (with the feedwater regulating valve controller in the automatic position and the blocking valves closed), a high flow condition resulted when the blocking valve was opened in an attempt to maintain reactor vessel level. This caused the reactor feed pump and booster pump to trip on low suction pressure. Repeated attempts to restart both pumps failed.

Because the same conditions would have existed during FWCI initiation, the FWCI subsystem would not have been available to perform its intended function. Technical Specifications 3.5.C.1 requires the FWCI subsystem to be operable whenever reactor pressure is greater than 90 psig and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.

# APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

A combination of high feedwater flow (through the full open feedwater regulating valve and feedpump minimum recirculation flow valves), and high differential pressure across the condensate demineralizers, (two in service), caused the low feedwater and booster pump suction pressures and resulting pump trips.

### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

Loss of the FWCI subsystem did not result in a condition that had not been previously analyzed. All other emergency core cooling systems were available and would have initiated the required action. Additionally, plant conditions that could cause the above situation only exists for a limited time during start-up and shutdown. Therefore, the probability of the above occurrence is very low.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-13/3L
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NO. DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

# CORRECTIVE ACTION

Operational testing was conducted on the FWCI subsystem to determine the system lineup required to maintain sufficient flow without causing a low pump suction pressure. Plant operating procedures were revised to reflect the test configuration that ensured FWCI operability at all plant conditions.