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USNRC REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA



Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

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
April 8, 1983
GM-83-314

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Special Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II, Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Section 3.13.1, ACTION 2 of Hatch Unit One Technical Specifications section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b of Hatch Unit Two Technical Specifications, please find attached Special Report No. 50-321/1983-003, Rev. 1.


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SPECIAL REPORT
50-321/1983-003, Rev. 1

LICENSEE : Georgia Power Company
FACILITY NAME : Edwin I. Hatch
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 3.13.1, ACTION 2 and Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b., required this report due to inoperable fire detection instrument's not being restored to operable status within 14 days.

Plant conditions at the time of the event:

Unit 1 was in cold shutdown, and Unit 2 was in steady state power operation at 1700 MWt (approximately 70 percent power) on February 10, 1983.

Detailed description of the events:

During performance of "FIRE DETECTOR SURVEILLANCE - SAFETY RELATED AREAS" procedure (HNP-1-3360 and HNP-2-3360), plant personnel could not complete the surveillance such that the minimum number of fire detection instruments (detectors) for the following fire detection areas could be considered operable:

1. CABLE SPREADING ROOM AREA
(Control Building 147 ft. EL.: Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, item A.3.3)
2. UNIT 1 REACTOR BUILDING AREA 130 ft. EL.
(Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, items D.1.1 and D.1.2)
3. CONTROL BUILDING AREA 164 ft. EL.
(Control Room: Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, items A.4.1, 2, and 3)
4. RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA
(Control Building 130 ft. EL.: Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, item A.2.3; and Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1)
5. UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING 130 Ft. EL. AREA
(Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1).
6. UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 2C and 2D AREA
(Control Building 130 ft. EL.: Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1)
7. UNIT 2 CORRIDOR AND WORK AREA
(Control Building 112 ft. EL.: Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1)
8. BATTERY ROOM 2C AREA
(Diesel Generator Building in Switchgear Room 2G Area: Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1)
9. UNIT 2 CORRIDOR
(Control Building 130 ft. EL.: Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1)

Following is the sequence of events:

1. February 2, 1983: Personnel performing HNP-1-3360 complained about safety hazards in performing HNP-1-3360 on fire detectors all over plant. Plant personnel performed a safety review and determined that fire detectors that could not be reached by either a ladder or scaffolding (for HNP-1-3360 or HNP-2-3360 to be performed) were not safely accessible. Personnel were then told to perform HNP-1-3360 and HNP-2-3360 on all fire detectors that were safely accessible.
2. February 10, 1983:
 - a. Personnel reported (upon completion of HNP-1-3360) that the minimum number of fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs. to make "CABLE SPREADING ROOM: CONTROL BLDG. 147 ft. EL., and Unit 1 REACTOR BUILDING 130 Ft. EL." operable could not be performed due to fire detectors not being safely accessible.
 - b. An LCO (1-83-020) went into effect for sequence of events 2.a. Also, personnel noted that the reason HNP-1-3360 could not be performed on "CONTROL BUILDING 164 ft. EL." was LCO 1-82-279 had this fire detection area out of service for modifications as reported by Special Report 50-321/1982-002.
3. February 24, 1983: Personnel reported (before completion of HNP-2-3360) that the minimum number of detectors as required per Tech. Specs. to make "Unit 2 REACTOR BUILDING 130 ft. EL. and SWITCHGEAR ROOMS (2C and 2D): CONTROL BLDG. 130 ft. EL." operable could not be performed due to fire detectors not being safely accessible. LCO's 2-83-35, 2-83-36, and 2-83-37 went into effect for the above sequence of events.
4. March 15, 1983: Personnel reviewing HNP-1-3360 completed data package (dated 2/10/83) and comparing this data to Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1 found that "RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA: CONTROL BLDG. 130 ft. EL." did not have the minimum number of fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs. to be operable due to the detectors not being safely accessible. On March 15, 1983, LCO 1-83-055 (Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 3.13.1, ACTION 2) and LCO 2-83-053 (Unit 2 Tech. Specs. section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b) were written on "RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA: CONTROL BLDG. 130 ft. EL." using an event date of February 10, 1983.

5. March 20, 1983:

- a. Personnel reported (upon completion of HNP-2-3360) that the minimum number of fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs. to make "BATTERY ROOM 2C (Diesel Generator Building - Switchgear Room 2G area)" operable, could not be performed due to fire detectors not being safely accessible. LCO 2-83-59 went into effect for "BATTERY ROOM 2C (Diesel General Building - Switchgear Room 2G area), SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 2C and 2D (already covered by LCO 2-83-37), and Unit 2 CORRIDOR AND WORK AREA (Control Building 112 ft. EL.)"
- b. As recorded in comment section of data package for HNP-2-3360, dated 3-20-83, the fire protection detectors for "CORRIDOR AND WORK AREA, Control Bldg. 112 ft. EL. (Zone 2Z43-NO33A)" could not be tested due to 2Z43-PO01 being in alarm condition. The 2Z43-PO01 was silenced due to welding setting off fire detectors alarms on LCO 1-83-46 on March 5, 1983. The welding in area affecting fire detection was completed on March 24, 1983, and 2Z43-PO01 was returned to full service with no alarm conditions present.
- c. Along with LCO 1-83-46 going into effect, LCO 1-83-41 on February 28, 1983, went into effect on modifications to fire detection panels in "CONTROL ROOM, Control Bldg. 164 ft. EL. and Fire Detection Cable Termination Box, Control Bldg. 147 ft. EL. This modification made fire detection systems inoperable for "INTAKE STRUCTURE, CABLE SPREADING ROOM, Control Bldg. 147 ft. EL., and CONTROL BUILDING 130 ft. EL.": also, this modification made "SPRINKLER SYSTEM CABLE SPREADING ROOM, Control Building 147 ft. EL." inoperable.
- d. On March 20, 1983, LCO 2-83-59 went into effect covering the fire detector areas already covered by LCO 2-83-37 and LCO 1-83-46: and including "BATTERY ROOM 2C AREA, Diesel Generator Building located in Switchgear Room 2G.

6. March 25, 1983

LCO's 1-83-65 (Unit 1) and 2-83-63 (Unit 2) went into effect consolidating all outstanding fire protection LCO's for each unit respectively. LCO's referenced in special reports that were consolidated are:

- a. Unit 1 LCO's: 1-82-279, 1-82-301, 1-83-20, 1-83-54, and 1-83-55.
- b. UNIT 2 LCO's: 2-83-14, 2-83-35, 2-83-36,

Consequences of these events:

Within 1 hour of each of the events' (fire zones) discovery dates, fire watches or fire watch patrols were assigned to appropriate areas of the plant to inspect the inoperable zone at least once per hour as required per Tech. Specs. The fire watches and fire watch patrols will remain in effect until affected inoperable zones are returned to an operable status. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

Cause(s) of the event:

1. Fire detectors' not being safely accessible for Cable Spreading Room area, RPS Vertical Cableway 130 ft. EL. area, Unit 1 Reactor Building 130 ft. EL. area, Unit 2 Reactor Building 130 ft. EL. area, Unit 2 Switchgear Rooms 2C and 2D area, Battery Room 2C area, and Unit 2 Corridor in Control Building 130 ft. EL. area, was attributed as the first cause of this event.
2. Control Building Area fire detectors were not accessible for performance of HNP-1-3360 due to modifications being made to the Control Building Area as previously reported on Special Report 50-321/1982-002.
3. The reporting of RPS Vertical Cableway 130 ft. EL. inoperable after event occurred was attributed to procedural error.
4. Corridor and Work area (Control Bldg. 112 ft. EL.) were not accessible for performance of HNP-2-3360 due to 2743-PO01 panel being in alarm condition. 2743-PO01 panel was in alarm condition due to welding being performed in fire detection areas as listed on LCO 1-83-46.
5. The Sprinkler System for Cable Spreading Room along with fire detection systems for Intake Structure, Cable Spreading Room, and Control Building 130 ft. EL. were out of service due to modifications to fire detection panels in Control Room, Control Bldg. 164 ft. EL., and Fire Detection Cable Termination Box (Computer Room), Control Bldg. 147 ft. EL.

Plans for restoring the instruments to operable status:

The following actions are being taken to make inoperable fire detection instruments operable:

1. Engineering and Maintenance personnel are walking down fire detectors presently termed not safely accessible to determine if a safe method of reaching the detectors can be found (expected to be completed by end of April 1983).
2. For remaining detectors not safely accessible, maintenance and engineering personnel will determine which detectors can be reached on a "one-time" basis to be replaced with heat type detectors or move detectors to a safely accessible location in their respective fire zones.

3. As methods are found to safely perform HNP-1-3360, the inoperable fire detection system will be made operable.
4. HNF-1-3360 will be performed on fire detection areas out of service for modifications when they become accessible.

Engineering is continuing to study other alternatives to our present fire detection system to find a lower maintenance, safely accessible, reliable, and cost effective fire detection system that will minimize our plant's problems.

Other action for cause(s) of this event:

1. Control Room Area modification completion is now expected to be the end of May 1983.
2. HNP-1-3360, Table 2 is being revised to include the Tech. Specs. requirement for RPS Vertical Cableway 130 ft. EL.
3. On March 24, 1983:
 - a. 2Z43-P001 panel was returned to service on completion of welding in fire detection areas covered by this panel.
 - b. The fire detections systems taken out of service per LCO 1-83-46 were returned to service due to completion of modifications to control room panels and fire detection cable termination box in computer room 147 ft. EL.

Fire Detection Instruments now restored to operable status:

1. Unit 1 REACTOR BUILDING AREA 130 ft. EL.
2. Unit 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 2C and 2D AREA
(Control Building 130 ft. EL.)
3. BATTERY ROOM 2C AREA
(Diesel Generator Building in Switchgear Room 2G)
4. Unit 2 CORRIDOR AND WORK AREA
(Control Building 112 ft. EL.)