MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT

April 18, 1983

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket No. 50-416/417
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/15525/15526/16694.4
PRD-83/03, Final Report, GE
IAC Overcurrent Relays
AECM-83/0246

Reference: AECM-83/0197, 3/18/83

On February 17, 1983, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R. Butcher, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns GE IAC Overcurrent Relays.

As previously reported, MP&L has evaluated this deficiency and determined that it is not reportable for Unit 1. Also, a Final Report was to be delayed until MP&L Project Engineering had determined whether or not the rationale supplied by our Architect/Engineer substantiates that there would be no impact on safety for Unit 2. MP&L has determined that this deficiency is not reportable for Unit 2.

Details are provided in our attached Final Report.

Yours truly,

ACP:dr
ATTACHMENT
cc: See page 2

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cc: Mr. J. B. Richard
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-83/03

I. Description of the Deficiency

On May 3, 1982, Mississippi Power & Light Company received GE Service Advice (SA) 721-PSM-168.1 concerning a problem with General Electric IAC Overcurrent Relays where two (2) of the three (3) specified insulation wraps were omitted between two leads of the operating coil of the time overcurrent unit. The Service Advice states that the relays were manufactured from January 1972 through July 1981.

This deficiency is not applicable to the NSSS scope of supply for either Unit 1 of Unit 2, in that GE did not supply the suspect relays to Grand Gulf.

This deficiency although applicable to the Bechtel scope of supply for Unit 1 was determined not reportable. MP&L Plant Staff conducted a field inspection to determine if any of the subject relays were manufactured within the time frame identified in the Service Advice. Plant Staff's investigation determined that sixty-three (63) of the subject IAC relays were furnished to Unit 1. Three (3) relays were located in the spare parts inventory, twenty (20) were used in safety-related applications and the remaining forty (40) were used in non-safety-related applications. Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE) -Electrical evaluated the twenty (20) safety-related relays and the determination was made that failure of any of the twenty (20) would not degrade plant safety. Therefore, the determination has been made that this deficiency is not reportable, for Unit 1, under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR21.

For the Unit 2 Bechtel scope of supply, an investigation was performed to determine if any of the IAC relays, noted by the Service Advice, were used in safety-related equipment. Twelve (12) relays were identified in safety-related applications. They were:

(1) - (6)	25BA1 thru 25BA6 - Meter and Relay Compartment - Device 51 N/T - Relay Type 121AC52A801A
(7) - (12)	26BB1 thru 26BB6 - Meter and Relay Compartment - Device 51 N/T - Relay Type 121AC52A801A

The design function of the relays is to trip on a bus ground fault condition. The bus would not be available in any case, since a trip would have to occur to initiate a challenge to the relay. Only one division would be affected at a time, since electrical design does not assume a fault condition on one division simultaneous with a single active failure on a redundant division.

For the Unit 2 Balance of Plant (BOP) -PGCC there were five (5) relays identified. They are:

(1) 2H12-P801 Device N41-M705(45IN/UT21) Relay Type 121AC51A801A
(2) 2H12-P812 Device 2R12-M701(25IN/T21B1) Relay Type 121AC51A801A
(3) 2H12-P812 Device 2R12-M702(25IN/T21B2) Relay Type 121AC51A801A
(4) 2H12-P812 Device 2R11-M704(15IN/T21A1) Relay Type 121AC51A801A
(5) 2H12-P812 Device 2R11-M705(15IN/T21A2) Relay Type 121AC51A801A

These five relays are non-class 1E and have no impact on plant safety.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications

Our Architect/Engineer and MP&L Project Engineering have determined (based on the single failure criterion) that any one device failure would not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant and that this deficiency is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) for Unit 2.

III. Corrective Actions Taken

For Unit 1, the three (3) relays located in spare parts have been removed from inventory. The replacement of the twenty (20) safety-related relays and the repair of the remaining forty (40) relays is estimated to be completed by May, 1983.

For Unit 2, our Constructor has determined that the corrective action will be to replace the nonconforming relays. This corrective action will be completed by October 15, 1983.