

Indiana Michigan  
Power Company  
Cook Nuclear Plant  
One Cook Place  
Bridgman, MI 49106  
616 465 5901



June 10, 1994

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Operating Licenses DPR-58  
Docket No. 50-315

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by  
10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System, the  
following report is being submitted:

94-006-00

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'A. Alan Blind'.

A. A. Blind  
Plant Manager

/sb

Attachment

c: J. B. Martin, Region III  
E. E. Fitzpatrick  
P. A. Barrett  
R. F. Kroeger  
M. A. Bailey - Ft. Wayne  
NRC Resident Inspector  
J. B. Hickman - NRC  
J. R. Padgett  
G. Charnoff, Esq.  
D. Hahn  
INPO  
S. J. Brewer

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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNRB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>05000 315</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 2</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**Seismic Gaps Found Filled with Untreated Styrofoam Behind Fire Seal**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
04	04	94	94	006	00	06	10	94	Cook Unit 2	05000 316
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	6	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME <b>W. M. Hodge - Plant Protection Superintendent</b>	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) <b>616-465-5901</b>
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO						

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 4, 1994, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, a seismic gap filled with untreated styrofoam was discovered in the Unit 1 East Main Steam Valve enclosure. The gap was covered with a fireproof silicone sheeting, which had degraded, exposing the styrofoam underneath. Two adjacent gap seals were examined, and were also found to contain untreated styrofoam. All three seals were declared inoperable, and compensatory actions per Technical Specification 3.7.10 were initiated.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the untreated styrofoam had likely been in place since 1979. Therefore, this interim LER is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

An aggressive inspection program was instituted to determine the total number of gaps filled with unqualified material, which required the use of destructive methods. It is expected that the entire population of gap seal fire barriers will be inspected by July 31, 1994. A revision to this LER will be submitted after the inspections are complete.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN FOR RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 800 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)  D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 1 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 9 4	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 0 0 6	REVISION NUMBER - 0 0 0	2 OF 0 2	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description

On April 4, 1994, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, a seismic gap filled with untreated styrofoam was discovered in the Unit 1 East Main Steam Valve enclosure. The gap was covered with a fireproof silicone sheeting, which had degraded, exposing the styrofoam underneath. Two adjacent gap seals were examined, and were also found to contain untreated styrofoam. All three seals were declared inoperable, and compensatory actions per Technical Specification 3.7.10 were initiated.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the untreated styrofoam had likely been in place since 1979. Therefore, this interim LER is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

It could not be easily determined if other gaps had this same discrepancy, as the styrofoam fill is normally entirely covered by the silicone sheeting. Therefore, an aggressive inspection program was instituted to determine the total number of gaps filled with unqualified material, which required the use of destructive methods. This inspection program has so far revealed 43 additional gaps filled with the untreated styrofoam, out of 325 inspected. It is expected that the entire population (486) of gap seal fire barriers will be inspected by July 31, 1994. A revision to this LER will be submitted after the inspections are complete.

In the event of a fire, the fire zones containing fire gap seals have automatic suppression and/or detection with the exception of 10 zones. This early warning suppression/detection system in the majority of the zones would alert the control room operators to any incipient fire and manual firefighting would be instituted, as needed. The zones without automatic fire protection features have relatively low combustible loadings, making it unlikely that a fire in these areas would breach the silicone sheeting over the gaps. Therefore, based on this defense in depth, this event does not represent a significant safety concern, or a hazard to the health and safety of the public.